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6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lafayette Car Wash, Inc. v. Boesgreen1 sentence2026See [Lafayette Car Wash, 282 N.E.2d at 839-40 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Christapher Batchelor v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2020In Batchelor, the trial court summarized the final instructions and then asked the parties, “We good?” to which defense counsel replied, “Yeah.” Id. at 554 . 2020In Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1844 | March 9, 2020 Page 12 of 21 Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 556 (Ind. 2019), our supreme court recently clarified the difference between the doctrine of invited error, which typically forecloses our review of a claim, and waiver, which leaves a claim open to review for fundamental error. | 1 | 1 |
Bunch v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Moreover, as our supreme court noted in Bunch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1285, 1287 (Ind. 2002), there is a difference between waiver as an affirmative defense and waiver as a “discretionary judicial doctrine that forecloses an issue on appeal.” Just as an appellate court “is not precluded from determining that an issue is foreclosed under a wide variety of circumstances[,]” including where “procedural default of an issue is an appropriate basis to affirm the judgment below[,]” id. at 1289 , a post-conviction court should not be precluded from considering whether a petitioner’s claims are entitled t 2013Moreover, as our supreme court noted in Bunch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1285, 1287 (Ind. 2002), there is a difference between waiver as an affirmative defense and waiver as a “discretionary judicial doctrine that forecloses an issue on appeal.” Just as an appellate court “is not precluded from determining that an issue is foreclosed under a wide variety of circumstances[,]” including where “procedural default of an issue is an appropriate basis to affirm the judgment below[,]” id. at 1289 , a post-conviction court should not be precluded from considering whether a petitioner’s claims are entitled t | 1 | 1 |
Douglass v. Irvingreen1 sentence1999See Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368, 370 (Ind.1990) (explaining the difference between this inquiry and that involved in establishing the defense of incurred risk). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Douglas A. Guilmette v. State of Indiana
green
2 sentences2017“The difference between the standard of review we apply to the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence and the standard of review we apply to the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence at trial lies in the facts the trial court can consider when making its decision.” Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38 , 40 n.1 (Ind. 2014). 2017“If the foundational evidence at trial is not the same as that presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court must make its decision based upon trial evidence and may consider hearing evidence only if it does not conflict with trial evidence.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kevin M. Clark v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2014Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 259 n. 9. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.