exculpatory clause in Illinois

2015The court explained that an exculpatory clause "attains efficacy only in a context in which the plaintiff may foresee the range of possible danger to which [the plaintiff] subjects himself [or herself]." Id. at 578 .

2015The court then found the assertion that a plaintiff could contemplate the danger of combustible cleaning compounds in a health club, and thereby alter one's behavior "untenable according to the standards of common experience." Id. ¶ 25 Like Larsen, we are unable to hold, as a matter of law, that a falling mirror is a danger within the scope of the exculpatory clause.

2025An exculpatory agreement will be enforced, absent fraud or -7- No. 1-23-1912 willful and wanton negligence, “unless: (1) there is a substantial disparity in the bargaining position of the two parties; (2) to uphold the exculpatory clause would be violative of public policy; or (3) there is something in the social relationship between the two parties that would militate against upholding the clause.” Id. at 584 .

2019Wheeler cites case law, holding that an exculpatory clause must be clear and explicit (see Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill.

2011However, “ ‘[t]he parties may not have contemplated the precise occurrence which resulted in plaintiff’s accident, but this does not render the exculpatory clause inoperable.’ ” Harris, 119 Ill. 2d at 549 (quoting Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d 82, 86 (1980)).

1993(Harris v. Walker (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 542, 548 , 519 N.E.2d 917, 919 .) Exculpatory clauses will be upheld in the absence of fraud; willful and wanton conduct; legislation to the contrary; where the exculpatory clause is not contrary to the settled public policy of this State; where there is no substantial disparity in the bargaining position of the parties; and where there is nothing in the social relationship of the parties which militates against upholding the agreement.

2010Thus, the exculpatory clause in the present case would not shield defendants from liability for fraud.” Zimmerman, 156 Ill.

2010Thus, the exculpatory clause in the present case would not shield defendants from liability for fraud.” Zimmerman, 156 Ill.

2017See, e.g., Allstate Indemnity Co. v. ADT LLC, 110 F. Supp. 3d 856, 862 (N.D.

2016See, e.g., Allstate Indemnity Co. v. ADT LLC, 110 F. Supp. 3d 856, 862 (N.D.

2014The trial court answered this argument even though it was not at issue at this point in time, finding, as I stated above, that defendants' conduct was grossly negligent in that they intentionally failed to act in the face of a known duty, demonstrating a conscious disregard for their duties, citing Sherman v. Ryan, 392 Ill.

2014The trial court answered this argument even though it was not at issue at this point in time, finding, as I stated above, that defendants' conduct was grossly negligent in that they intentionally failed to act in the face of a known duty, demonstrating a conscious disregard for their duties, citing Sherman v. Ryan, 392 Ill.

2010People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 515-16 , 670 N.E.2d 606, 621 (1996); People v. Adams, 308 Ill.

2010People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 515-16 , 670 N.E.2d 606, 621 (1996); People v. Adams, 308 Ill.

2011However, “ ‘[t]he parties may not have contemplated the precise occurrence which resulted in plaintiff’s accident, but this does not render the exculpatory clause inoperable.’ ” Harris, 119 Ill. 2d at 549 (quoting Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d 82, 86 (1980)).

1991The parties may not have contemplated the precise occurrence which resulted in plaintiffs accident, but this does not render the exculpatory clause inoperable.” 83 Ill. 2d at 86 .

2013App. 3d 407, 412 , 869 N.E.2d 195, 201 (2007). ¶ 25 In general, Illinois courts enforce a liability release if (1) the terms of the exculpatory clause are clear, explicit, and precise; (2) the exculpatory clause encompasses the activity, circumstance, or situation contemplated by the parties to relieve the defendant from a duty of care; (3) it is not against settled public policy; and (4) nothing in the “social relationship of the parties militat[es] against upholding the agreement.” Jackson v. First National Bank of Lake Forest, 415 Ill. 453, 460 , 114 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1953); Chicago Steel Ru

1981(Jackson v. First National Bank (1953), 415 Ill. 453 , 114 N.E.2d 721 ; O’Callahan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co. (1959), 15 Ill. 2d 436 , 155 N.E.2d 545 .) The exculpatory clause at issue in Jackson was contained in a business lease.

2015Because an exculpatory clause is strictly construed against the -5- party it benefits (Evans, 373 Ill.

2015Because an exculpatory clause is strictly construed against the party it benefits (Evans, 373 Ill.

2015Id. (“It should only appear that the injury falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity and, thus, reasonably contemplated by the plaintiff.”); Johnson v. Salvation Army, 2011 IL App (1st) 103323, ¶ 36 (danger causing injury must ordinarily accompany activity covered by release). ¶ 20 The scope of the exculpatory clause depends on the foreseeability of a specific danger.

2015Id. ("It should only appear that the injury falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity and, thus, reasonably contemplated by the plaintiff."); Johnson v. Salvation Army, 2011 IL App (1st) 103323, ¶ 36 (danger causing injury must ordinarily accompany activity covered by release). ¶ 20 The scope of the exculpatory clause depends on the foreseeability of a specific danger.

2004In Vaidya’s case, the court dismissed the negligence count based on Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 88-89 (1982).

2004In Vaidya’s case, the court dismissed the negligence count based on Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. , 91 Ill. 2d 69, 88-89 (1982).

2010Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that an agreement to purchase certain goods from a named vendor and pay for them if the hotel company did not was for the direct benefit of the vendor); (2) Resnik, 78 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (determining that an agreement in which the third party was identified as the user of the building being constructed and given the authority to consult with the contractor and revise the drawings and specifications was for the direct benefit of the user); (3) Bates & Rogers, 109 Ill. 2d at 233-3

2010Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that an agreement to purchase certain goods from a named vendor and pay for them if the hotel company did not was for the direct benefit of the vendor); (2) Resnik, 78 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (determining that an agreement in which the third party was identified as the user of the building being constructed and given the authority to consult with the contractor and revise the drawings and specifications was for the direct benefit of the user); (3) Bates & Rogers, 109 Ill. 2d at 233-3

2010Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that an agreement to purchase certain goods from a named vendor and pay for them if the hotel company did not was for the direct benefit of the vendor); (2) Resnik, 78 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (determining that an agreement in which the third party was identified as the user of the building being constructed and given the authority to consult with the contractor and revise the drawings and specifications was for the direct benefit of the user); (3) Bates & Rogers, 109 Ill. 2d at 233-3

2010Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that an agreement to purchase certain goods from a named vendor and pay for them if the hotel company did not was for the direct benefit of the vendor); (2) Resnik, 78 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (determining that an agreement in which the third party was identified as the user of the building being constructed and given the authority to consult with the contractor and revise the drawings and specifications was for the direct benefit of the user); (3) Bates & Rogers, 109 Ill. 2d at 233-3

2010Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that an agreement to purchase certain goods from a named vendor and pay for them if the hotel company did not was for the direct benefit of the vendor); (2) Resnik, 78 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (determining that an agreement in which the third party was identified as the user of the building being constructed and given the authority to consult with the contractor and revise the drawings and specifications was for the direct benefit of the user); (3) Bates & Rogers, 109 Ill. 2d at 233-3

2010Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that an agreement to purchase certain goods from a named vendor and pay for them if the hotel company did not was for the direct benefit of the vendor); (2) Resnik, 78 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (determining that an agreement in which the third party was identified as the user of the building being constructed and given the authority to consult with the contractor and revise the drawings and specifications was for the direct benefit of the user); (3) Bates & Rogers, 109 Ill. 2d at 233-3

2018Id. at 64-65 .

2012See Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Firstar Bank Illinois, 213 Ill. 2d 58 (2004) (affirming appellate court’s holding that an exculpatory clause in a safety deposit box lease agreement was unenforceable).

2025See Cox v. US Fitness, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 122442, ¶ 36 (in finding that an exculpatory clause in an agreement for a gym membership did not violate public policy, the court noted that “[n]o statute *** outright voids releases in gymnasium membership”); Zerjal, 405 Ill.

2024Id. at 911 (citing Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 548 (1988)).