exculpatory clause in Texas

2025See Castle, 134 S.W.3d at 283 ; Cone, 68 S.W.3d at 155 (“The gross negligence/willful misconduct requirement applies to any and all claims that the operator failed to conduct operations in a good and workmanlike manner.”).

2015See Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 741, 759 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.); see also Cone v. Fagadau Energy Corp., 68 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied).

2023In Grizzle, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed whether an exculpatory clause relieved trustees from liability for alleged self-dealing in misapplying and mishandling trust funds, such that summary judgment in favor of the trustees on their motion was properly granted. 96 S.W.3d at 247 .

2023Id. 32 In Kohlhausen, this Court considered on summary judgment whether an exculpatory clause relieved a trustee from liability.

2012The court held that “the exculpatory clause is limited to claims based upon an allegation that Abraxas failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator and does not apply to a claim that it breached the JOA.” Id.

2012The court held that “the exculpatory clause is limited to claims based upon an allegation that Abraxas failed to act as a reasonably prudent oper ator and does not apply to a claim that it breached the JOA.” Id.

2012The court of appeals noted that the exculpatory clause in this case contains the phrase “its activities under this agreement” while the contract in the prior case used the terms “all such operations.” Id.

2012The court of appeals nevertheless held that the exculpatory clause applies only to claims that Reeder breached his duty in operations and not to claims that he otherwise breached the JOA, because the clause is located within the paragraph describing “operations on the contract area.” Id.

2012In reviewing a verdict for legal sufficiency, we “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005).

2012In reviewing a verdict for legal sufficiency, we “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex.2005).

2023Littlefield v. Schaefer, 955 S.W.2d 272 , 273–75 (Tex. 1997) (noting that as a matter of law, an exculpatory clause will not be enforced when a party is not able to know what the contract terms are because they are unreadable); cf. Akin v. Bally Total 10 Fitness Corp., No. 10-05-00280-CV, 2007 WL 475406 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 14, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding release was conspicuous when the clause appeared in bold type and in part in larger type, was the only paragraph enclosed by a box, and was expressly referenced by paragraph number just above the signature line).

2012Id. at 275 (“Where a party is not able to know what the contract terms are because they are unreadable, as a matter of law the exculpatory clause will not be enforced.”).

2015This showing is not made if the exculpatory test results would "merely muddy the waters." Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim.

2015This showing is not made if the exculpatory test results would “merely muddy the waters.” Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim.

2001See Langford, 417 S.W.2d at 444-45 .

1977Appellees assert that an exculpatory clause like the one in the Gerdes’ will is void as against public policy and they cite Lang-ford v. Shamburger, 417 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

2012An exculpatory clause is a “clause in a contract designed to relieve one party of liability to the other for specified injury or loss incurred in the performance of the contract.” Howard Williams & Charles Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 372, 373 (12th ed. 2003, updated and revised by Patrick Martin & Bruce Kramer); see, e.g., Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas, 135 S.W.3d 605 , 612–13 (Tex. 2004); Dresser Indus., 5 Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 , 507 n.1, 508–11 (Tex. 1993); Tex. Gas Utils.

2012An exculpatory clause is a “clause in a contract designed to relieve one party of liability to the other for specified injury or loss incurred in the perform- anee of the contract.” Howard Williams & Charles Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 372, 373 (12th ed. 2003, updated and revised by Patrick Martin & Bruce Kramer); see, e.g., Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas, 135 S.W.3d 605, 612-13 (Tex.2004); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 , 507 n. 1, 508-11 (Tex.1993); Tex. Gas Utils.

2012The Fifth Circuit analyzed the same language and stated, contrary to the direction of the courts of appeal, that the clause’s “protection clearly extends to breaches of the JOA.” Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254, 261 (5th Cir. 1992).

2012The Fifth Circuit analyzed the same language and stated, contrary to the direction of the courts of appeal, that the clause’s “protection clearly extends to breaches of the JOA.” Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254, 261 (5th Cir.1992).

2012Co. v. Barrett, 460 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex. 1970).

2012Co. v. Barrett, 460 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex.1970).

1992Allright Inc. v. Elledge, 515 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex.1974).

1989See Allright Inc. v. Elledge, 515 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex.1974); 14 TEX.

2025Therefore, the court held that the exculpatory clause applied to a claim that the operator breached the JOA by “failing to maintain production in paying quantities” and failing to offer a well to a party prior to plugging the well, id. at 795 n.3, and that the plaintiff was required to show that the operator acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct.

2022In the Reeder case, the supreme court held that an exculpatory clause with similar language “exempt[ed] the operator from liability for its activities unless its liability-causing conduct [was] due to gross negligence or willful misconduct.” Id. at 795 .

2007Relying on exculpatory language in the rental contracts executed by jewelers who rented the bank's safety-deposit boxes, the bank had prevailed by summary judgment in the trial court based solely on the exculpatory clause in the rental contract, pursuant to which the jewelers who rented the boxes "assume[d] all risks." Id. at 412-13 .

2007Relying on exculpatory language in the rental contracts executed by jewelers who rented the bank’s safety-deposit boxes, the bank had prevailed by summary judgment in the trial court based solely on the exculpatory clause in the rental contract, pursuant to which the jewelers who rented the boxes “assume[d] all risks.” Id. at 412-13.

2025See Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 663 (construing similar language in a JOA and concluding that the JOA requires the operator to commence work no later than ninety days after formally proposing the operation to the interest owners but declining to address whether the operator was required to commence drilling or other preparatory work); Valence Operating Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 303 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (noting that the JOA “mandated [the operator] to ‘actually commence work’ and . . . ‘complete it with due diligence’”). 5 However, we must consider this duty in

2025See Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 663 (construing similar language in a JOA and concluding that the JOA requires the operator to commence work no later than ninety days after formally proposing the operation to the interest owners but declining to address whether the operator was required to commence drilling or other preparatory work); Valence Operating Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 303 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (noting that the JOA “mandated [the operator] to ‘actually commence work’ and . . . ‘complete it with due diligence’”). 5 However, we must consider this duty in

2025See Pathfinder Oil & Gas, 574 S.W.3d at 889 .

2023See Woods, 769 S.W.2d at 517 .

2022See Orr, 565 S.W.3d at 422 (“A question is immaterial if it has been rendered immaterial by other findings or if it should not have been submitted at all.”).

2019Exculpatory test results mean “results excluding the convicted person as the donor of th[e] material.” LaRue v. State, 518 S.W.3d 439, 446 (Tex. Crim.

2019App. 2017). 3 The preponderance of the evidence standard means that article 64.03 “requires the convicted person to show that he, more likely than not, would not have been convicted if results of the requested testing exclude him.” Id.

2018See Centeq Realty, Inc., 899 S.W.2d at 197 .

2018The Will plainly states that Kelley is not liable for any acts or omissions so long as such conduct was done “in good faith and without gross negligence.” See San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 2000) (stating court must attempt to ascertain testator’s intent based on plain language of will).

2014See Robertson, 187 S.W.3d at 484 ; Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 133 ; Garcia, 308 S.W.3d at 68-69 ; Stone, 17 S.W.3d at 353-54 ; see, e.g., Crews, 2014 WL 969964 , at *4.