8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Keystone Aeronautics Corporation, a Corporation v. R. J. Enstrom Corporation, a Corporation v. Foundry Allied Industries, Inc., a Corporationgreen2 sentences2006Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 150 (3rd Cir.1974) (interpreting an exculpatory clause disclaiming all liability in sale of used helicopters). {22} Based on these authorities, we conclude that the fact that the loss in this case arose out of consequential damages to commercial real property should not preclude enforcement of the limitation of liability clause, and Valhal does not support a different rule. 2006Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 150 (3rd Cir.1974) (interpreting an exculpatory clause disclaiming all liability in sale of used helicopters). {22} Based on these authorities, we conclude that the fact that the loss in this case arose out of consequential damages to commercial real property should not preclude enforcement of the limitation of liability clause, and Valhal does not support a different rule. | 2 | 2 |
Stromberg's v. Victor Gruen & Associatesgreen2 sentences1981Under these circumstances it cannot be said that such exculpatory clauses ... are `not a matter of public interest.'" New Mexico held that such an exculpatory clause did not violate public policy, Commercial Warehouse Co. v. Hyder Brothers, Inc., 75 N.M. 792 , 411 P.2d 978 (1965); see Stromberg's v. Victor Gruen & Associates, 384 F.2d 163 (10th Cir.1967), and the statutory modification, § 47-8-16, N.M.S.A. 1978. 1981Under these circumstances it cannot be said that such exculpatory clauses ... are ‘not a matter of public interest.’ ” New Mexico held that such an exculpatory clause did not violate public policy, Commercial Warehouse Co. v. Hyder Brothers, Inc., 75 N.M. 792 , 411 P.2d 978 (1965); see Stromberg’s v. Victor Gruen & Associates, 384 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1967), and the statutory modification, § 47-8-16, N.M.S.A.1978. | 2 | 2 |
Commercial Warehouse Co. v. Hyder Brothers, Inc.green2 sentences2004In addition, relying on Commercial Warehouse Co. v. Hyder Brothers, Inc., 75 N.M. 792, 798 , 411 P.2d 978, 984 (1965), Matrix contends that exculpatory clauses are disfavored in New Mexico and are to be strictly construed. {18} We note that although the parties disagree about the scope of protection afforded by the exculpatory clause, neither party argues that it is ambiguous. 2004In addition, relying on Commercial Warehouse Co. v. Hyder Brothers, Inc., 75 N.M. 792, 798 , 411 P.2d 978, 984 (1965), Matrix contends that exculpatory clauses are disfavored in New Mexico and are to be strictly construed. {18} We note that although the parties disagree about the scope of protection afforded by the exculpatory clause, neither party argues that it is ambiguous. | 1 | 3 |
Slide-A-Ride of Las Cruces, Inc. v. Citizens Bankgreen2 sentences2004See Slide-A-Ride of Las Cruces, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces, 105 N.M. 433, 436-37 , 733 P.2d 1316, 1320-21 (1987) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s denial of second motion to amend under facts of that case when two years had elapsed from filing of complaint, discovery was almost complete, and case had been set for trial three times). {24} In light of our holdings that Ricks complied with the notice requirement of the JO A, that the exculpatory clause shielded Ricks from liability, and that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying Matrix’s motion to 2004See Slide-A-Ride of Las Cruces, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces, 105 N.M. 433, 436-37 , 733 P.2d 1316, 1320-21 (1987) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s denial of second motion to amend under facts of that case when two years had elapsed from filing of complaint, discovery was almost complete, and case had been set for trial three times). {24} In light of our holdings that Ricks complied with the notice requirement of the JO A, that the exculpatory clause shielded Ricks from liability, and that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying Matrix’s motion to | 1 | 1 |
cluster 591417green1 sentence2004See Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254, 260 (5th Cir.1992) (stating an identical exculpatory clause is clear and unambiguous). | 1 | 1 |
Stanley v. Creighton Co.green2 sentences2002Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705, 706 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (holding exculpatory agreement in residential lease to be violative of public policy and unenforceable against tenant). 2002Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705, 706 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (holding exculpatory agreement in residential lease to be violative of public policy and unenforceable against tenant). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.green2 sentences1982See, e.g., Hill v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 235 N.C. 705 , 71 S.E.2d 133 (1952). 1982See, e.g., Hill v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 235 N.C. 705 , 71 S.E.2d 133 (1952). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Associates, Inc., Architects, Planners, Engineers
green
2 sentences2006Id. 2006Id. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Granger v. Caviness
neutral
2 sentences1981Co. of America, Inc. v. McKenna, 90 N.M. 516 , 565 P.2d 1033 (1977), or violative of a public policy, see Granger v. Caviness, 64 N.M. 424 , 329 P.2d 439 (1958). 1981Co. of America, Inc. v. McKenna, 90 N.M. 516 , 565 P.2d 1033 (1977), or violative of a public policy, see Granger v. Caviness, 64 N.M. 424 , 329 P.2d 439 (1958). | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Loyd v. Southwest Underwriters
green
2 sentences1981Plaintiffs state: “This case involves the validity of such an exculpatory clause where both a public interest is at stake and where the party seeking the protection afforded by the clause enjoyed a decisive bargaining advantage over the victim of its negligence.” Plaintiffs’ argument is that a “public interest” or “bargaining advantage” situation modifies the rule stated in Loyd v. Southwest Underwriters, 50 N.M. 66 , 169 P.2d 238 (1946): “The escrow holder’s liability is both ‘fixed and limited’ by the contract under which it undertakes to perform the impartial function of stake-holder.” We a 1981Plaintiffs state: “This case involves the validity of such an exculpatory clause where both a public interest is at stake and where the party seeking the protection afforded by the clause enjoyed a decisive bargaining advantage over the victim of its negligence.” Plaintiffs’ argument is that a “public interest” or “bargaining advantage” situation modifies the rule stated in Loyd v. Southwest Underwriters, 50 N.M. 66 , 169 P.2d 238 (1946): “The escrow holder’s liability is both ‘fixed and limited’ by the contract under which it undertakes to perform the impartial function of stake-holder.” We a | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Tunkl v. Regents of University of California
green
2 sentences1981Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92 , 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963), involved negligence by a nonprofit, charitable hospital. 1981Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92 , 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963), involved negligence by a nonprofit, charitable hospital. | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. NJ BANK
green
2 sentences1981Valley National Bank v. Tang, supra; Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, supra; Akin v. Business Title Corporation, supra; Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 138 N.J.Super. 112 , 350 A.2d 279 (1975). 1981Valley National Bank v. Tang, supra; Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, supra; Akin v. Business Title Corporation, supra; Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 138 N.J.Super. 112 , 350 A.2d 279 (1975). | 2 | 1981–1981 |
McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp.
green
2 sentences1981They cite McCutcheon v. United Homes Corporation, 79 Wash.2d 443 , 486 P.2d 1093 (1971). 1981They cite McCutcheon v. United Homes Corporation, 79 Wash.2d 443 , 486 P.2d 1093 (1971). | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n
green
2 sentences1981S. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Ass’n, 67 N.M. 108 , 353 P.2d 62 (1960), states: The rule is well established that a provision in a contract seeking to relieve a party to the contract from liability for his own negligence is void and unenforceable, if the provision is violative of law or contrary to some rule of public policy. 1981S. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Ass’n, 67 N.M. 108 , 353 P.2d 62 (1960), states: The rule is well established that a provision in a contract seeking to relieve a party to the contract from liability for his own negligence is void and unenforceable, if the provision is violative of law or contrary to some rule of public policy. | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Tyler v. Dowell, Inc
green
2 sentences1981Plaintiffs assert that because the exculpatory clause was “written by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs,” the clause “should not be enforced to relieve the more powerful bargainer of the consequences of its own negligence.” This argument is based on the reference to superior bargaining power in Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., supra; however, this argument distorts what was stated in that case. 1981We agree with the following from defendant’s answer brief: “[T]he record is devoid of any evidence that the Lynches sought any alternative sources of escrow, or alternatively, that in seeking such alternative sources of escrow, they encountered identical exculpatory language with no available alternatives, or that there were not available alternatives in the market place.” There being no showing of an absence of alternatives, there is no basis for applying the superior bargaining power concept of Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., supra. This holding answers plaintiffs’ contention; this answer, however, d | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Safeco Insurance Co. of America Inc. v. McKenna
green
2 sentences1981Co. of America, Inc. v. McKenna, 90 N.M. 516 , 565 P.2d 1033 (1977), or violative of a public policy, see Granger v. Caviness, 64 N.M. 424 , 329 P.2d 439 (1958). 1981Co. of America, Inc. v. McKenna, 90 N.M. 516 , 565 P.2d 1033 (1977), or violative of a public policy, see Granger v. Caviness, 64 N.M. 424 , 329 P.2d 439 (1958). | 2 | 1981–1981 |
DiGesu v. Weingardt
green
2 sentences1981There is no claim that the exculpatory clause in the escrow agreements is violative of statutory law, see DiGesu v. Weingardt, 91 N.M. 441 , 575 P.2d 950 (1978) and Safeco Ins. 1981There is no claim that the exculpatory clause in the escrow agreements is violative of statutory law, see DiGesu v. Weingardt, 91 N.M. 441 , 575 P.2d 950 (1978) and Safeco Ins. | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Freddi-Gail, Inc. v. Royal Holding Corp.
green
2 sentences1966See Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co., supra; Freddi-Gail, Inc. v. Royal Holding Corp., 34 N.J. 1966See Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co., supra; FreddiGail, Inc. v. Royal Holding Corp., 34 N.J. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.