exculpatory clause in Louisiana

2015Farrell Construction Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 693 F.Supp. 490 (E.D.La.1988); reversed in part, 896 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.1990).

1991Farrell Construction Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 693 F.Supp. 490 (E.D.La.1988); reversed in part, 896 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.1990).

2015Farrell Construction Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 693 F.Supp. 490 (E.D.La.1988); reversed in part, 896 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.1990).

1991Farrell Construction Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 693 F.Supp. 490 (E.D.La.1988); reversed in part, 896 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.1990).

1988In Carriage Meat, supra the granting of a summary judgment was reversed since an issue of material fact existed as to whether Honeywell's failure to notify the plaintiff in that case fell within a similar exculpatory clause.

1986Ultimately, it was held that the scope of the clause did not extend to include actions amounting to gross negligence—defined as a "willful or deliberate disregard of its [Honeywell] contractual duty"—and concluded that summary judgment was improper and liability could be imposed irrespective of the exculpatory clause on these grounds. 442 So.2d at 798 .

1973Therein the court observed: "This case, as noted in our original opinion, was brought to this Court because of an asserted conflict between the decision herein of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, and that of the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, in Sandel & Lastrapes v. City of Shreveport, 129 So. 2d 620 , which authority the First Circuit refused to follow.

1967In so arguing, plaintiff relies upon Sandel & Lastrapes v. City of Shreveport, La.App., 129 So.2d 620 , as authority for the proposition that such an exculpatory clause is contrary to public policy if intended to relieve one of his own negligence and therefore can apply only to third parties.

2013State v. Arvie, supra at 46 ; see State v. Patterson, supra. “To impeach him by casting doubt on his defense, using his constitutional right to silence to establish an inference that the defense was fabricated, constitutes reversible error.” State v. Sam, supra at 1085 .

2006Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp. (1955) 349 U.S. 85 , 75 S.Ct. 629 , 99 L.Ed. 911 , is a case in which an exculpatory clause was not enforced in maritime law, but this was a towage case, and subsequent cases have held that an exculpatory clause in a towage case is not automatically invalid.

2006Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp. (1955) 349 U.S. 85 , 75 S.Ct. 629 , 99 L.Ed. 911 , is a case in which an exculpatory clause was not enforced in maritime law, but this was a towage case, and subsequent cases have held that an exculpatory clause in a towage case is not automatically invalid.

1993Bradford Trust, 524 So.2d 1213, 1218 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), modified 538 So.2d 263 (La.1989), we addressed a similar exculpatory clause and held that notwithstanding the exculpatory clause: A trustee is required to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.

1986Co. of N.Y., 259 La. 599 , 250 So.2d 754 (1971)), we find that the exculpatory clause would cover liability for a manufacturing or design defect.

1986Co. of N.Y., 259 La. 599 , 250 So.2d 754 (1971)), we find that the exculpatory clause would cover liability for a manufacturing or design defect.

1982But, under a duty-risk analysis, the possibility of such contributory negligence cannot be both the reason a duty is imposed upon the storekeeper and an excuse for the storekeeper’s breach of that duty; Oliver v. Capitano, 405 So.2d 1102 (La.App. 4 Cir.1981), writ refused 407 So.2d 731 and 734.

1982But, under a duty-risk analysis, the possibility of such contributory negligence cannot be both the reason a duty is imposed upon the storekeeper and an excuse for the storekeeper’s breach of that duty; Oliver v. Capitano, 405 So.2d 1102 (La.App. 4 Cir.1981), writ refused 407 So.2d 731 and 734.

1979In those cases, the liability dispute was between the general employer and the special employer inter se ; or regarding the special employer's liability in tort versus in workmen's compensation; or they were cases which "in fact, held the general employer [liable] for the borrowed employee's tort by applying the stringent exculpatory test required of a general employer attempting to avoid liability to a third person for damages caused by his employee's tort." (Original emphasis.) LeJeune, supra, at 481 .

1977Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So.2d 786 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ refused, 294 So.2d 829 (1974).

1977Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So.2d 786 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ refused, 294 So.2d 829 (1974).

1977Freeman v. Department of Highways, 253 La. 105 , 217 So.2d 166 .

1977Freeman v. Department of Highways, 253 La. 105 , 217 So.2d 166 .

1969In Elephant, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., La.App., 216 So.2d 837 , this court recently considered an anticipatory release which did not specifically include the word "negligence".