Williams motion in Georgia

1997I concur with Presiding Judge McMurray and wish to make the further observation that Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641 (2), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) and Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 , 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991), are rules of admissibility to ensure that the prior similar crimes are relevant, similar, and thus, admissible; such protection was fully afforded upon the trial judge holding a hearing to see if the three prongs of the Williams test were satisfied prior to such evidence being *162 admitted at trial and the determination that such evidence was in fact admissible.

1997I concur with Presiding Judge McMurray and wish to make the further observation that Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641 (2), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) and Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 , 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991), are rules of admissibility to ensure that the prior similar crimes are relevant, similar, and thus, admissible; such protection was fully afforded upon the trial judge holding a hearing to see if the three prongs of the Williams test were satisfied prior to such evidence being *162 admitted at trial and the determination that such evidence was in fact admissible.

2020To the extent that Williams’s motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his convictions, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010).

2020To the extent that Williams’s motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his convictions, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010).

2020To the extent that Williams’s motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his convictions, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010).

2020To the extent that Williams’s motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his convictions, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010).

2009While it is true that the trial court has the discretion to exclude relevant similar transaction evidence on prejudice grounds, “this determination is not, strictly speaking, part of the Williams analysis, and the trial court is not obligated to make an express finding on this issue as part of the USCR 31.3 (B) hearing.” Newman v. State, 233 Ga. App. 794 , *681 795 (2) ( 504 SE2d 476 ) (1998). 2 See also Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 625-626 (2) ( 458 SE2d 643 ) (1995); Harris v. State, 276 Ga. App. 234, 238 (2) ( 622 SE2d 905 ) (2005).

2009While it is true that the trial court has the discretion to exclude relevant similar transaction evidence on prejudice grounds, “this determination is not, strictly speaking, part of the Williams analysis, and the trial court is not obligated to make an express finding on this issue as part of the USCR 31.3 (B) hearing.” Newman v. State, 233 Ga. App. 794 , *681 795 (2) ( 504 SE2d 476 ) (1998). 2 See also Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 625-626 (2) ( 458 SE2d 643 ) (1995); Harris v. State, 276 Ga. App. 234, 238 (2) ( 622 SE2d 905 ) (2005).

2024See Williams I, 308 Ga. at 272 (3) (b) (ii). 4 Williams carried this claim forward in his third amended complaint. 9 vacated the trial court’s order granting Thurmond’s motion to dismiss Williams’ claim for injunctive relief and remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration of Williams’ standing as a taxpayer, holding that “[t]he resolution of any claim that Williams seeks to have decided against Thurmond should not be addressed by the trial court until it is clear that Williams has standing to bring it and is, therefore, a proper plaintiff.” Id. at 274 (3) (b) (ii).

2024See Williams I, 308 Ga. at 272 (3) (b) (ii). 4 Williams carried this claim forward in his third amended complaint. 9 vacated the trial court’s order granting Thurmond’s motion to dismiss Williams’ claim for injunctive relief and remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration of Williams’ standing as a taxpayer, holding that “[t]he resolution of any claim that Williams seeks to have decided against Thurmond should not be addressed by the trial court until it is clear that Williams has standing to bring it and is, therefore, a proper plaintiff.” Id. at 274 (3) (b) (ii).

2023To evaluate Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was 10 See Dennis v. State, 293 Ga. 688, 689-90 (1) ( 748 SE2d 390 ) (2013) (holding that defendants moving victims from their own vehicle before shooting them was sufficient to support kidnapping-with-bodily-injury charge); Fuller v. State, 363 Ga. App. 217 , 222-23 (1) (b) ( 871 SE2d 79 ) (2022) (holding that moving victim outside of store after robb

2023To evaluate Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was 10 See Dennis v. State, 293 Ga. 688, 689-90 (1) ( 748 SE2d 390 ) (2013) (holding that defendants moving victims from their own vehicle before shooting them was sufficient to support kidnapping-with-bodily-injury charge); Fuller v. State, 363 Ga. App. 217 , 222-23 (1) (b) ( 871 SE2d 79 ) (2022) (holding that moving victim outside of store after robb

2017See, e.g., Parker v. State, 255 Ga. 167 (1) ( 336 SE2d 242 ) (1985).

2017See, e.g., Parker v. State, 255 Ga. 167 (1) ( 336 SE2d 242 ) (1985).

2016See also Wright, supra at 684 (same). 13 Supra. 14 Wright, supra at 684, n. 3 (emphasis in original). 7 court has in fact given notice, then a motion to set aside may be properly denied whether or not the losing party actually received the notice.”15 Williams filed no motion with a caption that included the words “set aside.” But in his (three-page) motion underlying the judgment at issue here, Williams plainly asserted that notice of the order had not been properly provided, then explicitly requested the superior court to set aside and re-enter that order.16 Accordingly, Williams’s motion ade

2016See also Wright, supra at 684 (same). 13 Supra. 14 Wright, supra at 684, n. 3 (emphasis in original). 7 court has in fact given notice, then a motion to set aside may be properly denied whether or not the losing party actually received the notice.”15 Williams filed no motion with a caption that included the words “set aside.” But in his (three-page) motion underlying the judgment at issue here, Williams plainly asserted that notice of the order had not been properly provided, then explicitly requested the superior court to set aside and re-enter that order.16 Accordingly, Williams’s motion ade

2014Frost v. State, 286 Ga. App. 694, 697 (1) ( 649 SE2d 878 ) (2007) (“[P]ressures such as a lack of faith in one’s trial counsel do not necessarily give rise to the manifest injustice required to withdraw a plea after sentencing.”) (footnote omitted).

2014Frost v. State, 286 Ga. App. 694, 697 (1) ( 649 SE2d 878 ) (2007) (“[P]ressures such as a lack of faith in one’s trial counsel do not necessarily give rise to the manifest injustice required to withdraw a plea after sentencing.”) (footnote omitted).

2013See Williams, 288 Ga. at 12 (2).

2013See Williams, 288 Ga. at 12 (2).

2012See Carter v. State, 272 Ga. App. 158, 160 (2) ( 611 SE2d 790 ) (2005) (defendant’s allegation of pressure by trial counsel simply a matter of witness credibility for the trial court to decide); Collier v. State, 281 Ga. App. 646, 650 ( 637 SE2d 72 ) (2006) (the trial court was authorized to conclude that “any coercion [Williams] may have experienced in connection with the guilty plea arose from the circumstances in which he found himself, not any deficiency in his trial counsel’s performance.”) The record, including the transcript of the plea hearing, shows that Williams’ plea was voluntarily

2012See Carter v. State, 272 Ga. App. 158, 160 (2) ( 611 SE2d 790 ) (2005) (defendant’s allegation of pressure by trial counsel simply a matter of witness credibility for the trial court to decide); Collier v. State, 281 Ga. App. 646, 650 ( 637 SE2d 72 ) (2006) (the trial court was authorized to conclude that “any coercion [Williams] may have experienced in connection with the guilty plea arose from the circumstances in which he found himself, not any deficiency in his trial counsel’s performance.”) The record, including the transcript of the plea hearing, shows that Williams’ plea was voluntarily

2012Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 249 (3) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010) (same “test applies whether the similar transaction occurred before or, as here, after the charged crimes”); Ayiteyfio v. State, 308 Ga. App. 286, 290 ( 707 SE2d 186 ) (2011); Scott v. State, 219 Ga. App. 906, 908 (3) ( 467 SE2d 348 ) (1996).

2012Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 249 (3) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010) (same “test applies whether the similar transaction occurred before or, as here, after the charged crimes”); Ayiteyfio v. State, 308 Ga. App. 286, 290 ( 707 SE2d 186 ) (2011); Scott v. State, 219 Ga. App. 906, 908 (3) ( 467 SE2d 348 ) (1996).

2012Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 249 (3) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010) (same “test applies whether the similar transaction occurred before or, as here, after the charged crimes”); Ayiteyfio v. State, 308 Ga. App. 286, 290 ( 707 SE2d 186 ) (2011); Scott v. State, 219 Ga. App. 906, 908 (3) ( 467 SE2d 348 ) (1996).

2012Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 249 (3) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010) (same “test applies whether the similar transaction occurred before or, as here, after the charged crimes”); Ayiteyfio v. State, 308 Ga. App. 286, 290 ( 707 SE2d 186 ) (2011); Scott v. State, 219 Ga. App. 906, 908 (3) ( 467 SE2d 348 ) (1996).

2012Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 249 (3) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010) (same “test applies whether the similar transaction occurred before or, as here, after the charged crimes”); Ayiteyfio v. State, 308 Ga. App. 286, 290 ( 707 SE2d 186 ) (2011); Scott v. State, 219 Ga. App. 906, 908 (3) ( 467 SE2d 348 ) (1996).

2012Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 249 (3) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010) (same “test applies whether the similar transaction occurred before or, as here, after the charged crimes”); Ayiteyfio v. State, 308 Ga. App. 286, 290 ( 707 SE2d 186 ) (2011); Scott v. State, 219 Ga. App. 906, 908 (3) ( 467 SE2d 348 ) (1996).

2012Although the plea form that Williams signed at the plea hearing is not included in the record before this Court, at the plea hearing the trial court reviewed the form with Williams and clearly explained all of the rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty. “[I]t is incumbent upon the trial court to ensure that a defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, he is relinquishing constitutional rights to which he is otherwise entitled.” Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893, 895 (1) ( 471 SE2d 869 ) (1996).

2012Although the plea form that Williams signed at the plea hearing is not included in the record before this Court, at the plea hearing the trial court reviewed the form with Williams and clearly explained all of the rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty. “[I]t is incumbent upon the trial court to ensure that a defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, he is relinquishing constitutional rights to which he is otherwise entitled.” Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893, 895 (1) ( 471 SE2d 869 ) (1996).

2004Pretermitting the issue of the timeliness of Williams’ motion for mistrial, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion when the person showing an emotional reaction to the evidence had been immediately removed from the courtroom and curative instructions were given following the subsequent polling of the jury to see if the comment had been heard. 4 See Todd v. State, 274 Ga. 98, 102 (5) ( 549 SE2d 116 ) (2001); Sheppard v. State, 235 Ga. 89, 91 (2) ( 218 SE2d 830 ) (1975).

2004Pretermitting the issue of the timeliness of Williams’ motion for mistrial, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion when the person showing an emotional reaction to the evidence had been immediately removed from the courtroom and curative instructions were given following the subsequent polling of the jury to see if the comment had been heard. 4 See Todd v. State, 274 Ga. 98, 102 (5) ( 549 SE2d 116 ) (2001); Sheppard v. State, 235 Ga. 89, 91 (2) ( 218 SE2d 830 ) (1975).

2004Pretermitting the issue of the timeliness of Williams’ motion for mistrial, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion when the person showing an emotional reaction to the evidence had been immediately removed from the courtroom and curative instructions were given following the subsequent polling of the jury to see if the comment had been heard. 4 See Todd v. State, 274 Ga. 98, 102 (5) ( 549 SE2d 116 ) (2001); Sheppard v. State, 235 Ga. 89, 91 (2) ( 218 SE2d 830 ) (1975).

2004Pretermitting the issue of the timeliness of Williams’ motion for mistrial, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion when the person showing an emotional reaction to the evidence had been immediately removed from the courtroom and curative instructions were given following the subsequent polling of the jury to see if the comment had been heard. 4 See Todd v. State, 274 Ga. 98, 102 (5) ( 549 SE2d 116 ) (2001); Sheppard v. State, 235 Ga. 89, 91 (2) ( 218 SE2d 830 ) (1975).

2001See generally Givens v. State, 264 Ga. 522, 523 (1) ( 448 SE2d 687 ) (1994) (recognizing that the right to open and close is important and that erroneous denial of that right gives rise to presumption of harm).

2001See generally Givens v. State, 264 Ga. 522, 523 (1) ( 448 SE2d 687 ) (1994) (recognizing that the right to open and close is important and that erroneous denial of that right gives rise to presumption of harm).

1998“The essential purpose of conducting the Williams analysis [at the USCR 31.3 (B) hearing] is to ensure that there exists a legitimate, probative purpose in introducing an independent criminal act and that there exists sufficient similarity to make the probativeness outweigh any prejudice as a consequence to injecting character into the case.” McTaggart v. State, 225 Ga. App. 359, 364 (2) ( 483 SE2d 898 ) (1997).

1998“The essential purpose of conducting the Williams analysis [at the USCR 31.3 (B) hearing] is to ensure that there exists a legitimate, probative purpose in introducing an independent criminal act and that there exists sufficient similarity to make the probativeness outweigh any prejudice as a consequence to injecting character into the case.” McTaggart v. State, 225 Ga. App. 359, 364 (2) ( 483 SE2d 898 ) (1997).

1997This Court notes that, although the parties argue this issue under a Williams analysis, the facts and circumstances of this case require that an analysis be made, not under Williams as a prior similar transaction, but under Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73, 74-75 (2) ( 414 SE2d 470 ) (1992), as prior difficulties between the parties where the issue is not similarity with an independent crime, but the existence of a nexus between the prior conduct and the subsequent crimes, between the same people, arising from their difficulties with each other. 1 USCR 31.3 (B) applies to a Maxwell analysis and wa

1997This Court notes that, although the parties argue this issue under a Williams analysis, the facts and circumstances of this case require that an analysis be made, not under Williams as a prior similar transaction, but under Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73, 74-75 (2) ( 414 SE2d 470 ) (1992), as prior difficulties between the parties where the issue is not similarity with an independent crime, but the existence of a nexus between the prior conduct and the subsequent crimes, between the same people, arising from their difficulties with each other. 1 USCR 31.3 (B) applies to a Maxwell analysis and wa

2009Therefore, Williams’ motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence was properly denied because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Williams guilty within the test established in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U. S. 307 .

2009Therefore, Williams’ motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence was properly denied because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Williams guilty within the test established in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U. S. 307 .

2023To evaluate Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was 10 See Dennis v. State, 293 Ga. 688, 689-90 (1) ( 748 SE2d 390 ) (2013) (holding that defendants moving victims from their own vehicle before shooting them was sufficient to support kidnapping-with-bodily-injury charge); Fuller v. State, 363 Ga. App. 217 , 222-23 (1) (b) ( 871 SE2d 79 ) (2022) (holding that moving victim outside of store after robb

2023To evaluate Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington,11 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was 10 See Dennis v. State, 293 Ga. 688, 689-90 (1) ( 748 SE2d 390 ) (2013) (holding that defendants moving victims from their own vehicle before shooting them was sufficient to support kidnapping-with-bodily-injury charge); Fuller v. State, 363 Ga. App. 217 , 222-23 (1) (b) ( 871 SE2d 79 ) (2022) (holding that moving victim outside of store after robb

2016Williams, 296 Ga. at 819 .

2015Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s *490 opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S._( 133 SCt 1552 , 185 LE2d 696) (2013), the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated both the order denying Williams’s motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for the trial court to address “whether Williams gave actual consent to the procuring and testing of his blood, which would require the determination of the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances.” Williams, 296 Ga. at 823 (emphasis in original).

1997I concur with Presiding Judge McMurray and wish to make the further observation that Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641 (2), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) and Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 , 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991), are rules of admissibility to ensure that the prior similar crimes are relevant, similar, and thus, admissible; such protection was fully afforded upon the trial judge holding a hearing to see if the three prongs of the Williams test were satisfied prior to such evidence being *162 admitted at trial and the determination that such evidence was in fact admissible.

1997I concur with Presiding Judge McMurray and wish to make the further observation that Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641 (2), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) and Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 , 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991), are rules of admissibility to ensure that the prior similar crimes are relevant, similar, and thus, admissible; such protection was fully afforded upon the trial judge holding a hearing to see if the three prongs of the Williams test were satisfied prior to such evidence being *162 admitted at trial and the determination that such evidence was in fact admissible.

2026As we have explained, however, “[a]n ethics violation ... does not necessarily establish a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.” Moore v. State, 306 Ga. 532, 537 (2019) (citing Blackshear v. State, 274 Ga. 842, 843 (2002)).

2026As we have explained, however, “[a]n ethics violation ... does not necessarily establish a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.” Moore v. State, 306 Ga. 532, 537 (2019) (citing Blackshear v. State, 274 Ga. 842, 843 (2002)).

2026See Goodwin, 319 Ga. at 845 (noting that the trial court was entitled to disbelieve the defendant’s testimony and to credit plea counsel’s testimony).