Williams rule in Florida

2025He argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded reverse Williams rule evidence * of a shooting that had taken place in Georgia. * Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).

2024Significantly, Barzee repeatedly testified that Paylan had been convinced that Williams rule evidence would "sink her case."10 Further, he recounted discussing with Paylan all possible defense theories and that they had jointly landed on the one that he ultimately had pursued. 9 Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 10 We note that regardless of whether the State had moved pretrial to introduce such evidence in its case-in-chief, such evidence would have been admissible to rebut any defense that put Paylan's intent squarely at issue.

2022Id. (5)(b). 7 where prior incident occurred the day before the charged events and was not relevant or inseparable part of charged acts); Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1994) (“[E]vidence of uncharged crimes which are inseparable from the crime charged, or evidence which is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged, is not Williams rule evidence.

2017See Griffin v. State, 639 So.2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1994) (“[Ejvidence of uncharged crimes which ... is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged, is not Williams rule evidence.”).

2021While the Supreme Court quashed that portion of the Fourth District’s opinion that had concluded the two crimes were sufficiently similar, Id., the Savino Court stated the general test for admissibility of “reverse Williams rule” evidence relevant to the instant case: “If a defendant’s purpose is to shift suspicion to another person, evidence of past criminal conduct of that other person should be of such nature that it would be admissible if that person were on trial for the present offense.” Id.

2021While the Supreme Court quashed that portion of the Fourth District’s opinion that had concluded the two crimes were sufficiently similar, Id., the Savino Court stated the general test for admissibility of “reverse Williams rule” evidence relevant to the instant case: “If a defendant’s purpose is to shift suspicion to another person, evidence of past criminal conduct of that other person should be of such nature that it would be admissible if that person were on trial for the present offense.” Id.

2026In Robertson, the Supreme Court declined to employ the tipsy coachman doctrine to affirm the admission of evidence concerning prior crimes of the defendant under section 90.404(2), Florida Statues, also known as the Williams rule, in part, because the trial court did not make the determinations 23 necessary for the evidence to be admitted under the Williams rule, which included both factual findings and discretionary determinations, such as “whether the prejudicial effect of the prior crime substantially outweighs its probative value.” Id. at 907-08 . 7 We also find support for our conclusion

2026In Robertson, the Supreme Court declined to employ the tipsy coachman doctrine to affirm the admission of evidence concerning prior crimes of the defendant under section 90.404(2), Florida Statues, also known as the Williams rule, in part, because the trial court did not make the determinations 23 necessary for the evidence to be admitted under the Williams rule, which included both factual findings and discretionary determinations, such as “whether the prejudicial effect of the prior crime substantially outweighs its probative value.” Id. at 907-08 . 7 We also find support for our conclusion

2021Underlying the Williams rule procedure is the foundational principle that "[d]ue process prohibits an individual from being convicted of an uncharged crime." Morgan v. State, 146 So. 3d 508, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (first citing Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); then citing Jaimes v. State, 51 So. 3d 445, 448 (Fla. 2010); and then citing Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 69 (Fla. 2004)). "[A] criminal defendant is entitled to a trial on the charges contained in the information and may not be prosecuted for uncharged offenses, even if they are of the same general character or constitute

2021“Before allowing Williams rule evidence to be presented to the jury, the trial court must find that the State has proved that the defendant committed the collateral acts by clear and convincing evidence.” McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1256 (Fla. 2006).

2021This inversion of the role of the Williams rule for the defendant’s benefit, so that the defendant may introduce evidence to establish a reasonable doubt of his or her guilt, is known as the “reverse Williams rule.” Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990).

2019See State v. Savino, 567 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. 1990) (describing "reverse Williams rule evidence" as similar fact evidence offered by a defendant to show that someone else committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried (citing Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990))).

2011As to the Williams rule issue, “the standard of review applicable to the consideration of whether evidence was properly admitted is abuse of discretion.” Stav v. State, 860 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

2011As to the Williams rule issue, “the standard of review applicable to the consideration of whether evidence was properly admitted is abuse of discretion.” Stav v. State, 860 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

2019For that reason, the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Mr. Newby from introducing that evidence under the reverse Williams rule here.8 The Trial Court's Error Was Not Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt The State argues that any error in precluding evidence of D.W.'s attack was harmless because "Mr. Newby was still able to argue that another person committed burglary." To prevail on this argument, the State must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the

1998Therefore, we find that the erroneous introduction of some Williams rule evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there is "no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction." State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986).

2025Williams rule evidence becomes a feature of the trial “when inquiry into the collateral crimes ‘transcends the bounds of relevancy to the charge being tried’ and the prosecution ‘devolves from development of facts pertinent to the main issue of guilt or innocence into an assault on the character of the defendant.’” Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 945 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1960)).

2021See Lowe v. State, 500 So. 2d 578, 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (finding "reversible error in the trial court's failure at the close of the evidence to instruct the jury on the limited use of collateral crime evidence"); Rivers v. State, 425 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) ("[W]e are compelled to hold that the failure to give the [Williams rule] instruction during the course of the trial . . . was reversible error."); cf. Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 947 (Fla. 2003) (affirming admission of lengthy testimony of collateral crimes and "plac[ing] special emphasis on the fact that the trial court

2006NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] The Williams rule is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). [3] Section 90.404(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1997), dealing with the ten-day notice, has since been renumbered as section 90.404(2)(c)1, Florida Statutes (2003). [4] Similar fact evidence is referred to as Williams rule evidence, and as codified provides: Section 90.404(2)(a): (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant

2006NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] The Williams rule is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). [3] Section 90.404(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1997), dealing with the ten-day notice, has since been renumbered as section 90.404(2)(c)1, Florida Statutes (2003). [4] Similar fact evidence is referred to as Williams rule evidence, and as codified provides: Section 90.404(2)(a): (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant

2006NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] The Williams rule is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). [3] Section 90.404(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1997), dealing with the ten-day notice, has since been renumbered as section 90.404(2)(c)1, Florida Statutes (2003). [4] Similar fact evidence is referred to as Williams rule evidence, and as codified provides: Section 90.404(2)(a): (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant

2006NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] The Williams rule is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). [3] Section 90.404(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1997), dealing with the ten-day notice, has since been renumbered as section 90.404(2)(c)1, Florida Statutes (2003). [4] Similar fact evidence is referred to as Williams rule evidence, and as codified provides: Section 90.404(2)(a): (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant

2021First, the State asserts without explanation that "M.B.'s testimony was properly admitted under the dictates of Heuring." But in Heuring, the State filed the required Williams rule notice, and the parties litigated the admissibility of the testimony within those parameters. 513 So. 2d at 123-24 ; cf. Robertson, 829 So. 2d at 908 .

2019In cases where collateral crime evidence is relevant to establish the identity of the perpetrator, the supreme court has required " 'identifiable points of similarity' between the collateral act and charged crime that 'have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant.' " Id. (quoting Drake v. State, 400 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1981)). " '[S]ubstantial similarity' is also required 'when the [collateral crime] evidence is sought to be admitted for the specific purpose of establishing absence of mistake or accident.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Robertson v. St

2010See Peek v. State, 488 So.2d 52, 55 (Fla.1986) (noting, in a traditional Williams rule case, that “ ‘[a] mere general similarity will not render the similar facts legally relevant to show identity[ ]’ ” and that “‘[tjhere must be identifiable points of similarity which pervade the compared factual situations.’ ” (quoting Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla.1981))); see also Vaughn v. State, 604 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (“The similar aspects or modus operandi of the incidents must be sufficiently distinctive, unique, unusual, or of such special character as to reasonably point

2010See Peek v. State, 488 So.2d 52, 55 (Fla.1986) (noting, in a traditional Williams rule case, that “ ‘[a] mere general similarity will not render the similar facts legally relevant to show identity[ ]’ ” and that “‘[tjhere must be identifiable points of similarity which pervade the compared factual situations.’ ” (quoting Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla.1981))); see also Vaughn v. State, 604 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (“The similar aspects or modus operandi of the incidents must be sufficiently distinctive, unique, unusual, or of such special character as to reasonably point

2006See White v. State, 817 So.2d 799 (Fla.2002); Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 195 (Fla.1997); see also Henrion v. State, 895 So.2d 1213, 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("A trial court's decision to admit collateral crime or Williams rule evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."); Kulling v. State, 827 So.2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court's decision to admit Williams rule evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Traina v. State, 657 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (exclusion of reverse Williams rule evidence was not abuse of discretion).

2002Williams rule decisions has been that startling similarities in the facts of each crime and the uniqueness of modus operandi will determine the admissibility of collateral crime evidence." Chandler, 702 So.2d at 192 .

2009“On the Williams Rule issue, the standard of review applicable to the consideration of whether evidence was properly admitted is abuse of discretion.” Stav v. State, 860 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Geldreich v. State, 763 So.2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

2007"On the Williams Rule issue, the standard of review applicable to the consideration of whether evidence was properly admitted is abuse of discretion." Stav v. State, 860 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Geldreich v. State, 763 So.2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

2019In cases where collateral crime evidence is relevant to establish the identity of the perpetrator, the supreme court has required " 'identifiable points of similarity' between the collateral act and charged crime that 'have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant.' " Id. (quoting Drake v. State, 400 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1981)). " '[S]ubstantial similarity' is also required 'when the [collateral crime] evidence is sought to be admitted for the specific purpose of establishing absence of mistake or accident.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Robertson v. St

2019In cases where collateral crime evidence is relevant to establish the identity of the perpetrator, the supreme court has required " 'identifiable points of similarity' between the collateral act and charged crime that 'have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant.' " Id. (quoting Drake v. State, 400 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1981)). " '[S]ubstantial similarity' is also required 'when the [collateral crime] evidence is sought to be admitted for the specific purpose of establishing absence of mistake or accident.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Robertson v. St

2020Applying this section of the evidence code, courts were cautious when asked to admit collateral crime evidence in sexual battery cases, so as not to run afoul of the statutory prohibition against admitting such evidence “solely to prove bad character or propensity.” See, e.g., Feller v. State, 637 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1994) (addressing Williams rule issue in order to offer guidance on retrial, explaining that sexual battery on an underage child is not uniformly admissible under section 90.404(2), and emphasizing that the acts at issue had only two things in common— they involved the same type

2011This evidentiary rule is also known as the "Williams rule.” See Williams v. State, 621 So.2d 413, 414-15 (Fla.1993). 3 .

2024Harmful Error “Improperly admitting Williams rule evidence is presumed harmful error.” Williams, 662 So. 2d at 420 .

2021"Improperly admitting Williams rule evidence is presumed harmful error." Williams v. State, 662 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (citing Wilson v. State, 490 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)); see also Botto v. State, 307 So. 3d 1006 , 1010 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)) ("The improper admission of similar fact testimony is presumed to be harmful error." (quoting Pastor v. State, 792 So. 2d 627, 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). 11 This is especially so where the State highlights and relies on the improper evidence during closing.

2025Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 761 (Fla. 2004).

2006"A trial court's exclusion of evidence of similar crimes committed by another person for exculpatory purposes, generally referred to as `reverse Williams rule evidence,' is subject to an abuse of discretion review." Huggins v. State, 889 So.2d 743, 761 (Fla.2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1107 , 125 S.Ct. 2546 , 162 L.Ed.2d 280 (2005).

2003The court did, however, state that the applicable standard "lies somewhere in between the stringent similarity requirement of the usual Williams rule case and the liberal similarity rule" that would allow the admission of collateral crime evidence of any sex crimes committed in the familial context. 660 So.2d at 671 .

2003The court did, however, state that the applicable standard "lies somewhere in between the stringent similarity requirement of the usual Williams rule case and the liberal similarity rule" that would allow the admission of collateral crime evidence of any sex crimes committed in the familial context. 660 So.2d at 671 .

2006Instead we concluded that the charged and collateral offenses were "strikingly similar" and therefore met the "strict standards of the Williams rule." Id. at 1353-54.

2006Instead we concluded that the charged and collateral offenses were "strikingly similar" and therefore met the "strict standards of the Williams rule." Id. at 1353-54.

2010See Dorsett, 944 So.2d at 1212 ; Griffin v. State, 639 So.2d 966, 968 (Fla.1994) (holding that evidence of acts inseparable from or inextricably intertwined with the crime charged is not Williams rule evidence).

2010Section 90.404 addresses the admissibility of similar fact evidence, commonly referred to as “Williams 2 rule evi dence.” Similar fact Williams rule, 90.404 evidence is evidence that is totally unrelated to the charged offenses and in the federal system, this type of evidence is referred to as “extrinsic evidence.” See Dorsett v. State, 944 So.2d 1207, 1212 (Fla. Bd DCA 2006).

2001See Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9 (Fla.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 858 , 121 S.Ct. 143 , 148 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000) (even though several witnesses testified, Williams rule evidence did not become a feature of the trial); Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3 (Fla.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 950 , 115 S.Ct. 364 , 130 L.Ed.2d 317 (1994) (similar fact evidence from three other victims did not become a feature of the trial where the state presented a significant amount of other evidence and testimony that outweighed the similar fact evidence).

2000Earlier, in Thompson v. State, 494 So.2d 203, 204 (Fla.1986), we discussed the admissibility requirement under the Williams rule: "To be admissible under the Williams rule, the identifiable points of similarity must pervade the compared factual situations, and, if sufficient factual similarity exists, the facts must have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant." Our recent decision in Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9 (Fla.2000), did not depart from this well-established precedent; instead, it explained the other uses of similar fact evidence as to issues other than ident

2024“The standard of review for the admission of Williams rule evidence is abuse of discretion.” Ricketts v. State, 125 So. 3d 194, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

2017Williams rule evidence is "admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." § 90.404(2)(a); see, e.g., Ricketts v. State, 125 So. 3d 194, 195-96 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ("Because knowledge is a specific element of [trafficking in cannabis], the evidence of the other crates was admissible Williams rule evidence because it was 'relevant or material to some aspect of the offense being tried . . . .' " (quoting Santiago v. State, 70 So. 3d 720, 725

2018See Washington v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208, 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (noting that the “upshot” of Williams rule evidence “is that an accused may show his innocence 6 by proof tending to show another person’s guilt”); see also McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 323 n.2 (“‘Reverse Williams rule’ evidence is evidence of a crime committed by another person that a defendant offers to show his or her innocence of the instant crime.”).

2014"Collateral crimes evidence includes similar fact evidence, which is governed by section 90.404, Florida Statutes, and is commonly referred to as ‘Williams rule evidence.’ ” Pulcini v. State, 41 So.3d 338, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959)). " 'Reverse Williams rule’ evidence” refers to evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by a person other than the defendant “that a defendant offers to show his or her innocence of the instant crime.” McDuffie v. State, 970 So.2d 312 , 323 n. 2 (Fla.2007) (citation omitted). . 59 So.3d 1092 (Fla.2011). .

2015See Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963, 969 (Fla.1993) (holding that “hearsay that does not fall within one of the hearsay exceptions .... does not constitute reverse Williams rule evidence because it would not have been admissible had the other suspect been on trial for the present offense”).

2015See Crump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963, 969 (Fla. 1993) (holding that “hearsay that does not fall within one of the hearsay exceptions. . . . does not constitute reverse Williams rule evidence because it would not have been admissible had the other suspect been on trial for the present offense”).

2025Williams rule evidence becomes a feature of the trial “when inquiry into the collateral crimes ‘transcends the bounds of relevancy to the charge being tried’ and the prosecution ‘devolves from development of facts pertinent to the main issue of guilt or innocence into an assault on the character of the defendant.’” Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 945 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1960)).

2014Williams rule evidence becomes a proscribed "feature” of trial “when inquiry into the collateral crimes ‘transcend[s] the bounds of relevancy to the charge being tried’ and the prosecution 'devolves from development of facts pertinent to the main issue of guilt or innocence into an assault on the character of the defendant.’ ” Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 945 (Fla.2003) (quoting Williams, 117 So.2d at 475 ).

2006The court *192 said, "[t]he testimony is precisely the kind forbidden by the Williams rule and section 90.404(2)." 451 So.2d at 461 .

2006The court *192 said, "[t]he testimony is precisely the kind forbidden by the Williams rule and section 90.404(2)." 451 So.2d at 461 .