Williams framework in Massachusetts

2013See Calimlirn v. Foreign Car Center, Inc., 392 Mass. 228, 235-236 (1984). 5 Here the jury were allowed, with Butera’s consent, to determine whether damages arising from various acts could be distinguished on the basis of underlying transactions, and they did so: they calculated Butera’s total damages as $100,500, comprised of $87,500 resulting from the contract breach and $13,000 resulting from Williams’s violation of c. 93A.

2012See Commonwealth v. Barriere, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 286, 290-291 (1999) (determination whether prisoner entitled to credit to reduce time remaining on sentence involves act of adjudication rather than clerical correction).

2011As we recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, there are two avenues by which to seek a remedy of suppression or exclusion on a claim that potentially exculpatory evidence has been lost or destroyed by the government. 6 In the first, the defendant must demonstrate the exculpatory nature of the destroyed evidence, by establishing “a ‘reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination,’ that access to the [material] would have produced evidence favorable to his cause.” Neal, supra at 12 , quoting State v. Michener, 25 Or.

2011As we recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, there are two avenues by which to seek a remedy of suppression or exclusion on a claim that potentially exculpatory evidence has been lost or destroyed by the government. 6 In the first, the defendant must demonstrate the exculpatory nature of the destroyed evidence, by establishing “a ‘reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination,’ that access to the [material] would have produced evidence favorable to his cause.” Neal, supra at 12 , quoting State v. Michener, 25 Or.

2008See Fronk v. Fowler, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 502 , 511 n.12 (2008).

2003Having challenged the adequacy of the police investigation, Williams argues that he was entitled to a so-called Bowden instruction, advising the jury, in essence, that if they found law enforcement failed to properly collect and preserve evidence, such a finding might itself raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. 7 See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485, 486 (1980).

1981The arguments in Williams’ brief, none of which was made to the judge, fail to point out any authentication, relevance or other basis in the record which would permit us to conclude that, on the evidence before the court at the time the composite was offered, the judge erred in refusing to admit it. 3 See Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 327 (1969); Commonwealth v. Balukonis, 357 Mass. 721, 725-726 (1970).

1981The arguments in Williams’ brief, none of which was made to the judge, fail to point out any authentication, relevance or other basis in the record which would permit us to conclude that, on the evidence before the court at the time the composite was offered, the judge erred in refusing to admit it. 3 See Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 327 (1969); Commonwealth v. Balukonis, 357 Mass. 721, 725-726 (1970).