Williams test in Alaska

2023As the State points out, Williams does not provide any arguments undermining the court’s discretionary decision not to consider Williams’s defense of 177 “Equitable estoppel requires proof of three basic elements: (1) ‘assertion of a position by conduct or word,’ (2) ‘reasonable reliance thereon,’ and (3) ‘resulting prejudice.’ In addition, equitable estoppel ‘will be enforced only to the extent that justice so requires.’ ” Beecher v. City of Cordova, 408 P.3d 1208, 1214 (Alaska 2018) (first quoting Jamison v. Consol.

2023Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978); and then quoting Mun. of Anchorage v. Schneider, 685 P.2d 94, 97 (Alaska 1984)). -88- 7658 equitable estoppel.

2023Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978); and then quoting Mun. of Anchorage v. Schneider, 685 P.2d 94, 97 (Alaska 1984)). -88- 7658 equitable estoppel.

2021Evid. 503(b) and (d)(1). 16 Munn v. Bristol Bay Housing Authority, 777 P.2d 188, 195 (Alaska 1989) (citations omitted); see also Jorgens v. State, 2013 WL 6168561 , at *4 (Alaska App. Nov. 20, 2013) (unpublished) (addressing, in the context of a criminal prosecution, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege). 17 Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66, 78 (Alaska 1976). –9– 2688 advance “a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”18 We therefore reject Williams’s claim of error and uphold the trial court’s rulin

2021Evid. 503(b) and (d)(1). 16 Munn v. Bristol Bay Housing Authority, 777 P.2d 188, 195 (Alaska 1989) (citations omitted); see also Jorgens v. State, 2013 WL 6168561 , at *4 (Alaska App. Nov. 20, 2013) (unpublished) (addressing, in the context of a criminal prosecution, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege). 17 Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66, 78 (Alaska 1976). –9– 2688 advance “a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”18 We therefore reject Williams’s claim of error and uphold the trial court’s rulin

2021Evid. 503(b) and (d)(1). 16 Munn v. Bristol Bay Housing Authority, 777 P.2d 188, 195 (Alaska 1989) (citations omitted); see also Jorgens v. State, 2013 WL 6168561 , at *4 (Alaska App. Nov. 20, 2013) (unpublished) (addressing, in the context of a criminal prosecution, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege). 17 Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66, 78 (Alaska 1976). –9– 2688 advance “a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”18 We therefore reject Williams’s claim of error and uphold the trial court’s rulin

2021Evid. 503(b) and (d)(1). 16 Munn v. Bristol Bay Housing Authority, 777 P.2d 188, 195 (Alaska 1989) (citations omitted); see also Jorgens v. State, 2013 WL 6168561 , at *4 (Alaska App. Nov. 20, 2013) (unpublished) (addressing, in the context of a criminal prosecution, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege). 17 Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66, 78 (Alaska 1976). –9– 2688 advance “a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”18 We therefore reject Williams’s claim of error and uphold the trial court’s rulin

2015See, eg, ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 322 P.3d 114, 134 (Alaska 2014) ("We affirm the superior court's order granting Williams's motion to enlarge time to file a motion for attorney's fees.

2010Park v. Park, 986 P.2d 205, 207 (Alaska 1999). 52 .

2010Id. at 302 ; see also id. at 300-01 (remanding for the trial court to also determine whether the husband's alleged violations of a long-term protective order were incidents of domestic violence that would constitute a "history'" under AS 25.24.150(h) where the trial court made no findings on the subject). 49 . - While the superior court did not expressly bar Williams from testifying about her allegations, it is unclear when during the hearing Williams would have had an opportunity to do so. 50 . - Although the trial court did refer to its earlier rulings denying domestic violence petitions fil

2010Id. at 302 ; see also id. at 300-01 (remanding for the trial court to also determine whether the husband's alleged violations of a long-term protective order were incidents of domestic violence that would constitute a "history'" under AS 25.24.150(h) where the trial court made no findings on the subject). 49 . - While the superior court did not expressly bar Williams from testifying about her allegations, it is unclear when during the hearing Williams would have had an opportunity to do so. 50 . - Although the trial court did refer to its earlier rulings denying domestic violence petitions fil

2006See State v. Roberts, 999 P.2d at 153 ("Generally courts will not resolve an issue when it is moot.”). 60 .

1997See Gillispie, 881 P.2d at 1109 .

1993See also Van Meter v. State, 743 P.2d 385, 389-91 (Alaska App.1987). *1347 It is conceivable, of course, as Williams argues, that a jury considering the evidence after Williams has been afforded an opportunity to explain or contradict the charges at trial might find a reasonable doubt as to whether the alleged touchings occurred accidentally or amounted to acts within the scope of normal caretaker functions.

1993Williams’ claim that the evidence did not establish sexual arousal or gratification on his part is beside the point, since “specific intent is no longer an element of sexual abuse of a minor.” Boggess v. State, 783 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Alaska App.1989).

1984Accord, Ningealook v. State, 691 P.2d 1053 (Alaska App. 1984) (motion to withdraw plea properly denied where defendant’s plea of nolo contendere and subsequent motion to withdraw that plea reflected an effort to circumvent trial court's denial of a pretrial request for a continuance).

1983The Williams test, as explained in McClanahan v. Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 179 , 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1266 , 36 L.Ed.2d 129, 140 (1973), “was designed to resolve [the] conflict [between State and tribal jurisdiction] by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected.” The problem here is that, as far as the record shows, the KIC does not operate as a government.

1983The Williams test, as explained in McClanahan v. Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 179 , 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1266 , 36 L.Ed.2d 129, 140 (1973), “was designed to resolve [the] conflict [between State and tribal jurisdiction] by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected.” The problem here is that, as far as the record shows, the KIC does not operate as a government.