Williams test in Michigan

2018Defendant also argues that this Court should reject plaintiffs’ argument because Williams’s analysis did not “exclude other reasonable causes.” In support of its argument, defendant relies on Fingerle v City of Ann Arbor, 498 Mich 910 (2015), in which our Supreme Court vacated the majority’s opinion in Fingerle v City of Ann Arbor, 308 Mich App 318 ; 863 NW2d 698 (2014), and adopted the concurring opinion of Judge O’Connell.

2018Defendant also argues that this Court should reject plaintiffs’ argument because Williams’s analysis did not “exclude other reasonable causes.” In support of its argument, defendant relies on Fingerle v City of Ann Arbor, 498 Mich 910 (2015), in which our Supreme Court vacated the majority’s opinion in Fingerle v City of Ann Arbor, 308 Mich App 318 ; 863 NW2d 698 (2014), and adopted the concurring opinion of Judge O’Connell.

2018Defendant also argues that this Court should reject plaintiffs’ argument because Williams’s analysis did not “exclude other reasonable causes.” In support of its argument, defendant relies on Fingerle v City of Ann Arbor, 498 Mich 910 (2015), in which our Supreme Court vacated the majority’s opinion in Fingerle v City of Ann Arbor, 308 Mich App 318 ; 863 NW2d 698 (2014), and adopted the concurring opinion of Judge O’Connell.

2018Defendant also argues that this Court should reject plaintiffs’ argument because Williams’s analysis did not “exclude other reasonable causes.” In support of its argument, defendant relies on Fingerle v City of Ann Arbor, 498 Mich 910 (2015), in which our Supreme Court vacated the majority’s opinion in Fingerle v City of Ann Arbor, 308 Mich App 318 ; 863 NW2d 698 (2014), and adopted the concurring opinion of Judge O’Connell.

2020As the Supreme Court has observed, “The upshot has been the repeated statements of this Court to the effect that, even on reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government or would impair a right granted or reserved by federal law.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v Jones, 411 US 145, 148 ; 93 S Ct 1267 ; 36 L Ed 2d 114 (1973) (citations omitted).

2020As the Supreme Court has observed, “The upshot has been the repeated statements of this Court to the effect that, even on reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government or would impair a right granted or reserved by federal law.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v Jones, 411 US 145, 148 ; 93 S Ct 1267 ; 36 L Ed 2d 114 (1973) (citations omitted).

2020These cases are relevant to our analysis because, although they address tribal sovereignty from the perspective of limitations on tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, rather than limitations on state jurisdiction, their holdings closely parallel the Williams analysis and inform the application of that analysis.”), Gustafson v Poitra, 916 NW2d 804, 810 ; 2018 ND 202 (2018) (“the lack of tribal jurisdiction is a factor to be considered in determining whether state court jurisdiction exists”), and Cordova v Holwegner, 93 Wash App 955, 967; 971 P2d 531 (1999) (“The infringement [Williams] test an

2020These cases are relevant to our analysis because, although they address tribal sovereignty from the perspective of limitations on tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, rather than limitations on state jurisdiction, their holdings closely parallel the Williams analysis and inform the application of that analysis.”), Gustafson v Poitra, 916 NW2d 804, 810 ; 2018 ND 202 (2018) (“the lack of tribal jurisdiction is a factor to be considered in determining whether state court jurisdiction exists”), and Cordova v Holwegner, 93 Wash App 955, 967; 971 P2d 531 (1999) (“The infringement [Williams] test an

2020Because states have an interest in resolving disputes involving non- Indians, and tribes have an interest in what occurs within its reservation, the Williams test “was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected.” McClanahan v State Tax Comm of Arizona, 411 US 164, 179 ; 93 S Ct 1257 ; 36 L Ed 2d 129 (1973).

2020Because states have an interest in resolving disputes involving non- Indians, and tribes have an interest in what occurs within its reservation, the Williams test “was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected.” McClanahan v State Tax Comm of Arizona, 411 US 164, 179 ; 93 S Ct 1257 ; 36 L Ed 2d 129 (1973).

2016A typical example of common plan offenses is a series of separate offenses that are committed pursuant to a conspiracy among two or more 2 Notably, the staff comment to MCR 6.121 states that, “[a] joinder of cases for trial may be based on a prosecution or defense motion.” 3 At the time of the Williams defendant’s trial, MCR 6.120 defined “related” offenses for purpose of joinder and severance as those based on “(1) the same conduct, or (2) a series of connected acts or acts constituting part of a single scheme or plan.” Williams, 483 Mich at 233 . -6- defendants.

2007Id. at 523-524 .

1997Id. at 448, 506 N.W.2d 857 .

1997Id. at 448, 506 N.W.2d 857 .

1978In People v Cochran, 84 Mich App 710, 712 ; 270 NW2d 502 (1978), this Court stated that "a failure to move for severance precludes review of that issue, except to remedy a *531 miscarriage of justice”.

1978In People v Cochran, 84 Mich App 710, 712 ; 270 NW2d 502 (1978), this Court stated that "a failure to move for severance precludes review of that issue, except to remedy a *531 miscarriage of justice”.

1970They do not alter our impression, upon reading the entire preliminary examination transcript and the entire record in this case, that Williams' plea of guilty should not be set aside because of the failure of the trial judge directly to question him before accepting his pre- Barrows guilty plea. [7] See, e.g., Edwards v. People (1878), 39 Mich 760 ; Henning v. People (1879), 40 Mich 733 . [8] Pre- Barrows cases where it was held that the defendant's conviction upon a plea of guilty would not be upset although his participation in the commission of the crime had not been established on the reco

1970They do not alter our impression, upon reading the entire preliminary examination transcript and the entire record in this case, that Williams' plea of guilty should not be set aside because of the failure of the trial judge directly to question him before accepting his pre- Barrows guilty plea. [7] See, e.g., Edwards v. People (1878), 39 Mich 760 ; Henning v. People (1879), 40 Mich 733 . [8] Pre- Barrows cases where it was held that the defendant's conviction upon a plea of guilty would not be upset although his participation in the commission of the crime had not been established on the reco

1970They do not alter our impression, upon reading the entire preliminary examination transcript and the entire record in this case, that Williams' plea of guilty should not be set aside because of the failure of the trial judge directly to question him before accepting his pre- Barrows guilty plea. [7] See, e.g., Edwards v. People (1878), 39 Mich 760 ; Henning v. People (1879), 40 Mich 733 . [8] Pre- Barrows cases where it was held that the defendant's conviction upon a plea of guilty would not be upset although his participation in the commission of the crime had not been established on the reco

1970They do not alter our impression, upon reading the entire preliminary examination transcript and the entire record in this case, that Williams' plea of guilty should not be set aside because of the failure of the trial judge directly to question him before accepting his pre- Barrows guilty plea. [7] See, e.g., Edwards v. People (1878), 39 Mich 760 ; Henning v. People (1879), 40 Mich 733 . [8] Pre- Barrows cases where it was held that the defendant's conviction upon a plea of guilty would not be upset although his participation in the commission of the crime had not been established on the reco

1970See, e.g., Edwards v. People (1878), 39 Mich 760 ; Henning v. People (1879), 40 Mich 733 .

1970In People v. Combs (1968), 15 Mich App 450 , another case concerning pre- Barrows guilty pleas, the defendant pled guilty on November 6, 1958 to separate charges of taking indecent liberties [9] and to possession of burglary tools. [10] The trial judge had failed to examine Combs regarding his participation in the commission of either offense before he accepted the guilty pleas.

1970In People v. Combs (1968), 15 Mich App 450 , another case concerning pre-Barrows guilty pleas, the defendant pled guilty on November 6, 1958 to separate charges of taking indecent liberties 9 and to possession of burglary tools. 10 The trial judge had failed to examine Combs regarding his participation in the commission of either offense before he accepted the guilty pleas.

1970In People v. Merhige (1920), 212 Mich 601 , the guilty plea was set aside, not because of the inadequacy of the examination of the defendant by the trial judge, but rather because the examination supported the defendant's claim that his plea was not well advised and voluntary.

1966Two more Justices (Souris and Adams), finding themselves unable to “subscribe his [Justice O’Hara’s] opinion because of the different views we take of the recent decisions of this Court herein cited,” joined “in the result reached by Justice O’Hara,” saying that the “result” was “to overrule Lewis v. Genesee County (1963), 370 Mich 110 .” No other Justice supported that.

1966Two more Justices (Souris and Adams), finding themselves unable to “subscribe his [Justice O’Hara’s] opinion because of the different views we take of the recent decisions of this Court herein cited,” joined “in the result reached by Justice O’Hara,” saying that the “result” was “to overrule Lewis v. Genesee County (1963), 370 Mich 110 .” No other Justice supported that.