fraudulent concealment doctrine in Delaware

2026Ch. 2007)) (alteration in original). 34 away from the truth.”73 “The rationale for this doctrine is to disallow a defendant from taking advantage of his own wrong in preventing a plaintiff from [filing] a timely suit in the courts.”74 Under Delaware law, inquiry notice universally limits tolling doctrines.75 A plaintiff cannot invoke tolling doctrines to push the timeliness period beyond the point when the plaintiff “was objectively aware, or should have been aware, of facts giving rise to the wrong.”76 “Even where a defendant uses every fraudulent device at its disposal to mislead a victim or

2022Fraudulent concealment is an intentional nondisclosure of material facts by one who owes a duty to disclose; typically, the defrauding party has knowledge of the facts they are concealing.192 A valid claim for fraudulent concealment requires that a plaintiff demonstrate the defendant engaged in an “affirmative act of concealment” that “put the plaintiff off the trail of inquiry,” preventing them “from gaining knowledge of the facts.”193 Put simply, a fraudulent concealment claim must 190 See Pls.’ Br. in Opp. at 30-31. 191 Broska, 668 A.2d at 1364 . 192 Allen v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261, 264 (Del.

2026“Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, a statute of limitations … can be ‘disregarded when a defendant has fraudulently concealed from a plaintiff the facts necessary to put [the plaintiff] on notice of the truth.’” 72 For tolling to apply, “a plaintiff must allege an affirmative act of ‘actual artifice’ by the defendant that either prevented the plaintiff from gaining knowledge of material facts or led the plaintiff 70 AB at 67. 71 See IAC/InterActiveCorp v. O’Brien, 26 A.3d 174 , 177–78 (Del. 2011). 72 LGM Hldgs., LLC v. Schurder, 340 A.3d 1134 , 1146 (Del. 2025) (quoting In re Tyson

2025“Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, a statute of limitations . . . can be ‘disregarded when a defendant has fraudulently concealed from a plaintiff the facts necessary to put [the plaintiff] on notice of the truth.’” LGM Hldgs., LLC v. Schurder, 340 A.3d 1134 , 1146 (Del. 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 585 (Del.

2023Following any such filings, or if no such submissions 82 See Ewing, 520 A.2d at 667 (“When a plaintiff wishes to rely on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, a prerequisite is for the Complaint to allege that the health care provider had actual knowledge of the wrong done and acted affirmatively in concealing the facts from the patient.”). 83 See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 35:3–8; id. at 38:14–20; see also Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n at 21. 84 See Reylek v. Albence, 2023 WL 142522 , at *6 & n.51 (Del.

2023Following any such filings, or if no such submissions 82 See Ewing, 520 A.2d at 667 (“When a plaintiff wishes to rely on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, a prerequisite is for the Complaint to allege that the health care provider had actual knowledge of the wrong done and acted affirmatively in concealing the facts from the patient.”). 83 See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 35:3–8; id. at 38:14–20; see also Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n at 21. 84 See Reylek v. Albence, 2023 WL 142522 , at *6 & n.51 (Del.

2025Given these facts, the Superior Court did not err in finding that Biden 99 See Shockley v. Dyer, 456 A.2d 798 , 799–800 (Del. 1983) (finding that the statute of limitations was not tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment because “the plaintiff could have discovered her rights by exercising due diligence . . . .”). 100 See supra note 3. 34 was on inquiry notice of his invasion-of-privacy-by-intrusion claim on October 14, 2020.

1986In Shockley v. Dyer, 456 A.2d at p. 799 (1983), the Supreme Court stated that in order to invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment: “The physician must have used some ‘actual artifice’ which prevented plaintiff from gaining knowledge of the facts or have made some misrepresentation which was intended to put plaintiff off the trail of inquiry.” The general rule in other jurisdictions is that “mere silence of a person concerning a cause of action which arises against him is not sufficient to prevent the running of the statute of limitations ...” 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 149.

2025Still, “the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff is objectively aware of the facts giving rise to the wrong, i.e. on inquiry notice.” Id. at 1147 (quoting Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 451 (Del.

2025Still, “the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff is objectively aware of the facts giving rise to the wrong, i.e. on inquiry notice.” Id. at 1147 (quoting Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 451 (Del.

2025Md. 2003) (disallowing plaintiffs to bring both claims because the fraudulent concealment claim was preempted by the Labeling Act); Hamner v. BMY Combat Sys., 869 F.Supp. 888, 892 (D.

2025Oct. 5, 2021) (noting that an affirmative act is required for tolling under the fraudulent concealment doctrine and that “mere silence is insufficient”). 170 Dean Witter, 1998 WL 442456 , at *5; see also Wal-Mart Stores, 860 A.2d at 319 (citation omitted). 171 Dean Witter, 1998 WL 442456 , at *6. 37 The plaintiffs conflate these distinct tolling doctrines.172 Substantively, their theory most aligns with inherently unknowable injuries.173 They posit that, because they relied on representations by Katz and others, the state of UpHealth and the Portfolio Companies “was entirely in [the d]efendant

2025Compl. ¶ 153 (“[Kathuria and the Gig2 Defendants] affirmatively and fraudulently concealed their unlawful scheme, course of conduct, and conspiracy from Plaintiffs.” (emphasis added)); but see Pls.’ Answering Br. 16 (“If a reasonable inference can be made [that] the plaintiff was blamelessly ignorant of the ‘wrongful acts’ until a time that is within the applicable statute of limitations, that is all that is required at the motion to dismiss stage.” (citing Wal-Mart Stores, 860 A.2d at 319 )); id. at 20-21 (analogizing to a case in which tolling applied under the “discovery rule,” which is oft

2023CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106(a). 127 Levy v. Brownstone Asset Mgmt., LP, 76 A.3d 764, 768 (Del. 2013) (citation omitted). 128 Worrel v. Farmers Bank of State of Del., 430 A.2d 469, 472 (Del. 1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 129 Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP, 2021 WL 3620435 , at *21 (Del.

2023CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106(a). 127 Levy v. Brownstone Asset Mgmt., LP, 76 A.3d 764, 768 (Del. 2013) (citation omitted). 128 Worrel v. Farmers Bank of State of Del., 430 A.2d 469, 472 (Del. 1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 129 Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP, 2021 WL 3620435 , at *21 (Del.

2021DOCTRINE OF FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT Plaintiffs next claim that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment (the “doctrine”) applies to this case and estops Boston Scientific from asserting any statute of limitations defense.26 A party wishing to invoke the doctrine must prove each of the following four elements: “(1) the defendant made a false representation or concealed material facts; (2) the plaintiff lack[ed] knowledge of the true facts; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff to act upon such [false] representations; and (4) the plaintiff did in fact rely upon such [false] representations.”27

2021A plaintiff asserting the doctrine must also show that the defendant “engaged in some affirmative act to conceal the cause of action” unless the defendant bears a confidential or fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff.32 Boston Scientific did 29 Id. 30 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted.) 31 As an initial matter, it was procedurally appropriate for Plaintiffs to invoke the doctrine for the first time in this litigation in their Opposition Brief.

2019Laches Bars The Counterclaims The allegations in the counterclaims reveal that Defendants’ claims accrued for statute of limitations (and laches) purposes no later than June 17, 2013.55 Each 51 See Krahmer v. Christie’s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 778 (Del.

2019Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply Here Defendants maintain that the brothers’ “repeated misstatements of fact” triggers equitable tolling.88 Delaware courts will apply equitable tolling in rare cases “where the facts underlying a claim were so hidden that a reasonable plaintiff could not timely discover them.”89 When the claimant alleges that tolling is justified because defendants’ fraud obscured the existence of the claim, the tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment, not equitable estoppel, provides the proper analytical framework.90 That doctrine permits tolling only where the plaintiff h