60 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hughes v. Glaesegreen2 sentences2013Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, “a person is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense if that person, by deception or violation of a duty, has concealed material facts from the plaintiff and thereby prevented discovery of a wrong.” Boggs, 730 N.E.2d at 698 (citing Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind. 1995)). 1998Fraudulent Concealment Our supreme court has held that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment “operates to estop a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense when that person, by deception or violation of a duty, has concealed material from the plaintiff thereby preventing discovery of a wrong.” Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind.1995) (emphasis supplied). | 5 | 6 |
Fager v. Hundtgreen2 sentences2016Fager [v. Hundt], 610 N.E.2d 246 , 253 n. 5 (Ind.1993) (“While the fraudulent concealment exception is an equitable doctrine, the relevant facts may be determined by a jury in the event of trial”). 2014Fager, 610 N.E.2d at 253 n. 5 (“While the fraudulent concealment exception is an equitable doctrine, the relevant facts may be determined by a jury in the event of trial.”). | 4 | 11 |
Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child & Family Services, Inc.green2 sentences2020Specifically, the City argues that LWG fraudulently concealed the Memo and, as a result, the statute of limitations period should be tolled. [36] The fraudulent concealment doctrine “operates to estop a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to a claim whenever the defendant, by his own actions, prevents the plaintiff from obtaining the knowledge necessary to pursue a claim.” Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child & Family Servs., 718 N.E.2d 738, 744 (Ind. 1999). 2017Even where a statute of limitations has expired, a plaintiff may be able to proceed under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which “is an equitable doctrine which operates to prevent a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to a claim where the defendant, by his own actions, prevents the plaintiff from obtaining the knowledge necessary to pursue a claim.” Meisenhelder v. Zipp Express, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 924, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child & Family Servs., Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 744-45 (Ind, 1999)). | 4 | 4 |
Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc.green2 sentences2018Theresa asserts that the period should be tolled by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, and she designated Dr. Nasir's affidavit to establish an issue of fact material to that theory. [17] Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, "a person is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense if that person, by deception or violation of a duty, has concealed material facts from the plaintiff and thereby prevented discovery of a wrong." Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc. , 730 N.E.2d 692 , 698 (Ind. 2000). 2013Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, “a person is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense if that person, by deception or violation of a duty, has concealed material facts from the plaintiff and thereby prevented discovery of a wrong.” Boggs, 730 N.E.2d at 698 (citing Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind. 1995)). | 3 | 7 |
Guy v. SCHULDTgreen2 sentences1985The court then introduced the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 236 Ind. at 107 , 138 N.E.2d at 895 . 1985The court then introduced the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 236 Ind. at 107 , 138 N.E.2d at 895 . | 2 | 8 |
Garneau v. Bushgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 1143 . [29] Smith argues that the malpractice was not discovered until August 2011 and that, under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, she had a full two years after that date to file her proposed complaint. 2016Smith directs us to evidence that Dr. Fehrenbacher did not provide her with the results of her original segmental pressure study from March 2010 until Dr. Fehrenbacher did further follow-up in August 2011. [27] Under the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment, “a defendant who has prevented a plaintiff from discovering an otherwise valid claim, by violation of duty or deception, is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense.” Id. at 1142 . | 2 | 4 |
Burks v. Rushmoregreen2 sentences2009"When the fraudulent concealment exception applies, ... the equitable grounds cease when a person, once becoming an adult, knows or should have discovered that a childhood injury was sustained as a result of the defendant's tortious conduct." Id. 1991The “doctrine of fraudulent concealment ... operates as an equitable doctrine to estop a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations when he has, either by deception or by a violation of a duty, concealed from the plaintiff material facts thereby preventing the plaintiff from discovering a potential cause of action.” Burks v. Rushmore (1989), Ind., 534 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 . | 1 | 4 |
Cyrus v. Nerogreen2 sentences1996Yarnell v. Hurley, 572 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied; Cyrus v. Nero, 546 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind.Ct.App.1989). 1990Cyrus v. Nero (1989), Ind.App., 546 N.E.2d 328 . | 1 | 2 |
Lambert v. Starkgreen2 sentences1996Lambert v. Stark, 484 N.E.2d 630, 632 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied. 1991Lambert v. Stark (1985), Ind.App., 484 N.E.2d 630, 632 . | 1 | 2 |
Virginia E. Alldredge and Julia A. Luker, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Venita Hargis v. The Good Samaritan Home, Inc.green1 sentence2023See Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc., 9 N.E. 3d 1257 (Ind. 2014) (reciting the history of legislation concerning the fraudulent concealment doctrine). | 1 | 1 |
Babcock v. Lafayette Home Hospital, Womans Clinicgreen1 sentence2018See Babcock v. Lafayette Home Hosp., Woman’s Clinic, 587 N.E.2d 1320, 1323 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding the doctrine inapplicable where the alleged injury was the retention of a surgical sponge inside the patient, determining that leaving the sponge behind and, later, misreading a chest x-ray were “isolated” events). [17] Finally, Musselman asserts that a defense based upon the statute of limitations should not be available to the Health Care Providers because of the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment. | 1 | 1 |
GRADUS-PIZLO v. Actongreen1 sentence2018Continuing Wrong [12] “‘The doctrine of continuing wrong applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury.’” Snyder, 20 N.E.3d at 552 (quoting Gradus- Pizlo v. Acton, 964 N.E.2d 865, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. AMAX COAL COMPANYgreen2 sentences2017See Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (Ratliff, J., dissenting), vacated on transfer by Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1986), reh’g denied. 2017See Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (Ratliff, J., dissenting), vacated on transfer by Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1986), reh’g denied. | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. Amax Coal Co.green2 sentences2017See Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (Ratliff, J., dissenting), vacated on transfer by Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1986), reh’g denied. 2017See Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (Ratliff, J., dissenting), vacated on transfer by Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1986), reh’g denied. | 1 | 1 |
Meisenhelder v. Zipp Express, Inc.green1 sentence2017Even where a statute of limitations has expired, a plaintiff may be able to proceed under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which “is an equitable doctrine which operates to prevent a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to a claim where the defendant, by his own actions, prevents the plaintiff from obtaining the knowledge necessary to pursue a claim.” Meisenhelder v. Zipp Express, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 924, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child & Family Servs., Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 744-45 (Ind, 1999)). | 1 | 1 |
Southerland v. Hammondgreen1 sentence2014Citing Southerland v. Hammond, 693 N.E.2d 74, 78 (Ind. Ct.App.1998), in which a panel of our Court of Appeals stated that as to a wrongful death claim, “the fraudulent concealment exception does not establish a new date for the commencement of the statute of limitations, but rather creates an equitable exception” under which a “plaintiff must institute an action within a reasonable time after he discovers information which would lead to discovery of the cause of action,” the trial court concluded the plaintiffs had waited too long after learning the true cause of death: a year to open the esta | 1 | 1 |
Kb Home Indiana Inc. v. Rockville Tbd Corp.green1 sentence2014See KB Home Ind., Inc. v. Rockville TBD Corp., 928 N.E.2d 297, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (plaintiff had no claim for trespass because it did not own the property when the damage occurred). 7 R&M and the Trust assert that they should be allowed to bring a trespass claim against Twin Lakes under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. | 1 | 1 |
FARMERS ELEV. CO. OF OAKVILLE v. Hamiltongreen1 sentence2010"Usually, to invoke the protection provided by this statute, the wrongdoer must have actively concealed the cause of action and the plaintiff is charged with the responsibility of exercising due diligence to discover the claims." Farmers Elevator Co. of Oakville, Inc. v. Hamilton, 926 N.E.2d 68, 79 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Roe No. 1, and Roe No. 2green2 sentences2009Doe v. Rog, 52 F.3d 151, 155 (7th Cir.1995). 2009The court disagreed, interpreting the fraudulent concealment exception announced in Fager to apply only to "actions by parents which result in injuries to their children, not omissions by parents which allow injuries to occur." Id. at 155 . | 1 | 1 |
| Ogle v. St. John's Hickey Memorial Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coffer v. Arndtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yarnell v. Hurleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Montgomery v. Crumgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carrow v. Streetergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chaffin v. Nicosiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Spoljaric v. Pangan
green
2 sentences1989Ferrell, supra; Spoljaric, supra; Nahmias, supra. Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, however, the plaintiff does not have two full years from the discovery of the alleged malpractice in which to file a claim. 1989Ferrell, supra; Spoljaric, supra; Nahmias, supra. Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, however, the plaintiff does not have two full years from the discovery of the alleged malpractice in which to file a claim. | 5 | 1987–1993 |
Nahmias v. Trustees of Indiana University
green
2 sentences1989Ferrell, supra; Spoljaric, supra; Nahmias, supra. Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, however, the plaintiff does not have two full years from the discovery of the alleged malpractice in which to file a claim. 1989Ferrell, supra; Spoljaric, supra; Nahmias, supra. Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, however, the plaintiff does not have two full years from the discovery of the alleged malpractice in which to file a claim. | 4 | 1987–1989 |
Ferrell v. Geisler
green
2 sentences1989Ferrell, supra; Spoljaric, supra; Nahmias, supra. Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, however, the plaintiff does not have two full years from the discovery of the alleged malpractice in which to file a claim. 1989Ferrell, supra; Spoljaric, supra; Nahmias, supra. Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, however, the plaintiff does not have two full years from the discovery of the alleged malpractice in which to file a claim. | 3 | 1988–1989 |
Martin v. Richey
green
2 sentences2000DISCUSSION We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant in light of our holding in Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273 (1999), which established that the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs who are unable to discover their medical malpractice claims before the expiration of the limitations period. 1999Bess further argues that the date of the termination of a physician-patient relationship is not a matter of law, as the Court of Appeals decided, but is a determination which must be left to the fact-finder. 8 We granted transfer, Weinberg v. Bess, No. 45S03-9503-CV-307 (Ind. Mar.3, 1995), and now discuss Bess’s claim in light of our decision in Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind.1999). 9 We also briefly discuss the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, but note that a decision in Bess’s favor with regard to the statute of limitations question makes it unnecessary for us to exercise our equi | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Hospital Corp. of America v. Hiland
green
2 sentences1995When the concealment is constructive-the failure of a physician to disclose material information to a patient-such duty to disclose ceases at the termination of the physician-patient relationship, and "estoppel will be denied if the plaintiff fails to exercise due diligence in filing his claim after the equitable grounds cease to be operational as a valid basis for inducing the plaintiff's delay." Hospital Corp., 547 N.E.2d at 873 . 1991The fraudulent concealment doctrine was described in Hospital Corp. of America v. Hiland (1989), Ind.App., 547 N.E.2d 869 , 873: The doctrine of fraudulent conceal ment operates to estop a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense when that person, by deception or a violation of a duty, has concealed material facts from the plaintiff thereby preventing discovery of a wrong. | 2 | 1991–1995 |
Van Bronckhorst v. Taube
green
2 sentences1983Van Bronckhorst v. Taube (1976), 168 Ind.App. 132, 138 , 341 N.E.2d 791, 796 . 1983Van Bronckhorst v. Taube (1976), 168 Ind.App. 132, 138 , 341 N.E.2d 791, 796 . | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Snyder v. Town of Yorktown
green
1 sentence2018Continuing Wrong [12] “‘The doctrine of continuing wrong applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury.’” Snyder, 20 N.E.3d at 552 (quoting Gradus- Pizlo v. Acton, 964 N.E.2d 865, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
GYN-OB Consultants, L.L.C. v. Schopp
green
1 sentence2018"There are two types of fraudulent concealment, active and passive." GYN-OB Consultants, LLC v. Schopp , 780 N.E.2d 1206 , 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Murphy v. Mortell
green
1 sentence2008Ob-Gyn cites four: (1) in Murphy v. Mortell, 684 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied, this court held that an allegation of sexual battery upon a hospital patient against a critical care respiratory therapy technician did not fall within the Medical Malpractice Act; (2) in Smith v. Hull, 659 N.E.2d 185 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied, we concluded there was no error in instructing the jury in a medical malpractice lawsuit alleging medical negligence in injecting prosthetic human hair into the scalp of a man with male pattern baldness; (3) in Battema v. Booth, 853 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind.Ct. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Battema v. Booth
green
1 sentence2008Ob-Gyn cites four: (1) in Murphy v. Mortell, 684 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied, this court held that an allegation of sexual battery upon a hospital patient against a critical care respiratory therapy technician did not fall within the Medical Malpractice Act; (2) in Smith v. Hull, 659 N.E.2d 185 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied, we concluded there was no error in instructing the jury in a medical malpractice lawsuit alleging medical negligence in injecting prosthetic human hair into the scalp of a man with male pattern baldness; (3) in Battema v. Booth, 853 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind.Ct. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Smith v. Hull
green
1 sentence2008Ob-Gyn cites four: (1) in Murphy v. Mortell, 684 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied, this court held that an allegation of sexual battery upon a hospital patient against a critical care respiratory therapy technician did not fall within the Medical Malpractice Act; (2) in Smith v. Hull, 659 N.E.2d 185 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied, we concluded there was no error in instructing the jury in a medical malpractice lawsuit alleging medical negligence in injecting prosthetic human hair into the scalp of a man with male pattern baldness; (3) in Battema v. Booth, 853 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind.Ct. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Olcott International & Co. v. Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Ayers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Keesling v. Baker & Daniels green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Weinberg v. Bess green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Jones v. Cloyd green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Walters v. Rinker green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Frady v. Hedgcock green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Coyne v. Campbell green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Toth v. Lenk green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Meier v. Combs green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.