6 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kern Ex Rel. Kern v. St. Joseph Hospital, Inc.green2 sentences2005We noted a few exceptions to this strict rule, as recognized by the district court in the present case, including the doctrine of fraudulent concealment: “Fraudulent conduct has always provided equitable grounds for relaxing a statutory time limit.” Id. ¶ 54, 918 P.2d 1321 (relying on Kern, 102 N.M. at 456 , 697 P.2d at 139 ). {10} The date that George performed the closed reduction on Tomlinson’s wrist, August 20, 1996, is the date that the alleged act of malpractice occurred. 2003Defendant relies on the rule expressed in Kern that to toll the statute under the fraudulent concealment doctrine Plaintiff must show she “did not know, or could not have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of [her] cause of action within the statutory period.” Id. at 456, 697 P.2d at 139 (emphasis added). | 2 | 3 |
Keithley Ex Rel. Estate of Keithley v. St. Joseph's Hospitalgreen2 sentences2005Joseph’s Hosp., 102 N.M. 565, 569 , 698 P.2d 435, 439 (Ct.App.1984) (involving medical malpractice). {23} As to the fraudulent concealment doctrine, we have not seen, and Plaintiffs have not pointed out, anything in the record that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants engaged in fraudulent concealment. 2005Joseph’s Hosp., 102 N.M. 565, 569 , 698 P.2d 435, 439 (Ct.App.1984) (involving medical malpractice). {23} As to the fraudulent concealment doctrine, we have not seen, and Plaintiffs have not pointed out, anything in the record that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants engaged in fraudulent concealment. | 2 | 2 |
Garcia on Behalf of Garcia v. La Fargegreen2 sentences2005Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 536-37 , 893 P.2d 428, 432-33 (1995) and Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico, 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶¶ 47-55, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 . 2005Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 536-37 , 893 P.2d 428, 432-33 (1995) and Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico, 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶¶ 47-55, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 . | 1 | 2 |
Bailey v. Glovergreen1 sentence2016Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959). {8} It is well settled in both “general common law” and “federal law[] that fraudulent concealment of a cause of action by the defendant will toll the statute of limitations.” Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1971) (citations and footnote omitted); see, e.g., Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 347-50 (1874) (tolling the statute of limitations period because the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of assets during bankruptcy proceedings prevented the plaintiff from discovering the injury incurred by that concealment); Holmberg v. | 1 | 1 |
Tomlinson v. Georgegreen2 sentences2016Id.; see also Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 13, 15 , 138 N.M. 34 , 116 P.3d 105 (concluding that fraudulent concealment did not preclude the defendant from asserting the limitations period as a defense because the defendant did not prevent the plaintiff from filing suit within the statutory period). 2016Id.; see also Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 13, 15 , 138 N.M. 34 , 116 P.3d 105 (concluding that fraudulent concealment did not preclude the defendant from asserting the limitations period as a defense because the defendant did not prevent the plaintiff from filing suit within the statutory period). | 1 | 1 |
Perry v. Stavergreen1 sentence2016See id. {15} We have likewise distinguished fraudulent concealment from a discovery rule. | 1 | 1 |
Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminalgreen1 sentence2016Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959). {8} It is well settled in both “general common law” and “federal law[] that fraudulent concealment of a cause of action by the defendant will toll the statute of limitations.” Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1971) (citations and footnote omitted); see, e.g., Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 347-50 (1874) (tolling the statute of limitations period because the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of assets during bankruptcy proceedings prevented the plaintiff from discovering the injury incurred by that concealment); Holmberg v. | 1 | 1 |
Holmberg v. Armbrechtgreen1 sentence2016Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959). {8} It is well settled in both “general common law” and “federal law[] that fraudulent concealment of a cause of action by the defendant will toll the statute of limitations.” Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1971) (citations and footnote omitted); see, e.g., Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 347-50 (1874) (tolling the statute of limitations period because the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of assets during bankruptcy proceedings prevented the plaintiff from discovering the injury incurred by that concealment); Holmberg v. | 1 | 1 |
Lopez Ex Rel. Lopez v. Maezgreen2 sentences2016NMSA 1978, § 38-1-3 (1876); see Lopez v. Maez, 1982-NMSC-103 , ¶ 6, 98 N.M. 625 , 651 P.2d 1269 . 2016NMSA 1978, § 38-1-3 (1876); see Lopez v. Maez, 1982-NMSC-103 , ¶ 6, 98 N.M. 625 , 651 P.2d 1269 . | 1 | 1 |
Richard S. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc.green1 sentence2016Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959). {8} It is well settled in both “general common law” and “federal law[] that fraudulent concealment of a cause of action by the defendant will toll the statute of limitations.” Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1971) (citations and footnote omitted); see, e.g., Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 347-50 (1874) (tolling the statute of limitations period because the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of assets during bankruptcy proceedings prevented the plaintiff from discovering the injury incurred by that concealment); Holmberg v. | 1 | 1 |
Wolf and Klar Cos. v. Garnergreen2 sentences1993See Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 118 , 679 P.2d 258, 260 (1984) (application of equitable defenses is in the sound discretion of the trial court). 1993See Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 118 , 679 P.2d 258, 260 (1984) (application of equitable defenses is in the sound discretion of the trial court). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico, P. C.
green
2 sentences2005We noted a few exceptions to this strict rule, as recognized by the district court in the present case, including the doctrine of fraudulent concealment: “Fraudulent conduct has always provided equitable grounds for relaxing a statutory time limit.” Id. ¶ 54, 918 P.2d 1321 (relying on Kern, 102 N.M. at 456 , 697 P.2d at 139 ). {10} The date that George performed the closed reduction on Tomlinson’s wrist, August 20, 1996, is the date that the alleged act of malpractice occurred. 2005Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 54, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 . {24} Because the fraudulent concealment doctrine does not toll Section 41-5-13 for Tomlinson, and because the district court ruled on the issue, we address whether the due process analysis excuses Tomlinson’s late filing. | 2 | 2003–2005 |
Sauter v. St. Michael's College
green
2 sentences2016Not only has New Mexico adopted the common law, to the extent it is applicable to our “condition and circumstances,” Johnson v. Amstutz, 1984-NMSC-030 , ¶ 3, 101 N.M. 94 , 678 P.2d 1169 , the New Mexico courts likewise generally adhere to the proposition that one should not be allowed to take advantage of one’s own wrong, see, e.g., Sauter v. Saint Michael’s College, 1962-NMSC-107 , ¶ 24, 70 N.M. 380 , 374 P.2d 134 (“To permit the defendant to invoke the doctrine of estoppel against a situation created by his own fraud would certainly not be in keeping with the principles of equity and it is a 2016Not only has New Mexico adopted the common law, to the extent it is applicable to our “condition and circumstances,” Johnson v. Amstutz, 1984-NMSC-030 , ¶ 3, 101 N.M. 94 , 678 P.2d 1169 , the New Mexico courts likewise generally adhere to the proposition that one should not be allowed to take advantage of one’s own wrong, see, e.g., Sauter v. Saint Michael’s College, 1962-NMSC-107 , ¶ 24, 70 N.M. 380 , 374 P.2d 134 (“To permit the defendant to invoke the doctrine of estoppel against a situation created by his own fraud would certainly not be in keeping with the principles of equity and it is a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Johnson v. Amstutz
neutral
2 sentences2016Not only has New Mexico adopted the common law, to the extent it is applicable to our “condition and circumstances,” Johnson v. Amstutz, 1984-NMSC-030 , ¶ 3, 101 N.M. 94 , 678 P.2d 1169 , the New Mexico courts likewise generally adhere to the proposition that one should not be allowed to take advantage of one’s own wrong, see, e.g., Sauter v. Saint Michael’s College, 1962-NMSC-107 , ¶ 24, 70 N.M. 380 , 374 P.2d 134 (“To permit the defendant to invoke the doctrine of estoppel against a situation created by his own fraud would certainly not be in keeping with the principles of equity and it is a 2016Not only has New Mexico adopted the common law, to the extent it is applicable to our “condition and circumstances,” Johnson v. Amstutz, 1984-NMSC-030 , ¶ 3, 101 N.M. 94 , 678 P.2d 1169 , the New Mexico courts likewise generally adhere to the proposition that one should not be allowed to take advantage of one’s own wrong, see, e.g., Sauter v. Saint Michael’s College, 1962-NMSC-107 , ¶ 24, 70 N.M. 380 , 374 P.2d 134 (“To permit the defendant to invoke the doctrine of estoppel against a situation created by his own fraud would certainly not be in keeping with the principles of equity and it is a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Tomlinson v. George
neutral
2 sentences2005The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court by unanimous opinion based on several cases from this Court, Tomlinson v. George, 2003-NMCA-004 , ¶¶ 25, 27, 133 N.M. 69 , 61 P.3d 195 , and we granted Tomlinson’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. {2} We address whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine equitably tolls the statute of repose, NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976), so as to permit Tomlinson to file a malpractice action more than three years after the alleged act of malpractice in light of the fact that she was aware of the act four months into the three-year period 2005The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court by unanimous opinion based on several cases from this Court, Tomlinson v. George, 2003-NMCA-004 , ¶¶ 25, 27, 133 N.M. 69 , 61 P.3d 195 , and we granted Tomlinson’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. {2} We address whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine equitably tolls the statute of repose, NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976), so as to permit Tomlinson to file a malpractice action more than three years after the alleged act of malpractice in light of the fact that she was aware of the act four months into the three-year period | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Juarez v. Nelson
green
2 sentences2005We take this opportunity to clarify the fraudulent concealment doctrine and Section 41-5-13, as well as to resolve conflicting Court of Appeals’ cases on this issue, compare Tomlinson, 2003-NMCA-004, ¶ 25 , 133 N.M. 69 , 61 P.3d 195 (concluding that Section 41-5-13 is not tolled by fraudulent concealment when the malpractice was discovered six weeks into the statutory period), with Juarez v. Nelson, 2003-NMCA-011, ¶¶ 22-25 , 133 N.M. 168 , 61 P.3d 877 (concluding that fraudulent concealment tolls Section 41-5-13 when the malpractice was discovered two weeks into the statutory period). {3} Fina 2005We take this opportunity to clarify the fraudulent concealment doctrine and Section 41-5-13, as well as to resolve conflicting Court of Appeals’ cases on this issue, compare Tomlinson, 2003-NMCA-004, ¶ 25 , 133 N.M. 69 , 61 P.3d 195 (concluding that Section 41-5-13 is not tolled by fraudulent concealment when the malpractice was discovered six weeks into the statutory period), with Juarez v. Nelson, 2003-NMCA-011, ¶¶ 22-25 , 133 N.M. 168 , 61 P.3d 877 (concluding that fraudulent concealment tolls Section 41-5-13 when the malpractice was discovered two weeks into the statutory period). {3} Fina | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.