fraudulent concealment claim in Florida

1998Similarly, in Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25 (Fla.1976), modified on other grounds, Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177 (Fla.1993), fraudulent concealment was explained as impacting the accrual of the cause of action by "prevent[ing] plaintiffs from discovering their cause of action," Nardone, 333 So.2d at 37 .

1998Similarly, in Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25 (Fla.1976), modified on other grounds, Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177 (Fla.1993), fraudulent concealment was explained as impacting the accrual of the cause of action by "prevent[ing] plaintiffs from discovering their cause of action," Nardone, 333 So.2d at 37 .

2020Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Calloway, 201 So. 3d 753, 766 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“The instruction need not include reliance on ‘a statement’ unless the facts of the case warrant it.

2017Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Calloway, 201 So. 3d 753, 766 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), this Court considered the propriety of a jury instruction on a smoker’s fraudulent concealment claim and held that it did not pass legal muster because it failed to instruct the jury that detrimental reliance was necessary.

2022The Engle class complaint had brought a single fraud count, under the heading “Fraud and Misrepresentation.” See Amended Class Action - 13 - Complaint for Compensatory and Punitive Damages at 38, Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (No. SC03-1856).

2012See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla.2006).

2016The Tobacco Companies rely on Wright v. Yurko, 446 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), for the proposition that “[a]n actionable conspiracy requires an actionable underlying tort or wrong.” Id. at 1165 .

2016The Tobacco Companies rely on Wright v. Yurko, 446 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), for the proposition that “[a]n actionable conspiracy requires an actionable underlying tort or wrong.” Id. at 1165 .

2020What is necessary is that an instruction properly tailored to the facts of the case apprise the jury of the essential element of ‘reliance’ in a fraudulent concealment claim.”); see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Duignan, 243 So. 3d 426, 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (determining that “a special jury instruction demanding reliance on ‘a statement’ was not required in this case”) 3; but see R.J.

2017In doing so, we wrote: “[I]n a post-Engle case, a plaintiff alleging fraudulent concealment need only prove that he or she detrimentally relied upon the defendant tobacco corporation’s misinformation.” [Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton, 104 So. 3d 1145, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013}] (emphasis added).

2017Id. (emphasis added).

2015Although Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So.2d 404, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), affirmed the dismissal of a fraudulent concealment claim involving genital herpes, it did so without discussion of how the fraud claim was pled, so its weight as authority on this issue is minimal.

2013Quoting Wright v. Yurko, 446 So.2d 1162, 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), the Tobacco Companies argue, “[a]n actionable conspiracy requires an actionable underlying tort or wrong.” They further argue, referencing our words from Palm Beach County Health Care District v. Professional Medical Education Inc., 13 So.3d 1090, 1096 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), that when “the counts regarding the goals of the conspiracy ... fail, so too the conspiracy count must fail.” Additionally, the Tobacco Companies argue the Plaintiff failed to prove Margot relied upon any statements made by any of the co-conspirators.

2004Berisford v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 667 So.2d 809, 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 288 .

1999Weekly S578 , ___ So.2d ___, 1997 WL 589312 (Fla.1997), as followed by Hearndon v. Graham, 710 So.2d 87, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

1995In rejecting the argument that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is a statutory creation which does not apply to toll the statute of limitations in a wrongful death action and applies only in medical malpractice actions, our court recently explained in Sullivan v. Fulton County Administrator, 662 So.2d 706, 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995): That argument is unpersuasive because, when our supreme court adopted the doctrine of fraudulent concealment in Proctor [v. Schomberg, 63 So.2d 68 ] in 1953, there were no provisions for fraudulent concealment in our statutes of limitations.

1995See University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000, 1003 (Fla.1991).