59 California opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2026 24 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc.green2 sentences2019(Bernson, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 931 .) MGA contends this is “a paradigmatic case for application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine,” and the trial court “failed to understand that fraudulent concealment applies even if a plaintiff knew of its cause of action, where the defendant fraudulently concealed material facts about the nature and scope of the claim, thereby thwarting the plaintiff’s investigation and running out the clock.” We do not agree. 14 MGA relies on general statements plucked from treatises and California cases dating back to 1944, but these do not assist MGA. 2019Bernson explained that the fraudulent concealment rule is a “close cousin of the discovery rule,” and “its rationale ‘is that the culpable defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to the extent that it hindered an “otherwise diligent” plaintiff in discovering his cause of action.’ ” (Bernson, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 931 .) Here, MGA had already discovered its cause of action by not later than 2007. | 4 | 8 |
Regents of University of California v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023(See Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 796 (Boeken).) In opposition, Robert argued that although the survivor claims were filed more than two years after the Incident, the statute of limitations did not bar them based on (1) “the discovery rule” (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397 ); (2) “[t]he doctrine of fraudulent concealment” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533 (Regents)); and (3) Susan’s alleged lack of “capacity to make decisions from the date of the incident until she died” within the meaning of section 352, subdivis 2023Absent such allegations, the complaint is subject to demurrer for failure to state a cause of action . . . .’ ” (Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 824 , italics added (Gentry).) Robert identifies three different theories on which the two-year limitations period for the survivor claims was either tolled or subject to delayed accrual until Susan’s death: (1) the discovery rule (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397 ); (2) the doctrine of fraudulent concealment (Regents, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 533 ); and (3) Susan’s alleged lack of legal capacity (§ 352, subd. (a).) We consider each | 3 | 10 |
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2024(Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1796 .) In Foster v. Xerox Corp. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 306 (Foster), the California Supreme Court analyzed the pleading requirements for the fraudulent concealment exception. 2003Three conditions are necessary for the fraudulent concealment exception to apply: (1) the employer must have concealed "the existence of the injury"; (2) the employer must have concealed the connection between the injury and the employment; and (3) the injury must have been aggravated following the concealment. ( Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1794 , 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 514 .) If any one of these conditions is lacking, the exception does not *902 apply and the employer is entitled to judgment in its favor. ( Id. at p. 1797, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 514 .) I Summary judgment | 3 | 4 |
Goodman v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2013(Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1197 .) One of these is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which tolls the statute of limitations if a defendant’s deceptive conduct “has caused a claim to grow stale.” (Id. at p. 1192; Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533 .) In support of this doctrine, a plaintiff must allege the supporting facts—i.e., the date of discovery, the manner of discovery, and the justification for the failure to discover the fraud earlier—with the same particularity as with a cause of action for fraud. ( Boatwright, supra, 124 Cal.App 2013(Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1197 .) One of these is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which tolls the statute of limitations if a defendant’s deceptive conduct “has caused a claim to grow stale.” (Id. at p. 1192; see Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 257 , 976 P.2d 808 ].) In support of this doctrine, a plaintiff must allege the supporting facts—i.e., the date of discovery, the manner of discovery, and the justification for the failure to discover the fraud earlier—with the same particularity as with a cause of action fo | 2 | 4 |
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences2010(See County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 329 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 ].) Thus, to recover, each unnamed class member would be required to prove individual reliance on Target’s false country-of-origin designation. 2010(See County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 329 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 ].) Thus, to recover, each unnamed class member would be required to prove individual reliance on Target’s false country-of-origin designation. | 2 | 2 |
Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc.green2 sentences2024In Aryeh, the lessee of Canon copiers alleged Canon violated unfair competition laws by charging him for test copies made by Canon employees on 17 service visits over the course of two years. 6 In arguing the fraudulent concealment doctrine should apply, Goldstein footnotes that in a different case in 2016 he filed a motion, of which the trial court took judicial notice, stating that the loans from respondents were “illegal, false and usurious . . . premised on Appellant’s understanding that the loans misstated [the] amounts due.” This indicates he knew, prior to the “recent [discovery] respon 2013(Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1197 .) One of these is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which tolls the statute of limitations if a defendant’s deceptive conduct “has caused a claim to grow stale.” (Id. at p. 1192; Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533 .) In support of this doctrine, a plaintiff must allege the supporting facts—i.e., the date of discovery, the manner of discovery, and the justification for the failure to discover the fraud earlier—with the same particularity as with a cause of action for fraud. ( Boatwright, supra, 124 Cal.App | 1 | 5 |
Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishopgreen2 sentences2020(Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 606 .) Consequently, “ ‘[t]he doctrine of fraudulent concealment [for tolling the statute of limitations] does not come into play, whatever the lengths to which a defendant has gone to conceal the wrongs, if a plaintiff is on notice of a potential claim.’ ” (Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1453, 1460 , quoting Hobson v. Wilson (D.C. 2016Co. (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 550, 562-563 .) Silence does not constitute concealment absent a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties, or “some specially appearing circumstances . . . which of themselves equitably estop a person from relying on his silence or inaction, and which of themselves are sufficient to create on the part of the nonrevealor a positive duty to speak or act . . . .” (Id. at p. 562.) Here, there is no evidence that WSG’s tardy assertion of its claims was induced by fraudulent concealment. “‘The doctrine of fraudulent concealment [for tolling the statute of l | 1 | 5 |
Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.green2 sentences2024The fraudulent concealment doctrine requires a plaintiff to “allege the supporting facts—i.e., the date of discovery, the manner of discovery, and the justification for the failure to discover the fraud earlier—with the same particularity as with a cause of action for fraud.” (Fuller v. First Franklin Financial Corp. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 955, 962 (italics added).) “In urging lack of means of obtaining knowledge, it must be shown that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the facts could not have been discovered at an earlier date. [Citation.]” (Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1974) 39 Cal.A 2016(Cleveland v. Internet Specialties West, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 24, 33 .) Also applicable to contract-based claims is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which is “[a] close cousin of the discovery rule” (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931 (Bernson)) that is “available ‘in all cases’” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533 , quoting Kane v. Cook (1857) 8 Cal. 449, 458 ). “‘It has long been established that the defendant’s fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations | 1 | 3 |
Community Cause v. Boatwrightgreen2 sentences2023(See id. at p. 896.) The Court of Appeal held that the fraudulent concealment doctrine did not toll the limitations periods for the causes of action predicated on “allegations of [the defendant’s] mere negligent failure to disclose . . . .” (See Community Cause, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 901 .) Conversely, the appellate court held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged fraud with regard to its other causes of action because the plaintiff had pleaded, inter alia, that even though “the defendant was subject to the requirements of either” the PRA or its predecessor, the defendant “intentionall 2013(Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1197 .) One of these is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which tolls the statute of limitations if a defendant’s deceptive conduct “has caused a claim to grow stale.” (Id. at p. 1192; Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533 .) In support of this doctrine, a plaintiff must allege the supporting facts—i.e., the date of discovery, the manner of discovery, and the justification for the failure to discover the fraud earlier—with the same particularity as with a cause of action for fraud. ( Boatwright, supra, 124 Cal.App | 1 | 3 |
Bank of America Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014Jones cannot be used to extend liability for concealment under the facts presented here. 15 *1193 In considering a fraudulent concealment claim, “we begin with the threshold question of duty. [Citation.]” (Bank of America Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 862, 871 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 504 ].) Based upon the absence of a relationship between the Hoffmans and 162 LLC, we conclude that there was no triable issue of material fact as to the second cause of action of the Cross-Complaint for fraudulent concealment/suppression of facts. 2014Jones cannot be used to extend liability for concealment under the facts presented here. 15 *1193 In considering a fraudulent concealment claim, “we begin with the threshold question of duty. [Citation.]” (Bank of America Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 862, 871 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 504 ].) Based upon the absence of a relationship between the Hoffmans and 162 LLC, we conclude that there was no triable issue of material fact as to the second cause of action of the Cross-Complaint for fraudulent concealment/suppression of facts. | 1 | 3 |
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.green2 sentences2021Discovery Rule The discovery rule “postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox).) Under the rule, the statute of limitations begins to run “once the plaintiff ‘“‘has notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry. . . .’”’ [Citations.] A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. 2019As we have just discussed at length, once a plaintiff has “reason to suspect an injury and some wrongful cause” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 803 ), the plaintiff has “ ‘discover[ed] his cause of action’ ” (Bernson, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 931 ) and the statute begins to run. | 1 | 2 |
Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospitalgreen2 sentences2016(Cleveland v. Internet Specialties West, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 24, 33 .) Also applicable to contract-based claims is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which is “[a] close cousin of the discovery rule” (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931 (Bernson)) that is “available ‘in all cases’” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533 , quoting Kane v. Cook (1857) 8 Cal. 449, 458 ). “‘It has long been established that the defendant’s fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations 1999Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 203, 210-213 [ 30 P.2d 39 ] (per curiam)', Kane v. Cook, supra, 8 Cal. at pp. 458-461), limits the typical statute of limitations. “[T]he defendant’s fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations . . . .” (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 99 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 553 P.2d 1129 ]; accord, e.g., Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 931 ; Kimball v. Pacific Gas & Elec. | 1 | 2 |
Kane v. Cookgreen2 sentences2016(Cleveland v. Internet Specialties West, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 24, 33 .) Also applicable to contract-based claims is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which is “[a] close cousin of the discovery rule” (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931 (Bernson)) that is “available ‘in all cases’” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533 , quoting Kane v. Cook (1857) 8 Cal. 449, 458 ). “‘It has long been established that the defendant’s fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations 1999“Statute of limitations” is the “collective term . . . commonly applied to a great number of acts,” or parts of acts, that “prescribe the periods beyond which” actions “may not be brought.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Actions, § 405, p. 509.) The typical one has as its purpose the “ ‘protection of the defendant from stale claims of a dilatory plaintiff.’ ” (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 936 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 440 , 873 P.2d 613 ], quoting 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 529, p. 558, which is continued in 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Actio | 1 | 2 |
BRANDON G. v. Graygreen2 sentences2014This statute of limitations for fraud is three years. (§ 338, subd. (d).) This section also codifies the delayed discovery rule, providing that a cause of action for fraud “‘is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.’” (Brandon G. v. Gray (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 29, 35 ; § 338, subd. (d).) The date a complaining party learns, or at least is put on notice, that a representation was false is the date the statute starts running. (§ 338, subd. (d).) The fraudulent concealment doctrine will also toll the statute of 2014This statute of limitations for fraud is three years. (§ 338, subd. (d).) This section also codifies the delayed discovery rule, providing that a cause of action for fraud “‘is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.’” (Brandon G. v. Gray (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 29, 35 ; § 338, subd. (d).) The date a complaining party learns, or at least is put on notice, that a representation was false is the date the statute starts running. (§ 338, subd. (d).) The fraudulent concealment doctrine will also toll the statute of | 1 | 2 |
American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hamptongreen2 sentences2003Having reviewed the ruling de novo ( American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1048 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 ), we conclude that the conditions necessary for a fraudulent concealment claim do not exist and that Amgen was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. 2003Having reviewed the ruling de novo ( American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1048 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 ), we conclude that the conditions necessary for a fraudulent concealment claim do not exist and that Amgen was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. | 1 | 2 |
Mercury Insurance v. Vanwanseele-Walkergreen2 sentences2003Co. v. Vanwanseele-Walker (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1103 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 28 .) The judgment is affirmed. 2003Co. v. Vanwanseele-Walker (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1103 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 28 .) The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 2 |
| Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
Blickman Turkus v. Mf Downtown Sunnyvalegreen1 sentence2026(See Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 43 [the complaint must include “the content of the omitted facts” where plaintiff alleges fraudulent concealment based on a defendant’s exclusive knowledge of undisclosed facts]; Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 877-878 [“unspecified statements on an identified topic [i.e., defendant’s ability to pay rent]” did not provide “the substance of those statements” sufficient to support a fraudulent concealment claim based on a theory of partial concealment].) In addition, Graham did not adequately allege the Universi | 1 | 1 |
| Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs CA4/3green | 1 | 1 |
| Yanowitz v. L'OREAL USA, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fuller v. First Franklin Financial Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Snapp & Associates Insurance Services, Inc. v. Robertsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boeken v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Britton v. Girardigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marshall v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| LiMandri v. Judkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Santisas v. Goodingreen | 1 | 1 |
| NBCUniversal Media v. Superior Court CA2/4green | 1 | 1 |
| Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Moreno v. Sanchezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crail v. Blakelygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Lawgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Spellis v. Lawngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Foster v. Xerox Corp.
green
2 sentences2024(Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1796 .) In Foster v. Xerox Corp. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 306 (Foster), the California Supreme Court analyzed the pleading requirements for the fraudulent concealment exception. 2024It is unassailable that an employer who knows that an employee has contracted a disease in the course of his employment has a duty to advise the employee of that fact. [Section 3602, subdivision (b)(2)] provides for an action at law for aggravation of a disease resulting from such concealment.” ( Foster, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 309-310.) Alco also argues plaintiff does not allege it “fraudulently concealed the alleged massive outbreak with the intent to induce [d]ecedent to continue working for any benefit.” This argument fails because the intent to extract more labor is simply not a requireme | 5 | 2003–2024 |
Palestini v. General Dynamics Corporation
green
2 sentences2003Other cases relied upon by Jensen, such as Foster v. Xerox Corp., supra, 40 Cal.3d 306 , 219 Cal.Rptr. 485 , 707 P.2d 858 ; Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.3d 465 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 612 P.2d 948 ; and Palestini v. General Dynamics Corp. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 80 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 , were similarly pleadings cases in which the plaintiffs had adequately alleged the three conditions necessary for the fraudulent concealment exception to apply. 2003Other cases relied upon by Jensen, such as Foster v. Xerox Corp., supra, 40 Cal.3d 306 , 219 Cal.Rptr. 485 , 707 P.2d 858 ; Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.3d 465 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 612 P.2d 948 ; and Palestini v. General Dynamics Corp. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 80 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 , were similarly pleadings cases in which the plaintiffs had adequately alleged the three conditions necessary for the fraudulent concealment exception to apply. | 4 | 2003–2023 |
cluster 437447
green
2 sentences2020Cir. 1984) 737 F.2d 1, 35 .) The Holt estate’s petition makes abundantly clear it had actual notice of the purported promissory note and Hackard’s denial of the note’s existence. 2016Cir. 1984) 737 F.2d 1 , from “[w]orldwide” sources. | 3 | 1986–2020 |
Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2012The fraudulent concealment exception did not apply as a matter of law based upon Johns-Manville Corp., supra, 27 Cal.3d 465 , which required that the employer conceal from the employee medical information about the employee’s condition. 2003The court concluded that these facts, if proven, would support tort recovery under a fraudulent concealment theory, but emphasized that this exception to the exclusivity of workers' compensation would apply to few situations: "[W]e cannot believe that many employers will aggravate the effects of an industrial injury by not only deliberately *903 concealing its existence but also its connection with the employment." ( Id. at p. 478, 165 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 612 P.2d 948 .) Nor did Jensen present evidence of the second condition necessary for the fraudulent concealment exception, namely, that Amgen c | 3 | 2003–2012 |
Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp.
green
2 sentences2026(Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 43; Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 993 .) “‘This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”’” (Rattagan, at p. 43.) “California courts apply th[is] same specificity standard to evaluate the factual underpinnings of a fraudulent concealment claim at the pleading stage, even though the focus of inquiry shifts to the unique elements of the claim.” (Ibid.) “[T]he complaint must [therefore] include specific allegations establi 2024Both suits “discourage[] such practices in the future while encouraging a ‘business climate free of fraud and deceptive practices.’ ” (Robinson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 992 , quoting Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1064 .) If, however, the duty of disclosure underlying a fraudulent concealment claim cannot be shown to stand independently from the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, the public policy calculus shifts considerably. | 2 | 2024–2026 |
Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347 ; Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248 ; Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1472 .) For instance, in a case such as this, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient factual basis for establishing a duty of disclosure on the part of the defendant independent of the parties’ contract. 2021The elements for a fraudulent concealment claim are: “‘“ (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.”’” (Boschma v. Home Lo | 2 | 2021–2024 |
Cansino v. Bank of America
green
2 sentences2024(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347 ; Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248 ; Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1472 .) For instance, in a case such as this, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient factual basis for establishing a duty of disclosure on the part of the defendant independent of the parties’ contract. 2021(Cansino, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at 7 p. 1468.) Having admitted she knew about the sale, she cannot state a fraudulent concealment claim. | 2 | 2021–2024 |
Silas v. Arden
green
2 sentences2023(Foster v. Xerox Corp. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 306, 312 ; Palestini v. General Dynamics Corp. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 80 , 89–90.) “If any one of these conditions is lacking, the exception does not apply and the employer is entitled to judgment in its favor. [Citation.]” (Silas v. Arden (2012) 213 Cal.App.4th 75, 91 .) Critically for our purposes, “[t]he exception does not apply where the employee was aware of the injury at all times. [Citation.]” (Silas v. Arden, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 91 .) This point is fatal to plaintiffs’ argument. 2023(Foster v. Xerox Corp. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 306, 312 ; Palestini v. General Dynamics Corp. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 80 , 89–90.) “If any one of these conditions is lacking, the exception does not apply and the employer is entitled to judgment in its favor. [Citation.]” (Silas v. Arden (2012) 213 Cal.App.4th 75, 91 .) Critically for our purposes, “[t]he exception does not apply where the employee was aware of the injury at all times. [Citation.]” (Silas v. Arden, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 91 .) This point is fatal to plaintiffs’ argument. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Intrieri v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2014(See LiMandri, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 336-337.) Summary adjudication of that claim was properly granted. 15 In addition, the Hoffmans cite Intrieri v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 72 (Intrieri). 2014(See LiMandri, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 336-337.) Summary adjudication of that claim was properly granted. 15 In addition, the Hoffmans cite Intrieri v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 72 (Intrieri). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.
green
2 sentences2014(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112 .) Here, Appellants claim the June 25, 2007 letter from Respondents' counsel contained "lies and misrepresentations . . . [that] constituted fraudulent concealment[,] which was calculated to prevent, and did prevent, [Appellants] discovery of their cause(s) of action and hindered [Appellants'] efforts to discovery [sic] their causes of action." Yet, Appellants ignore their May 10, 2007 demand letter. 2002(Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112 .) III Applicable Statutes of Limitations Snapp contends that even without the benefit of equitable tolling, the court erred by determining each of its causes of action is time-barred because there are questions of fact regarding when it knew, or reasonably should have known, of its causes of action against Robertson. | 2 | 2002–2014 |
Davis v. Lockheed Corp.
green
2 sentences2003(See also Davis v. Lockheed Corp., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 523 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 233 .) The first condition necessary for a fraudulent concealment claim is absent. 2003(See also Davis v. Lockheed Corp., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 523 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 233 .) The first condition necessary for a fraudulent concealment claim is absent. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
McDonald v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026(McDonald, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 303 .) The workers’ compensation scheme “subsumes” Employees’ tort remedies (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 814 ), and the 21 City’s liability for workers’ compensation is “in lieu of any other liability whatsoever” (Lab. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Insurance green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Jackson v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2026Co. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1164 ; Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1355 .) Once the trial court ruled the asbestos-related injuries alleged by Employees occurred in the course of employment and the fraudulent concealment exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule did not apply, they had no tort claim by which to obtain compensatory and punitive damages. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| CHARLES J. VACANTI v. State Comp. Ins. Fund green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Blank v. Kirwan green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Thorburn v. Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Hills Transportation Co. v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Multani v. Witkin & Neal green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Hahn v. Mirda green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Norgart v. Upjohn Co. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Gentry v. eBay, Inc. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| City of Stockton v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Roddenberry v. Roddenberry green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Manderville v. PCG & S GROUP, INC. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Strebel v. Brenlar Investments, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Williams v. Wraxall green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Cleveland v. Internet Specialties West, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Scafidi v. Western Loan & Building Co. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Jensen v. AMGEN INC. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.