fraudulent concealment doctrine in Texas

1990For example, in Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.1983), we tolled an "absolute" statute of limitations on the basis of the common-law doctrine of fraudulent concealment.

1990For example, in Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.1983), we tolled an “absolute” statute of limitations on the basis of the common-law doctrine of fraudulent concealment.

2023But the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, when it applies, tolls limitations “because a person cannot be permitted to avoid liability for his actions by deceitfully concealing wrongdoing until limitations has run.” Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011) (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6 ).

2016Thereby, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment acts to toll the running of the limitations period until the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence ‘“because a person cannot be permitted to avoid liability for his actions by deceitfully concealing wrongdoing until limitations has run.’ ” Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011) (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6 ); see also Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 67 The fraudulent concealment doctrine requires that BPL prove Choctaw, or Cody Texas, “‘actually knew a wrong occurred, had a fixed purpose to conceal

2015S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 4 ; see also Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 16 465 S.W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. 2015) (“We have recognized two doctrines that may delay accrual or toll limitations: (1) the discovery rule and (2) fraudulent concealment.”); Wagner & Brown Ltd., v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Tex. 2001) (holding that an alleged misrepresentation may be relevant to a fraudulent-concealment claim, but it is irrelevant to a discovery-rule analysis because “[t]he discovery rule exception and tolling based on fraudulent concealment are distinct concepts that exist for different reasons”).

2014Id.; see also Wagner & Brown, Ltd., 58 S.W.3d at 736 (fact that lessee allegedly misrepresented information in particular case “may be relevant to the equitable principles involved in a fraudulent concealment analysis, but it does not affect the categorical determination of inherent undiscoverability in a discovery rule analysis”).

2023But it is then the plaintiff’s “burden . . . to come forward with proof raising an issue of fact with respect to fraudulent concealment . . . [to] defeat [defendant’s] right to a summary judgment.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Nichols v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex. 1974)); see also KPMG, 988 S.W.2d at 749 (“[A] party asserting fraudulent concealment . . . has the burden to raise it in response to the summary judgment motion and to come forward with summary judgment evidence raising a fact issue on each element of the fraudulent concealment defense.”).

2021Like fraudulent concealment, “the discovery rule is a plea in confession and avoidance.” 33 The true difference is that one affects the accrual date of the cause of action (the discovery rule) and the other does not (fraudulent concealment). 30 Ante at 15. 31 See KPMG Peat Marwick, 988 S.W.2d at 749 (“[A] party asserting fraudulent concealment as an affirmative defense to the statute of limitations has the burden to raise it in response to the summary judgment motion and to come forward with summary judgment evidence raising a fact issue on each element of the fraudulent concealment defense.”

2023But the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, when it applies, tolls limitations “because a person cannot be permitted to avoid liability for his actions by deceitfully concealing wrongdoing until limitations has run.” Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011) (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6 ).

2017Reliance may be disposi-tive of whether the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applies or, if it applies, when ■it ceases to apply,- because the doctrine “only tolls the statute of limitations until ‘the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.’ ” Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011) (quoting BP Am.

2010See Santanna Natural Gas Corp., 954 S.W.2d at 891 (“We therefore hold that affirmative misrepresentations can support a fraudulent concealment defense to a statute of limitations bar even in the absence of a duty to disclose.”); see also World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (duty to disclose may arise when “a party later learns that a previous affirmative representation was false or misleading”).

2010See Santana Natural Gas Corp ., 954 S.W.2d at 891 ("We therefore hold that affirmative misrepresentations can support a fraudulent concealment defense to a statute of limitations bar even in the absence of a duty to disclose."); see also World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc ., 977 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (duty to disclose may arise when "a party later learns that a previous affirmative representation was false or misleading").

2008"The fraudulent concealment doctrine, unlike the discovery rule, resembles equitable estoppel." Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett , 958 S.W.2d 430, 439 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (fraudulent concealment is based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel; the doctrine tolls or suspends the running of limitations after it has begun because the defendant has concealed facts necessary for the plaintiff to know that he had a cause of action).

2008“The fraudulent concealment doctrine, unlike the discovery rule, resembles equitable estoppel.” Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430, 439 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (fraudulent concealment is based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel; the doctrine tolls or suspends the running of limitations after it has begun because the defendant has concealed facts necessary for the plaintiff to know that he had a cause of action).

2016Thereby, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment acts to toll the running of the limitations period until the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence ‘“because a person cannot be permitted to avoid liability for his actions by deceitfully concealing wrongdoing until limitations has run.’ ” Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011) (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6 ); see also Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 67 The fraudulent concealment doctrine requires that BPL prove Choctaw, or Cody Texas, “‘actually knew a wrong occurred, had a fixed purpose to conceal

2014The fraudulent-concealment doctrine requires that Appellants prove that Fidelity “‘actually knew a wrong occurred, had a fixed purpose to conceal the wrong, and did conceal the wrong.’” See id. (quoting Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 841 (Tex. 2001)).

2004Patrick v. Howard , 904 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, no writ).

2004Patrick v. Howard, 904 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ).

2013See Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (explaining that although similar in effect to the discovery rule, the fraudulent-concealment doctrine is an affirmative defense to limitations that resembles equitable estoppel) (citing Trousdale v. Henry, 261 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) (granting a rule 53.7(f) motion); Autry v. Dearman, 933 S.W.2d 182, 192 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied)).

2011Trousdale v. Henry, 261 S.W.3d 221, 234 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).

2021Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 67 (Tex. 2011) (stating that doctrine of fraudulent concealment requires 11 that “defendant actually knew the plaintiff was in fact wronged, and concealed that fact to deceive the plaintiff”).

2016Thereby, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment acts to toll the running of the limitations period until the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence ‘“because a person cannot be permitted to avoid liability for his actions by deceitfully concealing wrongdoing until limitations has run.’ ” Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011) (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6 ); see also Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 67 The fraudulent concealment doctrine requires that BPL prove Choctaw, or Cody Texas, “‘actually knew a wrong occurred, had a fixed purpose to conceal

2024Thus, like the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment “does not apply to claims that could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Kerlin v. Sauceda, 263 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Tex. 2008).

2023Thus, like the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment “does not apply to claims that could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Kerlin v. Sauceda, 263 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Tex. 2008).

2017Pointing out that a contracting party who responds to such a request with false information risks application of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, it concluded, “[b]ut failing to even ask for such information is not due diligence.” Id. (citations omitted); see Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 229 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet) (citing and applying Via Net).

2013See Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (explaining that although similar in effect to the discovery rule, the fraudulent-concealment doctrine is an affirmative defense to limitations that resembles equitable estoppel) (citing Trousdale v. Henry, 261 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) (granting a rule 53.7(f) motion); Autry v. Dearman, 933 S.W.2d 182, 192 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied)).

2022See, e.g., Exxon Corp., 348 S.W.3d at 209 (“Irrespective of the potential effect of fraudulent concealment or the discovery rule on limitations, actual knowledge of alleged injury-causing conduct starts the clock on the limitations period.”); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty.

2019See Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 209 (Tex. 2011). 12 This burden requires Sky Station to show that the judgment turns on the evidence that was excluded.

2010See Ca-dle Co., 136 S.W.3d at 354 (fraudulent concealment doctrine limited to those situations in which the defendant has a duty to disclose; cases where the doctrine applies are rare, such as those involving fiduciary relationships).

2010See Cadle Co. , 136 S.W.3d at 354 (fraudulent concealment doctrine limited to those situations in which the defendant has a duty to disclose; cases where the doctrine applies are rare, such as those involving fiduciary relationships).

2010See KPMG Peat Marwick, 988 S.W.2d at 749 ; Ponder v. Brice & Mankoff, 889 S.W.2d 637, 645 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

2010Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d at 439 ; see Ponder, 889 S.W.2d at 645 (recognizing estoppel effect of fraudulent concealment ends when party learns of facts, conditions, or circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to make inquiry, which, if pursued, would lead to discovery of cause of action).

2013See Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (explaining that although similar in effect to the discovery rule, the fraudulent-concealment doctrine is an affirmative defense to limitations that resembles equitable estoppel) (citing Trousdale v. Henry, 261 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) (granting a rule 53.7(f) motion); Autry v. Dearman, 933 S.W.2d 182, 192 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied)).

2008Trousdale v. Henry , 261 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, rule 53.7(f) motion granted); Autry v. Dearman , 933 S.W.2d 182, 192 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).

2010See Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.1983) (fraudulent concealment); Steel v. Rhone Poulenc, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997), aff'd, 997 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.1999) (discovery rule). .

2010See Bordelon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983) (fraudulent concealment); Steel v. Rhone Poulenc, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997), aff’d, 997 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1999) (discovery rule). 2 were also aware in December 2002 of the Krohn case,2 which held that cable companies were not permitted to “piggy-back” on electric cooperative easements.

2010See Santanna Natural Gas Corp., 954 S.W.2d at 891 (“We therefore hold that affirmative misrepresentations can support a fraudulent concealment defense to a statute of limitations bar even in the absence of a duty to disclose.”); see also World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (duty to disclose may arise when “a party later learns that a previous affirmative representation was false or misleading”).

2010See Santana Natural Gas Corp ., 954 S.W.2d at 891 ("We therefore hold that affirmative misrepresentations can support a fraudulent concealment defense to a statute of limitations bar even in the absence of a duty to disclose."); see also World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc ., 977 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (duty to disclose may arise when "a party later learns that a previous affirmative representation was false or misleading").

2008Id. at 494 (discussing the fraudulent concealment claim and citing Anderson, Greenwood & Co. v. Martin, 44 S.W.3d 200, 212-13 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)); id. at 495 (discussing claims of fraud and fraudulent inducement and concluding that the facts supported a duty to disclose).

2008Id. at 494 (discussing the fraudulent concealment claim and citing Anderson, Greenwood & Co. v. Martin, 44 S.W.3d 200, 212-13 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)); id. at 495 (discussing claims of fraud and fraudulent inducement and concluding that the facts supported a duty to disclose).

1997Leonard v. Eskew, 731 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ refd n.r.e.) Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the accrual of the plaintiff’s cause of action is deferred because a defendant cannot be permitted to avoid liability for its actions by deceitfully concealing wrongdoing until the statute of limitations has run.

1997Leonard v. Eskew, 731 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. App.--Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the accrual of the plaintiff's cause of action is deferred because a defendant cannot be permitted to avoid liability for its actions by deceitfully concealing wrongdoing until the statute of limitations has run.

1999See Cherry, 645 S.W.2d at 782 ; Santanna, 954 S.W.2d at 891 .

1997See Cherry v. Victoria Equip. & Supply, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Tex.1983) (ultimate duty to weigh evidence, determine credibility and decide if fraudulent concealment actually exists rests upon trier of fact).

2015See Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351-52 n. 4 (Tex.1990).

1996Appellees also argue that although not controlling, the reasoning in Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.1990), is also applicable to the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.

2017Pointing out that a contracting party who responds to such a request with false information risks application of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, it concluded, “[b]ut failing to even ask for such information is not due diligence.” Id. (citations omitted); see Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 229 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet) (citing and applying Via Net).

2010In evaluating the circumstances in Kerlin , the court reasoned that "Kerlin's receipt of more than 20,000 acres in fee simple and 1,000 mineral acres were matters of public record more than forty years before the Ballis filed this lawsuit" and the Ballis "were on notice that the warranty deeds their predecessors executed contained royalty reservation, yet they never received any royalties"; therefore, "[a]s a matter of law, the Ballis could have discovered the existence of any claims before limitations expired through the exercise of reasonable diligence." Id. at 926 . *22 We note that, in Hor

2013Equitable Estoppel / Fraudulent Concealment The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies as a toll to a statute of limitations, “when the tortfeasor fraudulently conceals the existence of a cause of action from the plaintiff.” Marshall v. First Baptist Church of Hous., 949 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

2012In Marshall v. First Baptist Church, 949 S.W.2d at 507-508 , this court addressed the discovery rule, fraudulent concealment, and equitable estoppel in a case involving claims against a church arising out of an alleged sexual assault of a minor.

2023See Hooks, 457 S.W.3d at 59 . 2.

2017Fraudulent Concealment We likewise find the present summary judgment record raises no issue of material fact regarding application of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 8 Citing Hooks, 457 S.W.3d at 61 , Pham’s briefing asserts that the franchise tax reports were inconsistent and contained misleading information.

2020“Passive silence is enough to sustain a fraudulent concealment defense only if there is a duty of disclosure.” AT&T Corp. v. Rylander, 2 S.W.3d 546, 556 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied); accord Santanna Nat.

2019“Passive silence is enough to sustain a fraudulent concealment defense only if there is a duty of disclosure.” Id.

2016See Baxter, 182 S.W.3d at 464 ; Otis, 612 S.W.2d at 667 .

2006In Otis v. Scientific Atlanta, 612 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), this Court held that concealment of one’s identity does not toll the statute of limitations when, regardless of the defendant’s identity, the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, he has a cause of action.