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34 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of USgreen2 sentences2021However, the fraudulent-concealment doctrine does not apply unless the plaintiff proves that the defendant “engaged in affirmative acts of concealment” that were “designed to prevent” and actually did “prevent discovery of the claim.” Stephens, 850 So. 2d at 83-84 (¶18) (quoting Robinson v. Cobb, 763 So. 2d 883, 887 (¶19) (Miss. 2000)). 9 Indeed, the Covenants were filed in the chancery clerk’s office, and the plaintiffs were aware of them. 2015This Court has laid out a two-part test for determining the existence of a fraudulent concealment claim, and has laid upon the party claiming fraudulent concealment the burden of showing that: “(1) some affirmative act or conduct was done and prevented discovery of a claim, and [that] (2) [ ... ] due diligence was performed on their part to discover it.” Channel v. Loyacono, 954 So.2d 415, 423 (Miss.2007) (quoting Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 850 So.2d 78, 84 (Miss.2003)). | 5 | 11 |
Reich v. Jesco, Inc.green2 sentences2019In order to establish fraudulent concealment, “there must be shown some act or conduct of an affirmative nature designed to prevent and which does prevent discovery of the claim.” Reich v. Jesco, Inc., 526 So.2d 550, 552 (Miss.1988). 2003In order to establish fraudulent concealment, "there must be shown some act or conduct of an affirmative nature designed to prevent and which does prevent discovery of the claim." Reich v. *84 Jesco, Inc., 526 So.2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1988). | 5 | 5 |
Robinson v. Cobbgreen2 sentences2021However, the fraudulent-concealment doctrine does not apply unless the plaintiff proves that the defendant “engaged in affirmative acts of concealment” that were “designed to prevent” and actually did “prevent discovery of the claim.” Stephens, 850 So. 2d at 83-84 (¶18) (quoting Robinson v. Cobb, 763 So. 2d 883, 887 (¶19) (Miss. 2000)). 9 Indeed, the Covenants were filed in the chancery clerk’s office, and the plaintiffs were aware of them. 2010The fraudulent concealment doctrine “applies to any cause of action.” Robinson, 763 So.2d at 887 (quoting Myers, 5 F.Supp.2d at 431 ). ¶ 21. | 4 | 7 |
cluster 783627green2 sentences2006NOTES [1] While not binding as authority, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has addressed what is required to toll the statute of limitations under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment: "[I]n Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2003), we held that Mississippi law is in fact well settled with respect to this issue, stating that `Mississippi law is unambiguous: Plaintiffs must prove a subsequent affirmative act of fraudulent concealment to toll the limitations.'" Liddell v. First Family Fin. 2005The illustration provided to him and to the Prathers was based on the company’s dividends, which were artificially inflated by this ‘dividend stabilization reserve’(DSR).” 1 While not binding as authority, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has addressed what is required to toll the statute of limitations under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment: “[I]n Ross v. CitiFinancial, Inc., 344 F. 3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2003), we held that Mississippi law is in fact well settled with respect to this issue, stating that ‘Mississippi law is unambiguous: Plaintiffs must prove a sub | 3 | 3 |
Liddell v. First Family Financial Services, Inc.green2 sentences2006Servs., 146 Fed.Appx. 748, 751 (5th Cir.2005). 2005Servs., 146 Fed. | 2 | 2 |
Hays v. Ellrichgreen1 sentence2018See Hays v. Ellrich, 31 N.E.3d 1064, 1075-76 (Mass. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
Channel v. Loyaconogreen1 sentence2015This Court has laid out a two-part test for determining the existence of a fraudulent concealment claim, and has laid upon the party claiming fraudulent concealment the burden of showing that: “(1) some affirmative act or conduct was done and prevented discovery of a claim, and [that] (2) [ ... ] due diligence was performed on their part to discover it.” Channel v. Loyacono, 954 So.2d 415, 423 (Miss.2007) (quoting Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 850 So.2d 78, 84 (Miss.2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Whitaker v. LIMECO CORP.green1 sentence2015“Both are questions of fact, not law, and should be left to a jury for determination.” Whitaker v. Limeco Corp., 32 So.3d 429, 436 (Miss.2010) (citing Robinson, 763 So.2d at 888-89 ). ¶ 18. | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Linamgreen1 sentence2006A similar decision was reached in Doe v. Linam, 225 F.Supp.2d 731, 733 (S.D.Tex.2002). | 1 | 1 |
First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. United States Gypsum Companygreen1 sentence2005While noting that “the plain language of Section 41-5-13 requires a claim to be filed within three years of the occurrence of the negligent act and that Section 41-5-13 operates as a statute of repose[,]” the Court found a fraudulent concealment exception 10 Any argument that this holding will “upset the economic balance struck by the legislative body[,]” First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F. 2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989), is fallacious. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Myers v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019The fraudulent concealment doctrine “applies to any cause of action.” Id. 2010The fraudulent concealment doctrine “applies to any cause of action.” Robinson, 763 So.2d at 887 (quoting Myers, 5 F.Supp.2d at 431 ). ¶ 21. | 7 | 1999–2019 |
Andrus v. Ellis
green
2 sentences2007Id. at 181 . 2006Id. at 181 . | 6 | 2004–2007 |
Dunn v. Dent
green
2 sentences2010The Court stated, “[Ajfter the delivery of the deed, the appellant had no communication with the appellees, and it fails to show that they did anything that could be construed as a concealment of the falsity of the representation as to the amount of land conveyed, or a concealment of the cause of action.” Id. 2009The Court stated, “[A]fter the delivery of the deed, the appellant had no communication with the appellees, and it fails to show that they did anything that could be construed as a concealment of the falsity of the representation as to the amount of land conveyed, or a concealment of the cause of action.” Id. | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church
green
2 sentences2009James Episcopal Church, 884 So.2d 747 (2004) (hereinafter Mabus I ), we affirmed the trial court and remanded the case for disposition of the fraudulent-concealment claim against McBride. 2006James Episcopal Church, 884 So. 2d 747 (2004) (hereinafter Mabus I), we affirmed the trial court and remanded the case for disposition of the fraudulent-concealment claim against McBride. | 2 | 2006–2009 |
Tomlinson v. George
green
2 sentences2008In Tomlinson v. George, 138 N.M. 34 , 116 P.3d 105 (2005), the New Mexico Supreme Court considered: whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine equitably tolls [11] the statute of repose, NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976), [12] so as to permit Tomlinson to file a malpractice action more than three years after the alleged act of malpractice *615 in light of the fact that she was aware of the act four months into the three-year period and thus had approximately two years and eight months within which to file her claim. 2008In Tomlinson v. George, 138 N.M. 34 , 116 P.3d 105 (2005), the New Mexico Supreme Court considered: whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine equitably tolls [11] the statute of repose, NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976), [12] so as to permit Tomlinson to file a malpractice action more than three years after the alleged act of malpractice *615 in light of the fact that she was aware of the act four months into the three-year period and thus had approximately two years and eight months within which to file her claim. | 2 | 2005–2008 |
Estes v. Bradley
green
2 sentences2008LEXIS at *7-8, or cases of simply "describing the plaintiff's arguments without applying them to this statute[,]" Estes, 954 So.2d at 465 , but rather, substantiated a fraudulent-concealment exception to the statute of repose found in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-41. 2005App. LEXIS at *7-8, or cases of simply “describing the plaintiff’s arguments without applying them to this statute[,]” Estes, 954 So. 2d at 465 , but rather, substantiated a fraudulent-concealment exception to the statute of repose found in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-41. | 2 | 2005–2008 |
MS Credit Center, Inc. v. Horton
green
2 sentences2008From this judgment, Spann appeals to us, asserting two issues: (1) whether this Court's decision in MS Credit Ctr., Inc. v. Horton, 926 So.2d 167 (Miss.2006), applies so as to result in a waiver of the statute-of-limitations affirmative defense asserted by Diaz, and (2) whether the trial court erred by not tolling the applicable statute of limitations based on the fraudulent concealment doctrine. 2006From this judgment, Spann appeals to us, asserting two issues: (1) whether this Court’s decision in MS Credit Ctr., Inc. v. Horton, 926 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 2006), applies so as to result in a waiver of the statute-of-limitations affirmative defense asserted by Diaz, and (2) whether the trial court erred by not tolling the applicable statute of limitations based on the fraudulent concealment doctrine. | 2 | 2006–2008 |
Lampkin v. Thrash
green
1 sentence2022Id. at (¶22). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Trustmark National Bank v. Meador
green
2 sentences2018The Bank, as the party using fraudulent concealment to assert a tolling of the statute of limitations, has the burden of proving “(1) some affirmative act of conduct was done and prevented discovery of the claim; and (2) due diligence was performed on its part to discover the claim.” Id. 2018The Bank, as the party using fraudulent concealment to assert a tolling of the statute of limitations, has the burden of proving "(1) some affirmative act of conduct was done and prevented discovery of the claim; and (2) due diligence was performed on its part to discover the claim." Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Windham v. Latco of Mississippi, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015We opined that, “[a]s fraud can never be sanctioned, we conclude that the Legislature intended that the fraudulent-concealment exception of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-67 6 applies to the statute of repose in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-41.” Id. at 614 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Windham v. Latco of Mississippi, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2008This Court finds that the consideration of the fraudulent concealment arguments in Reich and Ferrell were not mere "exercise[s] benefitting academia concerning the merits of a fraudulent concealment claim[,]" Windham, 972 So.2d at 655 , 2007 Miss.App. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.