20 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1938–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthalgreen2 sentences2022With the creation of a statutory right of contribution non-existent in New Jersey at common law, the JTCL from its inception was "grounded in principles of fairness and equitable distribution of liability." Young, 53 N.J. at 255 (citing Sattelberger, 14 N.J. at 367–68); see also Rosenthal, 14 N.J. at 387 ("The inequality emanating from the payment [of a judgment] is the thing redressed."); Polidori, 217 N.J. 1974And see, Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 389 (1954), dealing with a joint tortfeasor's defense in a contribution claim brought after entry of judgment, based on the then applicable interspousal immunity, plaintiff and defendant having married after the judgment was entered. | 2 | 2 |
Holloway v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Holloway, 125 N.J. at 402 ("How joint tortfeasors arrive at the litigation should not affect the substantive right of contribution." (citing Sattelberger, 14 N.J. at 369–72)). 2017“The Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law was enacted to promote the fair sharing of the burden of judgment by joint tortfeasors and to prevent a plaintiff from arbitrarily selecting his or her victim.” Holloway v. State, 125 N.J. 386, 400-01 , 593 A.2d 716 (1991) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Young v. STEINBERGgreen2 sentences2022For example, accepting for the moment Bowers' contribution claim is limited in amount to the $600,000 settlement reduced to a consent judgment, and assuming a jury found both Bowers and Comiskey wer e equally at fault, then each presumably would be responsible for $300,000. 7 Although Young suggests Bowers, as the contribution claimant, was also required to prove, and Comiskey was entitled to contest, "the quantum of damages ensuing from the joint offense," 53 N.J. at 255 , we query what the Court envisioned would be Comiskey's contribution obligation if the jury determined Hoelz's damages wer 1987As the Supreme Court made clear in Young v. Steinberg, et al., 53 N.J. 252, 255 (1969), where contribution is in issue, an alleged joint tortfeasor against whom a contribution claim is made is entitled to "have his day *266 in court as to both liability and damages." See also Antenucci v. Mr. Nick's Mens Sportswear, 212 N.J. | 1 | 2 |
Cherry Hill Manor Associates v. Faugnogreen1 sentence2025A contribution claim by a joint tortfeasor is "common liability at the time of the accrual of plaintiff's cause of action which is the Sine qua non of defendant's contribution right." Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 72 (2004) (quoting Markey, 129 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Polidori v. Kordys, Puzio & Di Tomassogreen1 sentence2022With the creation of a statutory right of contribution non-existent in New Jersey at common law, the JTCL from its inception was "grounded in principles of fairness and equitable distribution of liability." Young, 53 N.J. at 255 (citing Sattelberger, 14 N.J. at 367–68); see also Rosenthal, 14 N.J. at 387 ("The inequality emanating from the payment [of a judgment] is the thing redressed."); Polidori, 217 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Sattelberger v. Telepgreen2 sentences2022See Holloway, 125 N.J. at 402 ("How joint tortfeasors arrive at the litigation should not affect the substantive right of contribution." (citing Sattelberger, 14 N.J. at 369–72)). 2022With the creation of a statutory right of contribution non-existent in New Jersey at common law, the JTCL from its inception was "grounded in principles of fairness and equitable distribution of liability." Young, 53 N.J. at 255 (citing Sattelberger, 14 N.J. at 367–68); see also Rosenthal, 14 N.J. at 387 ("The inequality emanating from the payment [of a judgment] is the thing redressed."); Polidori, 217 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Fahy v. Connecticutgreen2 sentences2003See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229, 230 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 173 (1963) ("The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction"), discussed in Macon, supra, 57 N.J. at 339 , 273 A. 2d 1 ; and State v. Johnson, 46 N.J. 289, 291 , 216 A. 2d 392 (1966) (a pre- Macon decision, in which the Court said, with respect to an apparent non-constitutional error, "there must be an evaluation of its capacity for improper impact in the circumstances of a case"). 2003See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229, 230 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 173 (1963) ("The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction"), discussed in Macon, supra, 57 N.J. at 339 , 273 A. 2d 1 ; and State v. Johnson, 46 N.J. 289, 291 , 216 A. 2d 392 (1966) (a pre- Macon decision, in which the Court said, with respect to an apparent non-constitutional error, "there must be an evaluation of its capacity for improper impact in the circumstances of a case"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. MacOngreen2 sentences2003See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229, 230 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 173 (1963) ("The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction"), discussed in Macon, supra, 57 N.J. at 339 , 273 A. 2d 1 ; and State v. Johnson, 46 N.J. 289, 291 , 216 A. 2d 392 (1966) (a pre- Macon decision, in which the Court said, with respect to an apparent non-constitutional error, "there must be an evaluation of its capacity for improper impact in the circumstances of a case"). 2003See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229, 230 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 173 (1963) ("The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction"), discussed in Macon, supra, 57 N.J. at 339 , 273 A. 2d 1 ; and State v. Johnson, 46 N.J. 289, 291 , 216 A. 2d 392 (1966) (a pre- Macon decision, in which the Court said, with respect to an apparent non-constitutional error, "there must be an evaluation of its capacity for improper impact in the circumstances of a case"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dennisgreen1 sentence1997See generally Patterson v. Monmouth Reg’l High School Bd. of Educ., 222 N.J.Super. 448, 456 , 537 A.2d 696 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 183 , 540 A.2d 180 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Buchanangreen1 sentence1997See generally Patterson v. Monmouth Reg’l High School Bd. of Educ., 222 N.J.Super. 448, 456 , 537 A.2d 696 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 183 , 540 A.2d 180 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. MONMOUTH REGIONAL H. SCHOOL BD. OF EDUC.green2 sentences1997See generally Patterson v. Monmouth Reg’l High School Bd. of Educ., 222 N.J.Super. 448, 456 , 537 A.2d 696 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 183 , 540 A.2d 180 (1988). 1997See generally Patterson v. Monmouth Reg’l High School Bd. of Educ., 222 N.J.Super. 448, 456 , 537 A.2d 696 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 183 , 540 A.2d 180 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfieldgreen2 sentences1991In the event of a settlement the equities provided for in the right to contribution are transferred to the “logical incident,” Judson, supra, 17 N.J. at 93, 110 A.2d 24 , of the contribution doctrine, namely, the credit. 1991In the event of a settlement the equities provided for in the right to contribution are transferred to the “logical incident,” Judson, supra, 17 N.J. at 93, 110 A.2d 24 , of the contribution doctrine, namely, the credit. | 1 | 1 |
Antenucci v. Mr. Nick's Mens Sportsweargreen1 sentence1987As the Supreme Court made clear in Young v. Steinberg, et al., 53 N.J. 252, 255 (1969), where contribution is in issue, an alleged joint tortfeasor against whom a contribution claim is made is entitled to "have his day *266 in court as to both liability and damages." See also Antenucci v. Mr. Nick's Mens Sportswear, 212 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Zotta v. Otis Elevator Co.green1 sentence1980Fault alone is not enough; there must be a joint liability to respond to the injured person in damages for the consequences of the default [citations omitted]. [ Zotta v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Markey v. Skog
green
2 sentences2025A contribution claim by a joint tortfeasor is "common liability at the time of the accrual of plaintiff's cause of action which is the Sine qua non of defendant's contribution right." Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 72 (2004) (quoting Markey, 129 N.J. 1999Ibid. | 2 | 1999–2025 |
Twanda Jones v. Morey’s Pier, Inc. (077502) (Cape May and Statewide)
green
1 sentence2025Jones, 230 N.J. at 160 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gangemi v. National Health Laboratories, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022For example, she seizes on dicta in Gangemi criticizing the trial judge for concluding without a hearing that NHL's decision to file a stipulation of dismissal, rather than enter into a consent judgment, was to avoid "public disclosure which could impact on NHL's image," and not because of counsel's inadvertence. 305 N.J. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Stelicos v. Stelicos
neutral
1 sentence2020The appellate court further found that even if it “were to accept the premise of Dr. Fernandez that he cannot be financially responsible for damages . . . it would unfairly prejudice plaintiff, this late in the proceedings, to require plaintiff to present a defense of Dr. Fernandez.” At the time Fernandez filed this motion, “the case was nearly four years old, after the entry of nine case management orders and the expiration of expert witness deadlines.” The court observed that Fernandez “previously retained an expert on his own behalf . . . and served a report from him.” Fernandez filed a mot | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Young v. Latta
green
1 sentence2017Ibid. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Burt v. W. Jersey Health Systems
green
1 sentence2017Ibid. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Rendine v. Pantzer
green
2 sentences2014Rule 4:38-2(a) provides that a court may order a separate trial of any claim for the convenience of the parties or to avoid prejudice. "[O]ur Rules vest the determination whether or not to sever claims to the sound exercise of a trial court's discretion." Rendine, supra, 141 N.J. at 310 (citing R. 4:38- 2(a)). 2014Rule 4:38-2(a) provides that a court may order a separate trial of any claim for the convenience of the parties or to avoid prejudice. "[O]ur Rules vest the determination whether or not to sever claims to the sound exercise of a trial court's discretion." Rendine, supra, 141 N.J. at 310 (citing R. 4:38- 2(a)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance
green
2 sentences2013Recognition of an insurer’s contribution claim against its co-insurer serves “the demands of simple justice.” Carter-Wallace, supra, 154 N.J. at 322, 712 A.2d 1116 (citing Owens-Illinois, supra, 138 N.J. at 472-73 , 650 A.2d 974 ). 2013Recognition of an insurer’s contribution claim against its co-insurer serves “the demands of simple justice.” Carter-Wallace, supra, 154 N.J. at 322, 712 A.2d 1116 (citing Owens-Illinois, supra, 138 N.J. at 472-73 , 650 A.2d 974 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Potomac Ins. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs.
green
2 sentences2013Potomac, supra, 425 N.J.Super. at 323-24 , 41 A.3d 586 (citing Owens-Illinois, supra, 138 N.J. at 470-71 , 650 A.2d 974 ; Fireman’s Fund, supra, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d at 309 ). 2013Potomac, supra, 425 N.J.Super. at 323-24 , 41 A.3d 586 (citing Owens-Illinois, supra, 138 N.J. at 470-71 , 650 A.2d 974 ; Fireman’s Fund, supra, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d at 309 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Maryland Casualty Co.
green
1 sentence2013Potomac, supra, 425 N.J.Super. at 323-24 , 41 A.3d 586 (citing Owens-Illinois, supra, 138 N.J. at 470-71 , 650 A.2d 974 ; Fireman’s Fund, supra, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d at 309 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance
green
2 sentences2013Recognition of an insurer’s contribution claim against its co-insurer serves “the demands of simple justice.” Carter-Wallace, supra, 154 N.J. at 322, 712 A.2d 1116 (citing Owens-Illinois, supra, 138 N.J. at 472-73 , 650 A.2d 974 ). 2013Recognition of an insurer’s contribution claim against its co-insurer serves “the demands of simple justice.” Carter-Wallace, supra, 154 N.J. at 322, 712 A.2d 1116 (citing Owens-Illinois, supra, 138 N.J. at 472-73 , 650 A.2d 974 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2003See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229, 230 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 173 (1963) ("The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction"), discussed in Macon, supra, 57 N.J. at 339 , 273 A. 2d 1 ; and State v. Johnson, 46 N.J. 289, 291 , 216 A. 2d 392 (1966) (a pre- Macon decision, in which the Court said, with respect to an apparent non-constitutional error, "there must be an evaluation of its capacity for improper impact in the circumstances of a case"). 2003See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229, 230 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 173 (1963) ("The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction"), discussed in Macon, supra, 57 N.J. at 339 , 273 A. 2d 1 ; and State v. Johnson, 46 N.J. 289, 291 , 216 A. 2d 392 (1966) (a pre- Macon decision, in which the Court said, with respect to an apparent non-constitutional error, "there must be an evaluation of its capacity for improper impact in the circumstances of a case"). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ronson v. Talesnick
green
1 sentence2002Id. at 357 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Class v. AMERICAN ROLLER DIE
green
2 sentences1998Id. at 436 , 683 A.2d 595 . 1998Id. at 436 , 683 A.2d 595 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
O'CONNOR v. Abraham Altus
green
2 sentences1994As explained by O'Connor v. Abraham Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 121-122 , 335 A. 2d 545 (1975), N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 is a special statutory limitation or "hybrid." On the one hand, it bars a right of action from coming into existence if the accident occurs subsequent to the ten-year period; but as to those events happening before the statutory period has run, the provision disallows, like any other statute of limitations, the institution of suit after the prescribed ten years. *489 To the extent, then, that the contribution claim is based, as here, on occurrences taking place within the ten-year period, 1994As explained by O'Connor v. Abraham Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 121-122 , 335 A. 2d 545 (1975), N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 is a special statutory limitation or "hybrid." On the one hand, it bars a right of action from coming into existence if the accident occurs subsequent to the ten-year period; but as to those events happening before the statutory period has run, the provision disallows, like any other statute of limitations, the institution of suit after the prescribed ten years. *489 To the extent, then, that the contribution claim is based, as here, on occurrences taking place within the ten-year period, | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Echevarias v. Lopez
green
1 sentence1991Id. at 111 , 572 A. 2d 671 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Johnson v. Tennessee Oil, Gas & Mineral Development Co. green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| American Automobile Insurance v. Molling green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Woolston v. Pullen green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.