contribution test in California

2017That apportionment, however, has no bearing upon the insurers' obligations to the policyholder. [Citation.] A pro rata allocation among insurers "does not reduce their respective obligations to their insured." [Citation.] The insurers' contractual obligation to the policyholder is to cover the full extent of the policyholder's liability (up to the policy limits).' [Citations.] This principle is consistent with 'the settled rule that an insurer on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorating damage or injury first manifests itself remains obligated to indemnify the insured for the en

2017That apportionment, however, has no bearing upon the insurers' obligations to the policyholder. [Citation.] A pro rata allocation among insurers "does not reduce their respective obligations to their insured." [Citation.] The insurers' contractual obligation to the policyholder is to cover the full extent of the policyholder's liability (up to the policy limits).' [Citations.] This principle is consistent with 'the settled rule that an insurer on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorating damage or injury first manifests itself remains obligated to indemnify the insured for the en

2017That apportionment, however, has no bearing upon the insurers' obligations to the policyholder. [Citation.] A pro rata allocation among insurers "does not reduce their respective obligations to their insured." [Citation.] The insurers' contractual obligation to the policyholder is to cover the full extent of the policyholder's liability (up to the policy limits).' [Citations.] This principle is consistent with 'the settled rule that an insurer on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorating damage or injury first manifests itself remains obligated to indemnify the insured for the en

2017That apportionment, however, has no bearing upon the insurers' obligations to the policyholder. [Citation.] A pro rata allocation among insurers "does not reduce their respective obligations to their insured." [Citation.] The insurers' contractual obligation to the policyholder is to cover the full extent of the policyholder's liability (up to the policy limits).' [Citations.] This principle is consistent with 'the settled rule that an insurer on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorating damage or injury first manifests itself remains obligated to indemnify the insured for the en

2014(Bowen v. Board of Retirement (1986) 42 Cal.3d 572, 574-575 (Bowen).) In Bowen, the Board of Retirement argued that the substantial contribution test set forth in the statute required “more than 50 percent industrial causation.” (Id. at p. 577.) The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Legislature’s intention was to correct a line of appellate cases that had held “even an infinitesimal or inconsequential work-related contribution to disability would suffice for a service-connected disability retirement.” (Id. at p. 576.) The Supreme Court explained that other case law interpreting this st

1986Relying on case law interpreting the preamended statute, we determined that the substantial contribution test of amended section 31720 requires substantial evidence of a real and measurable connection between an employee's disability and his employment in order for the employee to qualify for a service-connected disability retirement. ( Id., at p. 579; DePuy v. Board of Retirement (1978) 87 Cal. App.3d 392, 399 [ 150 Cal. Rptr. 791 , 12 A.L.R.4th 1150 ].) Since amended section 31720 operates to clarify existing law, it may be applied retroactively to Hoffman's application.

2015Co. v. American Casualty Co. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 929, 937 [“‘other insurers’” obligation to pay under a contract is a common ingredient of contribution claims].) Indeed, in Great American West v. Safeco Ins. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 1145, 1149-1151 , the court held that a contractually negotiated limitations period applied to a third party plaintiff pursuing a contribution claim.

2012The cases the court cited in American Continental, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at page 938 where the courts declined to enforce an insurer’s contribution claim did not involve the timing of the satisfaction of an SIR.

1996The government argued that the claim for partial comparative indemnity derived from the doctrine of contribution, an equitable doctrine, citing American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578 .

1995Some years ago, the Supreme Court pointed out that “. . . the Legislature did not conceive of its contribution legislation as a complete and inflexible system for the allocation of loss between multiple tortfeasors. . . .” (American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 603 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ], citations omitted), but intended by its enactment to encourage judicial developments in the law “which further the act’s principal purpose of ameliorating the harshness and inequity of the old no contribution rule." (Id. at p. 601.) Our reading of section 877.6 serves

2024(Signal, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 369 .) Rather, when evaluating a contribution claim, courts should consider a variety of factors, including “the particular policies of insurance, the nature of the claim made, . . . the relation of the insured to the insurers” (ibid.) and “ ‘any other equitable considerations.’ ” (Unigard, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 974 .) Although equitable contribution claims are not “ ‘controlled by the language of [the insurers’] contracts with the respective policy holders’ ” (Signal, at p. 369), we have emphasized that the policy language nonetheless remains an important

1996Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 359, 369 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 612 P.2d 889 ]; CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 619-620 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ]).

2022When multiple policies are triggered on a single claim, the insurer’s liability is apportioned pursuant to the ‘other insurance’ clauses of the policies [citations] or under the equitable doctrine of contribution. [Citations.] That apportionment [among insurers], however, has no bearing upon the insurer’s obligation to the policyholder [Citation.] . . . . [Citation.] The insurers’ contractual obligation to the policyholder is to cover the full extent of the policyholder’s liability (up to the policy limits).” ( Armstrong, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 105– 106.) In other words, the insurer must

2002That apportionment, however, has no bearing upon the insurers' obligations to the policyholder. [Citation.] A pro rata allocation among insurers `does not reduce their respective obligations to their insured.' [Citation.] The insurers' contractual obligation to the policyholder is to cover the full extent of the policyholder's liability (up to the policy limits)." ( Armstrong World *160 Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1, 105-106 , 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 ; see also FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Co. (1998) 61 Cal. App.4th 1132, 1185 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 .) This pr

2015(See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 98–99 [“While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory challenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures, we do not agree that our decision today will undermine the contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration of justice.”].) As to the third objective, today’s opinion speculates that if reviewing courts deem the first stage moot and proceed to the third stage in this circumstance, trial courts “may be discouraged from ever making the threshold determination whether a prima facie case exists,” and “prosecutors will not w

1992Accordingly, courts must be careful not to “undermine the contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration of justice." (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 98-99 [ 90 L.Ed.2d at p. 89 ].) No party, therefore, should be denied its statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges (Code Civ.

1973American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 202 Cal. App.2d 520, 522-523 , states: "Prior to 1957, when the Legislature enacted sections 875-880 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the normal common-law rule, although subject to certain exceptions, was that one joint tortfeasor could not seek contribution or indemnity from another.

1973American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 202 Cal. App.2d 520, 522-523, states: “Prior to 1957, when the Legislature enacted sections 875-880 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the normal common-law rule, although subject to certain exceptions, was that one joint tortfeasor could not seek contribution or indemnity from another.

2022(Aerojet, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 72 [equitable contribution “has no place between insurer and insured”]; Dart Industries Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins.

2020Howe Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 688 , 700.) Contribution is a creature of statute and apportions the loss equally among several joint tortfeasors. (§ 875.) A contribution claim “requires a showing that one of several joint tortfeasor judgment debtors has paid more than a pro rata share of a judgment.” (14A Cal.Jur.3d Contribution and Indemnification (2008) § 101; § 875, subd. (f); see Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1378 [contribution may be sought only after the rendition of a judgment declaring more than one defendant jointly

2014The Supreme Court noted further that “this definition of substantial contribution also comports with the principle that pension legislation be applied fairly and broadly.” (Id. at p. 579.) As we observed in Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare County Employees’ Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, 964 (Valero), the test indicated by the statutory and case authority is this: “a disability applicant’s employment must contribute substantially to, or be a real and measurable part of, the employee’s permanent disability, in order to qualify the employee for a [service-connected] disability retireme

2014(Bowen v. Board of Retirement (1986) 42 Cal.3d 572, 574-575 (Bowen).) In Bowen, the Board of Retirement argued that the substantial contribution test set forth in the statute required “more than 50 percent industrial causation.” (Id. at p. 577.) The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Legislature’s intention was to correct a line of appellate cases that had held “even an infinitesimal or inconsequential work-related contribution to disability would suffice for a service-connected disability retirement.” (Id. at p. 576.) The Supreme Court explained that other case law interpreting this st

2014There must be substantial evidence of some connection between the disability and the job.’” ( Bowen, supra, at p. 578 .) Accordingly, the substantial contribution test set forth in the statute simply required that there be “substantial evidence of a ‘real and measurable’ connection between the disability and employment.” (Ibid.) 13.

1996Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 359, 369 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 612 P.2d 889 ]; CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 619-620 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ]).

1996Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 359, 369 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 612 P.2d 889 ]; CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 619-620 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ]).

1996Appeals Bd. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 786, 796 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 405 ].) Disposition The WCAB’s order denying General’s petition for reconsideration is annulled and the matter remanded to the WCAB with directions to enter an order dismissing Fireman’s contribution claim as barred by section 5500.5, subdivision (e).

1996Appeals Bd. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 786, 796 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 405 ].) Disposition The WCAB’s order denying General’s petition for reconsideration is annulled and the matter remanded to the WCAB with directions to enter an order dismissing Fireman’s contribution claim as barred by section 5500.5, subdivision (e).

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic