contribution claim in Texas

1996CASELAW The Texas Supreme Court set out the essential prerequisites for a contribution claim in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1987).

1992Below the statement of facts heading of his brief, it is said, “In the Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Jones prayed that Winnebago and Willingham be found jointly and severally liable for the damages alleged.” In a later paragraph, in connection with the discussion of a motion in limine, the brief contains this sentence, “Willingham asserted that Plaintiff-Appellee was wrongfully trying to separate Winnebago from causation in this matter when Winnebago’s activities and/or omissions were an integral and indivisible part of the Plaintiff-Appellee’s cause of action.” In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jin

2024See Alarcon v. Velazquez, 552 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“The Restatement methodology requires a separate conflict-of-laws analysis for each issue in a case.”); see also BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bracewell & Patterson, LLP, No. 05-02-00636-CV, 2003 WL 124829 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 16, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he substantive law applicable to the underlying tort action is not automatically applicable to a defendant’s contribution claim.”).

2024See Alarcon v. Velazquez, 552 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“The Restatement methodology requires a separate conflict-of-laws analysis for each issue in a case.”); see also BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bracewell & Patterson, LLP, No. 05-02-00636-CV, 2003 WL 124829 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 16, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he substantive law applicable to the underlying tort action is not automatically applicable to a defendant’s contribution claim.”).

2010Mid-Continent, 236 S.W.3d at 772 (citations omitted) (citing Hicks Rubber, 169 S.W.2d at 147 , and Employers Cas.

2010Mid-Continent, 236 S.W.3d at 772 (citations omitted) (citing Hicks Rubber, 169 S.W.2d at 147 , and Employers Cas.

2019In Shoemake, Shoemake’s child died from injuries suffered at Fogel’s swimming pool. 826 S.W.2d at 935 .

2018Shoemake v. Fogel, 826 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. 1992); Varela v. American Petrofina Co. of Tex., 658 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1983).

2011See Jacobs , 687 S.W.2d at 732-33 .

2011See Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d at 732-33 .

2004In this case, as in a contribution claim against a joint tort-feasor, liability could not have been established until judgment was rendered.” Id.

2004In this case, as in a contribution claim against a joint tort-feasor, liability could not have been established until judgment was rendered." Id.

2023Kroesche v. Wassar Logistics Holdings, LLC, No. 01-20-00047-CV, 2023 WL 1112002 , at *25 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 31, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Orr v. Broussard, 565 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.)).

2020See id.

2019See Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 926 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1992); Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Brooks, 180 S.W.3d 694, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

2019“The Restatement methodology requires a separate conflict-of-laws analysis for each issue in a case.” Alarcon v. Velazquez, 552 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (citing Greenberg Traurig of N.Y., P.C. v. Moody, 161 S.W.3d 56, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)); BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bracewell & Patterson, LLP, No. 05-02- 00636-CV, 2003 WL 124829 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 16, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[T]he substantive law applicable to the underlying tort action is not automatically applicable to a defendant’s contribution claim.”).

2019In addressing choice of law issues, “it is necessary for the court to analyze liability and damages separately.” Bain, 257 F.Supp.2d at 875 (citation omitted).

2018Shoemake v. Fogel, 826 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. 1992); Varela v. American Petrofina Co. of Tex., 658 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1983).

2017Code § 3.406(a). 930505.20140273/2851932.1 67 As the Maryland court of appeals stated, “[t]he common thread running through [cases discussing section 3-406] is that the substantial contribution test under the UCC includes negligent conduct on the part of the [person precluded] which previously had been viewed as too remote in the chain of causation to preclude recovery.” Dominion Const., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Maryland, 163, 315 A.2d 69, 73-74 (Md. 1974).

2015See Arnold v. Garlock Inc., 288 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The essential prerequisites for a contribution claim are a judgment finding the party seeking contribution to be a joint tortfeasor and the payment by such party of a disproportionate share of the common liability”) (citation omitted). 19  Case 9:08-cv-00200-MAC Document 257 Filed 04/20/11 Page 20 of 27 PageID #: 4661 the accident, created documents, and conducted interviews and site inspections in Mexico.

2015See Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1992); Eslon Thermoplastics v. Dynamic Sys., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 891, 901-02 (Tex. App— Austin 2001, no pet.).

2008Atlantic argues that Dodson's fraudulent inducement claim could not have related back to its contribution claim because a contribution claim does not even accrue, for limitations purposes, until a plaintiff recovers damages or settles its suit against a defendant, a contribution claim is derivative of the plaintiff's right to recover damages from the defendant against whom contribution is sought, and "[n]o defendant has a right of contribution against any settling person." See J.M.K. 6, Inc. v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C. , 192 S.W.3d 189, 200, 202 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see

2008See Ware v. Everest Group, L.L.C. , 238 S.W.3d 855, 866 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2007, pet. filed) (setting forth two-part test that must be satisfied in order for amended pleading to relate back to an original pleading under section 16.068).

2004Appellees contend the holding in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.1995) compels a ruling that appellants’ SWDA claim is barred by paragraph 8.

1998See C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.1994)(holding that a defendant who enters only a partial settlement with the plaintiff is not subject to a contribution claim with respect to that part, but remains subject to contribution with respect to parts of plaintiffs claims that were not settled).

1998See C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.1994)(holding that a defendant who enters only a partial settlement with the plaintiff is not subject to a contribution claim with respect to that part, but remains subject to contribution with respect to parts of plaintiffs claims that were not settled).

1997Union City Body Co. v. Ramirez, 911 S.W.2d 196, 207-08 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ) (Duncan, J., dissenting). *875 The parties’ arguments are interesting, but they fail to note that Chapter 33 explicitly does not grant a right to pursue a contribution claim against a nonparty after submission of the primary case to the trier of fact.

1992Below the statement of facts heading of his brief, it is said, “In the Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Jones prayed that Winnebago and Willingham be found jointly and severally liable for the damages alleged.” In a later paragraph, in connection with the discussion of a motion in limine, the brief contains this sentence, “Willingham asserted that Plaintiff-Appellee was wrongfully trying to separate Winnebago from causation in this matter when Winnebago’s activities and/or omissions were an integral and indivisible part of the Plaintiff-Appellee’s cause of action.” In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jin