contribution claim (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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contribution claim in Pennsylvania

9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1962–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Straw, J. v. Fair, K. v. Pittsburgh Lubesgreen
pasuperct · 2018 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See Straw, supra. As noted above, the 2018 Settlement Agreement did not properly release the Hood Latch Defendants, as they were not a party to the Agreement and, therefore, the contribution claim did not arise.

2022See Straw, supra. As noted above, the 2018 Settlement Agreement did not properly release the Hood Latch Defendants, as they were not a party to the Agreement and, therefore, the contribution claim did not arise.

11
Walton v. Avco Corp.red
pa · 1992 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See Walton, supra. Accordingly, this argument lacks merit and we grant no relief on this claim.

11
Mattia v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green
pa · 1987 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999See Mattia v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 366 Pa. Super. 504, 508 , 531 A.2d 789, 791-92 (1987).

1999See Mattia v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 366 Pa. Super. 504, 508 , 531 A.2d 789, 791-92 (1987).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Swartz v. Sunderland green
pa · 1961
2 sentences

1990Swartz, 403 Pa. at 225 , 169 A.2d at 291 . 3 *500 We also agree with Automated’s assertion that the statute of limitations applicable to Oviatt’s underlying claim against the additional defendants has no effect on Automated’s ability to enforce a contribution claim against them.

1990Swartz, 403 Pa. at 225 , 169 A.2d at 291 . 3 *500 We also agree with Automated’s assertion that the statute of limitations applicable to Oviatt’s underlying claim against the additional defendants has no effect on Automated’s ability to enforce a contribution claim against them.

21962–1990
Oviatt v. Automated Entrance System Co. green
pa · 1990
1 sentence

2015Oviatt, 583 A.2d at 1227 .

12015–2015
Falciani v. Philadelphia Transportation Co. green
paed · 1960
1 sentence

2014Id. at 204 .

12014–2014
Hileman v. Morelli green
pasuperct · 1992
1 sentence

2014This concern is not present where a timely joinder has occurred, as the liability of the defendant and the additional defendant are adjudicated in the same case. 2 Plaintiffs also cite to Hileman v. Morelli, 605 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. 1992), for the proposition that their contribution claim is not premature.

12014–2014
Baker v. ACandS green
pa · 2000
2 sentences

2001Wkly, March 17,1997, at 12, 13: “In conclusion, given the fact that the pro tanto release is so clearly favorable to the plaintiffs, the only reasonable explanation that such releases are not seen more often is that defendants refuse to enter into them, given the subsequent risk of exposure to defendants.” I recognize that the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Baker v. ACandS, supra, 562 Pa. at 297 , 755 A.2d at 667 , contains the following dicta: “Thus, in Pennsylvania, the UCATA contemplates three separate scenarios.

2001Wkly, March 17,1997, at 12, 13: “In conclusion, given the fact that the pro tanto release is so clearly favorable to the plaintiffs, the only reasonable explanation that such releases are not seen more often is that defendants refuse to enter into them, given the subsequent risk of exposure to defendants.” I recognize that the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Baker v. ACandS, supra, 562 Pa. at 297 , 755 A.2d at 667 , contains the following dicta: “Thus, in Pennsylvania, the UCATA contemplates three separate scenarios.

12001–2001
Commonwealth v. Bryner green
pacommwct · 1992
1 sentence

1997In the case of Department of Environmental Resources v. Bryner, 149 Pa. Cmwlth. 59, 613 A.2d 43 (1992), Judge Palladino, in granting summary judgment to the Department on liability, held that where the administrative record clearly demonstrated that the defendants contributed to causing the release of hazardous substances, the acts or omissions of a third party were not a defense under Section 703(a)(8) of the HSCA, 35 P.S. § 6020.703(a)(3), which requires that the release of such substances be caused solely by the acts or omissions of a third party.

11997–1997
Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets green
pa · 1987
2 sentences

1990In the case of Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 513 Pa. 474 , 522 A.2d 1 (1987), our supreme court discussed the definition of "voluntary settlement” in the context of a contribution claim under the UCATA. *500 In their briefs, the additional defendants direct our attention to Chief Justice Nix’s observation that a settling tortfeasor who elects to pay consideration for a release enjoys no contribution rights.

1990In the case of Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 513 Pa. 474 , 522 A.2d 1 (1987), our supreme court discussed the definition of "voluntary settlement” in the context of a contribution claim under the UCATA. *500 In their briefs, the additional defendants direct our attention to Chief Justice Nix’s observation that a settling tortfeasor who elects to pay consideration for a release enjoys no contribution rights.

11990–1990
Mong v. Hershberger green
pasuperct · 1962
2 sentences

1964Bearing in mind that "equity [is] the keynote of the doctrine of contribution" ( Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Superior Ct. 68 , 186 A. 2d 427 ), the provisions of § 2(2) require that, until Buterbaugh, as a joint tortfeasor, has satisfied the alternative provisions of the act he is not entitled to any contribution from Daly.

1964Bearing in mind that "equity [is] the keynote of the doctrine of contribution" ( Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Superior Ct. 68 , 186 A. 2d 427 ), the provisions of § 2(2) require that, until Buterbaugh, as a joint tortfeasor, has satisfied the alternative provisions of the act he is not entitled to any contribution from Daly.

11964–1964

Where else courts name it

IL 169 (1969–2026) NY 67 (1874–2025) TX 46 (1896–2024) MN 33 (1943–2019) CA 31 (1973–2024) FL 27 (1975–2025) WI 27 (1962–2019) NJ 20 (1938–2025) WA 16 (1981–2026) MI 14 (1922–2015) OH 14 (1997–2024) OR 14 (1974–2026) WV 12 (1990–2023) MO 12 (1878–2013) MD 10 (1989–2023) IA 10 (1916–2014) PA 9 (1962–2022) NV 9 (2004–2022) DE 9 (2004–2025) AZ 8 (1971–2016) CT 8 (1971–2014) MA 7 (1979–2026) LA 7 (1979–2009) GA 6 (1900–2023) DC 6 (1990–2008) UT 5 (2000–2024) TN 5 (1915–2019) NM 4 (1987–2011) AK 4 (1975–2001) VA 4 (1983–1995) IN 4 (1997–2012) ME 4 (2000–2011) SC 3 (2009–2025) CO 3 (1995–2007) NC 3 (1895–2014) KY 3 (1907–1990) OK 2 (2001–2011) MT 2 (1995–2005) WY 2 (1993–2013) RI 2 (1998–2008) HI 2 (2002–2006) NH 2 (1987–1987) KS 2 (1980–2009)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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