contribution claim in West Virginia

2023We explained the doctrine of contribution in Syllabus Point 4, in part, of Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 169 W.

2013The Court disagreed and held that “where the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides an express exception from immunity against suits by an employee in a tort area, it follows that a suit grounded on this exception would enable a third party to maintain an action in contribution.” 169 W.Va. at 449 , 288 S.E.2d at 517 . 13 The plaintiffs state that they are immune from liability under the parental immunity doctrine and argue that there is no exception to parental immunity that would allow the defendants to pursue a contribution claim.

2015LOUGHRY, Justice, concurring: I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that Modular advanced a proper contribution claim and write separately to express my strong belief that this Court must revisit the holding in Charleston Area Medical Center, Itic. v. Parke-Davis, 217 W.Va. 15 , 614 S.E.2d 15 (2005).

2015LOUGHRY, Justice, concurring: I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that Modular advanced a proper contribution claim and write separately to express my strong belief that this Court must revisit the holding in Charleston Area Medical Center, Itic. v. Parke-Davis, 217 W.Va. 15 , 614 S.E.2d 15 (2005).

2013Cole, 198 W.Va. at 749 , 482 S.E.2d at 926 .

2013Cole, 198 W.Va. at 749 , 482 S.E.2d at 926 .

2013The defendants state that “the reference to 13 (...continued) Chinos Villas, Inc. v. Bermudez, 448 So.2d 1179 (Fla. App.3d Dist. 1984); and Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 1981). 15 the derivative nature of contribution” in Unipunch should not prevail over their independent “right” to assert a contribution claim.

2013The defendants state that “the reference to 13 (...continued) Chinos Villas, Inc. v. Bermudez, 448 So.2d 1179 (Fla. App.3d Dist. 1984); and Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 1981). 16 the derivative nature of contribution” in Unipunch should not prevail over their independent “right” to assert a contribution claim.

2013Paris v. Dance, 194 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 2008), in which a Colorado court concluded that a parent could be designated as a nonparty for the allocation of fault, even though the parental immunity doctrine would still bar recovery of damages allocated to the parent.

2013Paris v. Dance, 194 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 2008), in which a Colorado court concluded that a parent could be designated as a nonparty for the allocation of fault, even though the parental immunity doctrine would still bar recovery of damages allocated to the parent.

2013The defendants state that “the reference to 13 (...continued) Chinos Villas, Inc. v. Bermudez, 448 So.2d 1179 (Fla. App.3d Dist. 1984); and Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 1981). 15 the derivative nature of contribution” in Unipunch should not prevail over their independent “right” to assert a contribution claim.

2013The defendants state that “the reference to 13 (...continued) Chinos Villas, Inc. v. Bermudez, 448 So.2d 1179 (Fla. App.3d Dist. 1984); and Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 1981). 16 the derivative nature of contribution” in Unipunch should not prevail over their independent “right” to assert a contribution claim.

2013In addition to Connecticut, the plaintiffs assert that a number of other courts outside of our jurisdiction have held that the parental immunity doctrine precludes the parents of a minor child from being joined as a third-party defendant for purposes of contribution.12 In opposition to the plaintiffs’ arguments, the defendants contend that the parental immunity doctrine should not preclude them from asserting a contribution claim against A.N.’s parents and offer the following arguments in support of their position: (1) contribution is an equitable doctrine that demands that all parties respons

2013In addition to Connecticut, the plaintiffs assert that a number of other courts outside of our jurisdiction have held that the parental immunity doctrine precludes the parents of a minor child from being joined as a third-party defendant for purposes of contribution.12 In opposition to the plaintiffs’ arguments, the defendants contend that the parental immunity doctrine should not preclude them from asserting a contribution claim against A.N.’s parents and offer the following arguments in support of their position: (1) contribution is an equitable doctrine that demands that all parties respons

2013Answer: Yes. 1 This Court held in Syllabus Point 3, in part, of Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W.Va. 404 , 432 S.E.2d 74 (1993), that [w]hen a certified question is not framed so that this Court is able to fully address the law which is involved in the question, then this Court retains the power to reformulate questions certified to it under . . . the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act found in W.Va.

2013Answer: Yes. 1 This Court held in Syllabus Point 3, in part, of Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W.Va. 404 , 432 S.E.2d 74 (1993), that [w]hen a certified question is not framed so that this Court is able to fully address the law which is involved in the question, then this Court retains the power to reformulate questions certified to it under . . . the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act found in W.Va.

2013Co., 61 Mich.App. 480 , 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975) (no contribution because parental authority exception to parental immunity doctrine barred defendant’s third party complaint against father). 13 The defendants also argue that courts in other jurisdictions have ruled that the parental immunity doctrine does not prevent a defendant from seeking contribution from a minor child’s parent.

2013Co., 61 Mich.App. 480 , 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975) (no contribution because parental authority exception to parental immunity doctrine barred defendant’s third party complaint against father). 13 The defendants also argue that courts in other jurisdictions have ruled that the parental immunity doctrine does not prevent a defendant from seeking contribution from a minor child’s parent.

2013In addition to Connecticut, the plaintiffs assert that a number of other courts outside of our jurisdiction have held that the parental immunity doctrine precludes the parents of a minor child from being joined as a third-party defendant for purposes of contribution.12 In opposition to the plaintiffs’ arguments, the defendants contend that the parental immunity doctrine should not preclude them from asserting a contribution claim against A.N.’s parents and offer the following arguments in support of their position: (1) contribution is an equitable doctrine that demands that all parties respons

2013In addition to Connecticut, the plaintiffs assert that a number of other courts outside of our jurisdiction have held that the parental immunity doctrine precludes the parents of a minor child from being joined as a third-party defendant for purposes of contribution.12 In opposition to the plaintiffs’ arguments, the defendants contend that the parental immunity doctrine should not preclude them from asserting a contribution claim against A.N.’s parents and offer the following arguments in support of their position: (1) contribution is an equitable doctrine that demands that all parties respons

2015Powell v. Montange, 277 Neb. 846 , 765 N.W.2d 496, 504 (2009) ("[A] right of contribution among joint tort-feasors is not established if the tort-feasor seeking contribution extinguishes only his or her liability and does not extinguish the liability of the other joint tort-feasors from whom contribution is sought.”); The Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644 , 98 P.3d 681, 683 (2004) ("[A] joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought.”); H

2015Powell v. Montange, 277 Neb. 846 , 765 N.W.2d 496, 504 (2009) ("[A] right of contribution among joint tort-feasors is not established if the tort-feasor seeking contribution extinguishes only his or her liability and does not extinguish the liability of the other joint tort-feasors from whom contribution is sought.”); The Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644 , 98 P.3d 681, 683 (2004) ("[A] joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought.”); H

2015Powell v. Montange, 765 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Neb. 2009) (“[A] right of contribution among joint tort-feasors is not established if the tort-feasor seeking contribution extinguishes only his or her liability and does not extinguish the liability of the other joint tort-feasors from whom contribution is sought.”); The Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 98 P.3d 681, 683 (Nev. 2004) (“[A] joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought.”); Husni v. Meden, 640 N

2015Powell v. Montange, 277 Neb. 846 , 765 N.W.2d 496, 504 (2009) ("[A] right of contribution among joint tort-feasors is not established if the tort-feasor seeking contribution extinguishes only his or her liability and does not extinguish the liability of the other joint tort-feasors from whom contribution is sought.”); The Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644 , 98 P.3d 681, 683 (2004) ("[A] joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought.”); H

2015Powell v. Montange, 277 Neb. 846 , 765 N.W.2d 496, 504 (2009) ("[A] right of contribution among joint tort-feasors is not established if the tort-feasor seeking contribution extinguishes only his or her liability and does not extinguish the liability of the other joint tort-feasors from whom contribution is sought.”); The Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644 , 98 P.3d 681, 683 (2004) ("[A] joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought.”); H

2015Powell v. Montange, 277 Neb. 846 , 765 N.W.2d 496, 504 (2009) ("[A] right of contribution among joint tort-feasors is not established if the tort-feasor seeking contribution extinguishes only his or her liability and does not extinguish the liability of the other joint tort-feasors from whom contribution is sought.”); The Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644 , 98 P.3d 681, 683 (2004) ("[A] joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought.”); H

2015Ct. App. 2003) (same); Kirk v. Moe, 789 P.2d 84 (Wash. 1990) (recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf). 16 his liability on the fortuitous event that another paid the entire joint judgment.” Sitzes, 169 W.

2015Co., 224 W.Va. 636 , 687 S.E.2d 574 (2009), which the circuit court read to extinguish the contribution claim upon Modularis settlement with Mr. Smith. 3 Modular filed a motion for judgment as a matter-of law, or alternatively, a new trial.

2015Co., 224 W.Va. 636 , 687 S.E.2d 574 (2009), which the circuit court read to extinguish the contribution claim upon Modularis settlement with Mr. Smith. 3 Modular filed a motion for judgment as a matter-of law, or alternatively, a new trial.

2015Moreover, “[t]he right [to clarification of an irregular verdict] after waiver cannot be reclaimed and revived by a motion for a new trial.” Id. at 107 , 516 S.E.2d at 511 . 5 As noted above, the circuit court initially ruled in Modular’s favor pre-trial in allowing the contribution claim to be presented to the jury.

2015Moreover, “[t]he right [to clarification of an irregular verdict] after waiver cannot be reclaimed and revived by a motion for a new trial.” Id. at 107 , 516 S.E.2d at 511 . 5 As noted above, the circuit court initially ruled in Modular’s favor pre-trial in allowing the contribution claim to be presented to the jury.

2015Powell v. Montange, 277 Neb. 846 , 765 N.W.2d 496, 504 (2009) ("[A] right of contribution among joint tort-feasors is not established if the tort-feasor seeking contribution extinguishes only his or her liability and does not extinguish the liability of the other joint tort-feasors from whom contribution is sought.”); The Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644 , 98 P.3d 681, 683 (2004) ("[A] joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought.”); H

2015Powell v. Montange, 277 Neb. 846 , 765 N.W.2d 496, 504 (2009) ("[A] right of contribution among joint tort-feasors is not established if the tort-feasor seeking contribution extinguishes only his or her liability and does not extinguish the liability of the other joint tort-feasors from whom contribution is sought.”); The Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644 , 98 P.3d 681, 683 (2004) ("[A] joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought.”); H

2013This Court first recognized the right to inchoate contribution in Haynes v. City of Nitro, 161 W.Va. 230 , 240 S.E.2d 544 (1977).

2013This Court first recognized the right to inchoate contribution in Haynes v. City of Nitro, 161 W.Va. 230 , 240 S.E.2d 544 (1977).

2005The Defendants unsuccessfully sought to have the contribution claim dismissed by arguing that this Court's decision in Howell v. Luckey, 205 W.Va. 445 , 518 S.E.2d 873 (1999), barred such a claim. 6 .

2005The Defendants unsuccessfully sought to have the contribution claim dismissed by arguing that this Court's decision in Howell v. Luckey, 205 W.Va. 445 , 518 S.E.2d 873 (1999), barred such a claim. 6 .

2002Icl. at 333, 547 S.E.2d at 271 . 11 .Bifurcation of the damages and liability phases has, under some circumstances,. been held to be an abuse of discretion.

2001See also Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 94, 115-117 , 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1544-1548 (1998) (successor attorney, a defendant in legal malpractice suit, could assert a claim against a predecessor attorney as a third-party defendant alleging that the damages claimed by the plaintiff are "attributable, at least in part” to the plaintiff's predecessor attorney); Smith v. McDougall, 365 Pa.Super. 157 , 529 A.2d 20 (1987) (defendant attorney in a legal malpractice case joined plaintiff’s previous counsel as third-party defendant); Schauer v. Joyce, 54 N.Y.2d 1 , 444 N.Y.S.2d 5

2001See also Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 94, 115-117 , 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1544-1548 (1998) (successor attorney, a defendant in legal malpractice suit, could assert a claim against a predecessor attorney as a third-party defendant alleging that the damages claimed by the plaintiff are "attributable, at least in part” to the plaintiff's predecessor attorney); Smith v. McDougall, 365 Pa.Super. 157 , 529 A.2d 20 (1987) (defendant attorney in a legal malpractice case joined plaintiff’s previous counsel as third-party defendant); Schauer v. Joyce, 54 N.Y.2d 1 , 444 N.Y.S.2d 5