contribution exception in Utah

2024As support for this determination, the commissioner noted that the marital estate had repaid the $150,000 loan that used the House as collateral, and reasoned that the loan indicated “that the family in essence bought that mortgage and paid it back.” The commissioner also relied on the facts that, during the period before Marcus was gifted the House, the parties obtained homeowners insurance indicating that they were both owners of it and that Mona’s mother had paid $13,000 toward “the mother-in-law apartment being enhanced.” And the commissioner found relevant the fact that Mona had been “res

2024For 20210871-CA 25 2024 UT App 156 Godfrey v. Godfrey those reasons, we decline to address the merits of Randy’s argument on this point. 6 CONCLUSION ¶68 Randy has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in its management of discovery issues, valuation of the marital property, imputation of income, or application of the contribution exception to the distribution of High Country’s sale proceeds.

2020Once this money left the practice and entered these accounts, that money then became marital property. 5 Cf. Keiter v. Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 19 , 235 P.3d 782 (“[E]arned income from employment or from rendering professional services during a marriage falls within the usual definition of marital property.”). ¶19 But this one-way flow did not convert the source of that money, i.e., the practice, into a marital asset.

2020Once this money left the practice and entered these accounts, that money then became marital property. 5 Cf. Keiter v. Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 19 , 235 P.3d 782 (“[E]arned income from employment or from rendering professional services during a marriage falls within the usual definition of marital property.”). ¶19 But this one-way flow did not convert the source of that money, i.e., the practice, into a marital asset.

2017Even “viewing] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to” Ms. Lindsey, see Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 9 , 284 P.3d 630 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), she did not enhance, maintain, or protect the value of Mr. Lindsey’s business interests for purposes of the contribution exception. ¶ 42 Ms. Lindsey argues otherwise, citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 , 45 P.3d 176 , but those cases do not support her claim.

2017Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 , 45 P.3d 176 , have occasionally been referenced in the context of the contribution exception.

2017Moreover, Ms. Lindsey did not contend that Mr. Lindsey elected to forgo salary or other compensation that would have benefited the marriage so that those funds could be reinvested in his business, cf. Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ¶ 30 , 351 P.3d 90 ; supra ¶33 n.4, and it was undisputed that Mr. Lindsey received significant compensation as well as dividends during the marriage, which were treated as marital income and thus benefited both parties. ¶ 41 The trial court thus correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that Ms. Lindsey’s household and family responsibilities, coupled with her intermi

2017Moreover, Ms. Lindsey did not contend that Mr. Lindsey elected to forgo salary or other compensation that would have benefited the marriage so that those funds could be reinvested in his business, cf. Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ¶ 30 , 351 P.3d 90 ; supra ¶33 n.4, and it was undisputed that Mr. Lindsey received significant compensation as well as dividends during the marriage, which were treated as marital income and thus benefited both parties. ¶ 41 The trial court thus correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that Ms. Lindsey’s household and family responsibilities, coupled with her intermi

2017Even “viewing] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to” Ms. Lindsey, see Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 9 , 284 P.3d 630 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), she did not enhance, maintain, or protect the value of Mr. Lindsey’s business interests for purposes of the contribution exception. ¶ 42 Ms. Lindsey argues otherwise, citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 , 45 P.3d 176 , but those cases do not support her claim.

2017Even “viewing] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to” Ms. Lindsey, see Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 9 , 284 P.3d 630 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), she did not enhance, maintain, or protect the value of Mr. Lindsey’s business interests for purposes of the contribution exception. ¶ 42 Ms. Lindsey argues otherwise, citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 , 45 P.3d 176 , but those cases do not support her claim.

2017The Contribution Exception ¶ 34 Ms. Lindsey asserts that the trial court incorrectly determined, “on summary judgment based on undisputed facts, that Ms. Lindsey’s contributions to Mr. Lindsey’s business ... were infrequent and immaterial” and were “insufficient to augment or enhance the value of Mr. Lindsey’s business interests as a matter of law.” According to Ms. Lindsey, the trial court “misapplied the undisputed facts to governing case law” and erroneously “remov[ed] the parties’ largest asset from the marital pie, leaving such an equitable discrepancy! ] that even if Ms. Lindsey were awa

2017Even “viewing] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to” Ms. Lindsey, see Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 9 , 284 P.3d 630 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), she did not enhance, maintain, or protect the value of Mr. Lindsey’s business interests for purposes of the contribution exception. ¶ 42 Ms. Lindsey argues otherwise, citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 , 45 P.3d 176 , but those cases do not support her claim.

2017Even “viewing] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to” Ms. Lindsey, see Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 9 , 284 P.3d 630 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), she did not enhance, maintain, or protect the value of Mr. Lindsey’s business interests for purposes of the contribution exception. ¶ 42 Ms. Lindsey argues otherwise, citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 , 45 P.3d 176 , but those cases do not support her claim.

2017Likewise, in Kumler v. Kunzler, the contribution exception was not triggered by one spouse’s assumption of household responsibilities, which allowed the other spouse “to focus his time and energy on preserving and increasing the value” of his separate property. 2008 *977 UT App 263, ¶¶ 19 & n.5, 32, 37, 190 P.3d 497 . ¶ 38 The division of labor among married parties may take any number of forms, and the give-and-take often inherent in marital relationships is generally not a sufficient basis for judicially rewriting title to property.