contribution claim in Oregon

2026Hutchings, 340 Or App at 212 n 2.7 We decline to remand to the Court of 6 Defendant contends that that the Court of Appeals “never exercised discre- tion,” because it concluded that there was not plain error, and that, to the extent that the Court of Appeals explained in a footnote that it would not exercise dis- cretion to reverse even if the error was plain, the court had “balanced the parties’ contribution to the error incorrectly.” 7 In stating that it would decline to exercise its discretion to reverse defen- dant’s conviction, the Court of Appeals expressly addressed two factors listed i

2026Hutchings, 340 Or App at 212 n 2.7 We decline to remand to the Court of 6 Defendant contends that that the Court of Appeals “never exercised discre- tion,” because it concluded that there was not plain error, and that, to the extent that the Court of Appeals explained in a footnote that it would not exercise dis- cretion to reverse even if the error was plain, the court had “balanced the parties’ contribution to the error incorrectly.” 7 In stating that it would decline to exercise its discretion to reverse defen- dant’s conviction, the Court of Appeals expressly addressed two factors listed i

2024Although the briefing focused on other arguments, Continental did contend at oral argument that “[t]he statute’s verb tenses certainly do suggest that, if the targeted insurer seeks contribution before a co-insurer settles with the insured, that settlement is not eligible * * * to bar the contribution claim.” Moreover, the interpretation of the statute is at the heart of this appeal, and an appellate court has “an independent duty to correctly interpret any statute that comes before [it], regardless of the arguments and inter- pretations offered by the parties.” Strasser v. State of Oregon, 36

2024Although the briefing focused on other arguments, Continental did contend at oral argument that “[t]he statute’s verb tenses certainly do suggest that, if the targeted insurer seeks contribution before a co-insurer settles with the insured, that settlement is not eligible * * * to bar the contribution claim.” Moreover, the interpretation of the statute is at the heart of this appeal, and an appellate court has “an independent duty to correctly interpret any statute that comes before [it], regardless of the arguments and inter- pretations offered by the parties.” Strasser v. State of Oregon, 36

2024Moreover, under the majority’s approach, a targeted insurer is left in a state of perpetual uncertainty—a settle- ment between another responsible insurer and the insured may come at any point—thus further undermining efforts to facilitate “speedy clean up of hazardous waste sites[.]” Certain Underwriters, 287 Or App at 291 .

2021As amicus curiae former Governor Kulongoski points out, the OECAA “was enacted to assure the prompt availability of insurance proceeds due and owing” from the insurance companies whose insureds “ ‘face potential liability for their ownership of or roles at Cite as 367 Or 711 (2021) 743 polluted sites in this state.’ ” (Quoting ORS 465.478.) The statute does so, amicus Kulongoski explains, “by prescribing rules of construction, imposing consequences for delay and obfuscation, and rewarding performing insurers by vest- ing them with contribution rights against nonperforming insurers.” The two ke

2021(CC 19CV14525) (SC S067138) 492 P3d 1245 After being sued for claims stemming from the explosion in Oregon of a hydro- gen generator, HP, Inc. brought a contribution claim against TÜV Rheinland of North America, Inc. (TÜV), alleging that TÜV had negligently certified the design of the hydrogen generator, which HP had purchased from the hydrogen generator’s Connecticut manufacturer.

2017The trial court granted summary judgment and, on appeal, London argued, in part, that “the trial court erred in concluding that defendants’ settlements with Zidell foreclosed any subsequent contribution claims as a matter of law.” Id. at 110 .

2010If, under ORS 465.480(4), a settlement between an insured and its insurer barred a contribution claim against that insurer in all pending cases, the act would have already accomplished everything that section 5(4)(b) does, thereby *130 rendering the provision entirely redundant. 17 We assume the legislature would not have drafted the law in that way. 18 Stamper, 197 Or App at 418 .

1997He cannot be required to defend himself in Oregon against plaintiff's claims, Steers, 129 Or.App. at 22 , 877 P.2d 654 , and, according to the record, plaintiff can no longer bring the claims against him in either of the two other conceivable forums, California or Alberta. [5] To the extent that Segerstrom is concerned about having a contribution claim brought against him, he can intervene in this proceeding by waiving his personal jurisdiction defense or by stepping in and controlling the defense of, at a minimum, Turnbull. [6] Defendants argue, however, that if the proceedings continue witho

1997He cannot be required to defend himself in Oregon against plaintiff's claims, Steers, 129 Or.App. at 22 , 877 P.2d 654 , and, according to the record, plaintiff can no longer bring the claims against him in either of the two other conceivable forums, California or Alberta. [5] To the extent that Segerstrom is concerned about having a contribution claim brought against him, he can intervene in this proceeding by waiving his personal jurisdiction defense or by stepping in and controlling the defense of, at a minimum, Turnbull. [6] Defendants argue, however, that if the proceedings continue witho

1996However, under Miller v. City of Portland, 288 Or 271 , 604 P2d 1261 (1980), that claim must be analyzed from K’s perspective.

1996However, under Miller v. City of Portland, 288 Or 271 , 604 P2d 1261 (1980), that claim must be analyzed from K’s perspective.

1994Plaintiff cites Kahn v. Weldin, 60 Or App 365, 373 , 653 P2d 1268 (1982), rev den 294 Or 682 (1983), for the proposition that we review a contribution claim de novo.

1994Plaintiff cites Kahn v. Weldin, 60 Or App 365, 373 , 653 P2d 1268 (1982), rev den 294 Or 682 (1983), for the proposition that we review a contribution claim de novo.

1993Machunze v. Chemeketa Community College, 106 Or.App. 707, 712 , 810 P.2d 406 , rev. den., 312 Or. 16 , 815 P.2d 703 (1991).

1993Machunze v. Chemeketa Community College, 106 Or.App. 707, 712 , 810 P.2d 406 , rev. den., 312 Or. 16 , 815 P.2d 703 (1991).

1985Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1978). [2] In Scovell v. TRK Trans., Inc., 71 Or.

1985Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 NW2d 79 (Minn. 1978).

1985Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1978). [2] In Scovell v. TRK Trans., Inc., 71 Or.

1985White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363 , 137 N.W.2d 674 (1965).

1985White v. Johnson, 272 Minn 363, 137 NW2d 674 (1965).

1983It concedes that the summary judgment on the contribution claim was proper under Blackledge v. Harrington, 291 Or 691 , 634 P2d 243 (1981).

1983It concedes that the summary judgment on the contribution claim was proper under Blackledge v. Harrington, 291 Or 691 , 634 P2d 243 (1981).

1974In Case v. McKinnis, 107 Or 223, 256 , 213 P 422 (1923) the court said: “The plaintiff relies upon the doctrine of contribution.

1974In Case v. McKinnis, 107 Or 223, 256 , 213 P 422 (1923) the court said: “The plaintiff relies upon the doctrine of contribution.