abuse of process claim in Pennsylvania

2007Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 776, 785 (Pa.Super.2002). ¶ 9 Appellants first assert that the trial court erred in concluding that they failed to satisfy the first element of an abuse of process claim: that a legal process was used against them individually.

2007CONCURRING OPINION BY ORIE MELVIN, J.: ¶ 1 I concur in the decision to affirm the entry of summary judgment for the Appel-lees but would do so on a different basis. 4 Specifically, I would affirm on the ground that Appellants have failed to offer evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude as a matter of law that Appellants satisfied the third element of the abuse of process claim, i.e., harm caused to the plaintiffs. 5 ¶ 2 “To establish a claim for abuse of process it must be shown that the defendant (1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose fo

2009Abuse of process cases frequently turn on the second element of this three-part conjunctive test, and, hence, the courts of this Commonwealth have had little opportunity to discuss the third element of harm caused to the plaintiff. ¶ 3 In Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228 (Pa.Super.1998), although it reversed the verdict on the plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim on the grounds that such was preempted by the Bankruptcy Code, this Court arguably suggested that emotional harm is compensable in an abuse of process action by affirming the award of damages for emotional distress without differentiat

2009Abuse of process cases frequently turn on the second element of this three-part conjunctive test, and, hence, the courts of this Commonwealth have had little opportunity to discuss the third element of harm caused to the plaintiff. ¶ 3 In Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228 (Pa.Super.1998), although it reversed the verdict on the plaintiffs' abuse of process claim on the grounds that such was preempted by the Bankruptcy Code, this Court arguably suggested that emotional harm is compensable in an abuse of process action by affirming the award of *23 damages for emotional distress without differen

2024See McGee v. Feege, 535 A.2d 1020 , 1026 (Pa. 1987) (an abuse of process claim may be premised upon “the use of the legal process as a tactical weapon to coerce a desired result that is not the legitimate object of the process”); Clausi v. Stuck, 74 A.3d 242 , 249 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“In evaluating the primary purpose prong of the [abuse of process] tort, there must be an act or threat not authorized by the process, or the process must be used for an illegitimate aim such as extortion, blackmail, or to coerce or compel the plaintiff to take some collateral action.”) (citation omitted).

2024See McGee v. Feege, 535 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Pa. 1987) (an abuse of process claim may be premised upon “the use of the legal process as a tactical weapon to coerce a desired result that is not the legitimate object of the process”); Clausi v. Stuck, 74 A.3d 242, 249 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“In evaluating the primary purpose prong of the [abuse of process] tort, there must be an act or threat not authorized by the process, or the process must be used for an illegitimate aim such as extortion, blackmail, or to coerce or compel the plaintiff to take some collateral action.”) (citation omitted).

2019In order to establish an abuse of process claim, a person must "show that the defendant (1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff." Id. "[T]here is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions." Shaffer v. Stewart, 326 Pa. Super. 135, 138-39 , 473 A.2d 1017, 1019 (1984).

2019In order to establish an abuse of process claim, a person must "show that the defendant (1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff." Id. "[T]here is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions." Shaffer v. Stewart, 326 Pa. Super. 135, 138-39 , 473 A.2d 1017, 1019 (1984).

2025See, e.g., Rosen, 627 A.2d at 192 (noting process includes noticing of deposition and issuing subpoenas, including those against third parties); Vivian, 318 A.3d at 904 (citation omitted) (“To establish a claim for abuse of process it must be shown that the defendant (1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.”).

2019"The tort of 'abuse of process' is defined as the use of legal process against another 'primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed."' Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 426 Pa.Super. 376 , 627 A.2d 190, 192 (1993) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682).

2024Freundlich, 157 A.3d at 531 (citation omitted).

2023See Freundlich & Littman, 157 A.3d at 531 (internal citation and quotations omitted). - 31 - J-A24038-22 An abuse of process claim differs from a wrongful use of civil proceedings claim.22 A wrongful use of civil proceedings claim, as noted above, focuses on the initiation of process, that is, the initiation or continuation of a claim with malicious motive and without probable cause.

2025See Hart v. O’Malley, 647 A.2d 542, 550 (Pa.Super. 1994) (“Hart - 20 - J-A23020-25 I”) (indispensable parties had standing to sue for wrongful use of civil proceedings).

2025See, e.g., id. at 4, 9-10 (affirming transfer where eight defense witnesses presented affidavits explaining that business activities made it more burdensome to attend trial 100 miles from the county of their location and the location of the events underlying the abuse of process claim); Smith v. CMS West, Inc., 305 A.3d 593, 597-98 (Pa. Super. 2023) (affirming transfer to the county encompassing the subject cement manufacturing facility 300 miles away based on defense affidavits from eyewitness facility employees and manager claiming hardship due to caregiver responsibilities, furlough, and un

2025See, e.g., id. at 4, 9-10 (affirming transfer where eight defense witnesses presented affidavits explaining that business activities made it more burdensome to attend trial 100 miles from the county of their location and the location of the events underlying the abuse of process claim); Smith v. CMS West, Inc., 305 A.3d 593, 597-98 (Pa. Super. 2023) (affirming transfer to the county encompassing the subject cement manufacturing facility 300 miles away based on defense affidavits from eyewitness facility employees and manager claiming hardship due to caregiver responsibilities, furlough, and un

2025See, e.g., Rosen, 627 A.2d at 192 (noting process includes noticing of deposition and issuing subpoenas, including those against third parties); Vivian, 318 A.3d at 904 (citation omitted) (“To establish a claim for abuse of process it must be shown that the defendant (1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.”).

2025See, e.g., id. at 4, 9-10 (affirming transfer where eight defense witnesses presented affidavits explaining that business activities made it more burdensome to attend trial 100 miles from the county of their location and the location of the events underlying the abuse of process claim); Smith v. CMS West, Inc., 305 A.3d 593, 597-98 (Pa. Super. 2023) (affirming transfer to the county encompassing the subject cement manufacturing facility 300 miles away based on defense affidavits from eyewitness facility employees and manager claiming hardship due to caregiver responsibilities, furlough, and un

2024In finding that Allegheny County was an improper venue for Appellants’ abuse of process claim, the trial court explained,9 "The appropriate consideration when determining venue in a claim of wrongful use of civil proceedings is the location of the underlying litigation." Harris[, 844 A.2d at 570 ,] citing Kring v. U[niv. of] Pittsburgh, 829 A.2d 673, 678 (Pa. Super. [] 2003)[.] [The Scotts] argue the only proper venue for [the abuse of process claim and the wrongful use of civil process claim] lies in Greene County, as the underlying civil matter was filed in Greene [County.

2024See McGee v. Feege, 535 A.2d 1020 , 1026 (Pa. 1987) (an abuse of process claim may be premised upon “the use of the legal process as a tactical weapon to coerce a desired result that is not the legitimate object of the process”); Clausi v. Stuck, 74 A.3d 242 , 249 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“In evaluating the primary purpose prong of the [abuse of process] tort, there must be an act or threat not authorized by the process, or the process must be used for an illegitimate aim such as extortion, blackmail, or to coerce or compel the plaintiff to take some collateral action.”) (citation omitted).

2024See McGee v. Feege, 535 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Pa. 1987) (an abuse of process claim may be premised upon “the use of the legal process as a tactical weapon to coerce a desired result that is not the legitimate object of the process”); Clausi v. Stuck, 74 A.3d 242, 249 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“In evaluating the primary purpose prong of the [abuse of process] tort, there must be an act or threat not authorized by the process, or the process must be used for an illegitimate aim such as extortion, blackmail, or to coerce or compel the plaintiff to take some collateral action.”) (citation omitted).

2023See Stone Crushed Partnership v. Kassab Archbold Jackson & O'Brien, 908 A.2d 875 , 877 n.1 (Pa. 2006).

2023See id. at 1238-39 .

2023Abuse of process requires “[s]ome definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process . . ..” Freundlich & Littman, LLC v. Feierstein, 157 A.3d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he gravamen of this tort is the perversion of legal process to benefit someone in achieving a purpose which is not an authorized goal of the procedure in question.” P.J.A. v. H.C.N., 156 A.3d at 288 (internal citation omitted).

2017In that case, the appellant filed a complaint, “alleging causes of action sounding in libel, conspiracy to libel, malicious use and abuse of process, and invasion of privacy; all arising out of a series of alleged libelous statements contained in a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and in a brief in support thereof....” Passon v. Spritzer, 277 Pa.Super. 498 , 419 A.2d 1258, 1259 (1980). 9 In short, the libelous statements purportedly “represent[ed] the latest effort by [the] appellee[, who had been convicted of killing her husband,] to cast suspicion upon [the] appellants the brother-in-law o

2017In that case, the appellant filed a complaint, “alleging causes of action sounding in libel, conspiracy to libel, malicious use and abuse of process, and invasion of privacy; all arising out of a series of alleged libelous statements contained in a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and in a brief in support thereof....” Passon v. Spritzer, 277 Pa.Super. 498 , 419 A.2d 1258, 1259 (1980). 9 In short, the libelous statements purportedly “represent[ed] the latest effort by [the] appellee[, who had been convicted of killing her husband,] to cast suspicion upon [the] appellants the brother-in-law o

2009Such evidence will be sufficient to raise a question of material fact and thereby survive summary judgment if either direct testimony or circumstantial evidence indicates that the Cruzes suffered emotional harm as a result of Princeton’s filing of the guardianship petition. 6 See Ludmer v. Nernberg, 433 Pa.Super. 316 , 640 A.2d 939, 943-44 (1994) (specifically relying on circumstantial evidence to establish element. of attorney’s “improper motive” in abuse of process case); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 599 Pa. 465 , 961 A.2d 1229, 1242-43 (2008) (reaffirming that circumstantial evidence is entit

2009Such evidence will be sufficient to raise a question of material fact and thereby survive summary judgment if either direct testimony or circumstantial evidence indicates that the Cruzes suffered emotional harm as a result of Princeton’s filing of the guardianship petition. 6 See Ludmer v. Nernberg, 433 Pa.Super. 316 , 640 A.2d 939, 943-44 (1994) (specifically relying on circumstantial evidence to establish element. of attorney’s “improper motive” in abuse of process case); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 599 Pa. 465 , 961 A.2d 1229, 1242-43 (2008) (reaffirming that circumstantial evidence is entit

2009Such evidence will be sufficient to raise a question of material fact and thereby survive summary judgment if either direct testimony or circumstantial evidence indicates that the Cruzes suffered emotional harm as a result of Princeton’s filing of the guardianship petition. 6 See Ludmer v. Nernberg, 433 Pa.Super. 316 , 640 A.2d 939, 943-44 (1994) (specifically relying on circumstantial evidence to establish element. of attorney’s “improper motive” in abuse of process case); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 599 Pa. 465 , 961 A.2d 1229, 1242-43 (2008) (reaffirming that circumstantial evidence is entit

2009Such evidence will be sufficient to raise a question of material fact and thereby survive summary judgment if either direct testimony or circumstantial evidence indicates that the Cruzes suffered emotional harm as a result of Princeton's filing of the guardianship petition. [6] See Ludmer v. Nernberg, 433 Pa.Super. 316 , 640 A.2d 939, 943-44 (1994) (specifically relying on circumstantial evidence to establish element of attorney's "improper motive" in abuse of process case); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 599 Pa. 465 , 961 A.2d 1229, 1242-43 (2008) (reaffirming that circumstantial evidence is enti

2004THE INSURER’S DUTY TO DEFEND In order “to decide whether a duty to defend exists [, a court] must interpret the insurance policy to determine the scope of the coverage [and] must analyze the complaint filed against the insured to determine whether the claims asserted potentially falls [sic] within that coverage.” Biborosch v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 412 Pa. Super. 505, 509-10 , 603 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1992).

2004THE INSURER’S DUTY TO DEFEND In order “to decide whether a duty to defend exists [, a court] must interpret the insurance policy to determine the scope of the coverage [and] must analyze the complaint filed against the insured to determine whether the claims asserted potentially falls [sic] within that coverage.” Biborosch v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 412 Pa. Super. 505, 509-10 , 603 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1992).

2001See Mruz v. Caring, 39 F. Supp.2d 495, 503 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that where the jurisdictional basis for the alleged frivolous claim is federal question, the aggrieved parties must avail themselves of the arsenal of federal remedies available to punish litigation abuse and dismissing a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees under the New Jersey Frivolous Claim Act); Thompson v. Lehrer P.C., 183 F.R.D. 161 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that an attorney who seeks to assert an abuse of process claim against an attorney-adversary based upon conduct which occurred in a case pending before a federal district co