abuse of process claim in Massachusetts

2010To sustain an abuse of process claim, the fact finder must find that process was used “to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed.” Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423, 426 (1963), quoting Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 236 (1949).

2006Mkts., Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 389 (1975). ‘To prevail on an abuse of process claim it must appear that the process was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed.” Datacomm Interface, Inc., 396 Mass. at 775 (citations and quotation marks omitted); Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589, 595 (1982); Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423, 426 (1963).

2010Plaintiffs correctly rely on Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589, 595-96 (1982), for the proposition that merely filing an action is insufficient to establish an abuse of process claim without proof of any ulterior purpose, but then seek to define the proscribed purpose more narrowly than have Massachusetts appellate decisions: “Hallowell’s allegations focus solely on Plaintiffs [sic] ‘motive’ in filing this action, and are completely devoid of facts alleging that Plaintiffs have taken any further action to coerce or extort an advantage either within or outside of the proceedings.” Plaintiffs’

2008“To prevail on an abuse of process claim ‘it must appear that the process was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed.’ ” Datacomm Interface, Inc., 396 Mass. at 775 , quoting Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589, 595 (1982).

2013See Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 775-76 (1986) (holding plaintiff must allege the usage of the court system to accomplish some ulterior purpose to sustain an abuse of process claim).

2006Mkts., Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 389 (1975). ‘To prevail on an abuse of process claim it must appear that the process was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed.” Datacomm Interface, Inc., 396 Mass. at 775 (citations and quotation marks omitted); Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589, 595 (1982); Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423, 426 (1963).

2008The first element of an abuse of process claim is satisfied if a “process” was used that resulted in “papers issued by a court to bring a party or property within its jurisdiction.” Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 390 (1975).

2006Mkts., Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 389 (1975). ‘To prevail on an abuse of process claim it must appear that the process was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed.” Datacomm Interface, Inc., 396 Mass. at 775 (citations and quotation marks omitted); Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589, 595 (1982); Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423, 426 (1963).

2025In contrast, an abuse of process claim requires a plaintiff to show "ulterior or illegitimate purpose." Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC, 456 Mass. at 636 .

2024See Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 456 Mass. 627, 636 (2010) ("To sustain an abuse of process claim, the fact finder must find that process was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed" [quotation and citation omitted]).

2013Adams v. Whitman, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 850, 855 (2005) (“Initiating process alone can at times be so coercive and promoting of ulterior advantage that it supports an abuse of process claim”).

2012Auth., 437 Mass. 396, 408 (2002) (“It is immaterial to an abuse of process claim that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained in connection with a proceeding brought with probable cause, or that the proceeding terminated in favor of its proponent”). ’’More specifically, abuse of process has been described as a ‘form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money.’ “ Vittands, 49 Mass.App.Ct. at 406 , quoting Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 439, 442 (1985). ’’Thus, only the fi

2011In an abuse of process claim, in contrast to a claim for malicious prosecution, such a motive does not alone suffice to show ulterior purpose. 35 Rather, the ulterior purpose must be *714 to gain some collateral advantage. 36 See Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517 , 519 n.3 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004), quoting Vittands v. Sudduth, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 406 (2000) (“More specifically, abuse of process has been described as a ‘form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money’ ”).

2009As such, this court finds that the Plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim is based solely on the Defendants’ petitioning activities and has “no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.” See Duracraft Corp., 427 Mass. at 167-68 ; see also Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 524 (2002) (holding that, where Plaintiffs complaint only complained of Defendant’s petitioning activity and failed to allege any other wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs abuse of process claim was based solely on Defendant’s petitioning activities and had no other basis).

2012Auth., 437 Mass. 396, 408 (2002) (“It is immaterial to an abuse of process claim that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained in connection with a proceeding brought with probable cause, or that the proceeding terminated in favor of its proponent”). ’’More specifically, abuse of process has been described as a ‘form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money.’ “ Vittands, 49 Mass.App.Ct. at 406 , quoting Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 439, 442 (1985). ’’Thus, only the fi

2011As to the abuse of process claim, probable cause is immaterial, but it is necessary to prove an ulterior, or illegitimate, purpose in seeking or using “process.” Gutierrez v. MBTA et al., 437 Mass. 396, 407 (2002), and cases cited.

2012Auth., 437 Mass. 396, 408 (2002) (“It is immaterial to an abuse of process claim that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained in connection with a proceeding brought with probable cause, or that the proceeding terminated in favor of its proponent”). ’’More specifically, abuse of process has been described as a ‘form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money.’ “ Vittands, 49 Mass.App.Ct. at 406 , quoting Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 439, 442 (1985). ’’Thus, only the fi

2005See Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 442 .

2026See Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 713 (2011) ("ulterior purpose element is not satisfied merely by a showing that a person commenced litigation knowing it was groundless").

2025Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 713 (2011).

2014See Silvia v. Building Inspector of West Bridgewater, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 451, 453 (1993) (“Abuse of process presupposes the use of legal action for an ulterior purpose, i.e., to achieve some end other than the apparent end. of the litigation process which has been launched”); see also Ladd v. Marcella, 424 Mass. 196, 198-200 (1997) (finding that plaintiff could not establish an abuse of process claim based on an attachment of property, even if the action was groundless, absent allegations of an ulterior motive).

2014See Silvia v. Building Inspector of West Bridgewater, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 451, 453 (1993) (“Abuse of process presupposes the use of legal action for an ulterior purpose, i.e., to achieve some end other than the apparent end. of the litigation process which has been launched”); see also Ladd v. Marcella, 424 Mass. 196, 198-200 (1997) (finding that plaintiff could not establish an abuse of process claim based on an attachment of property, even if the action was groundless, absent allegations of an ulterior motive).

2006Kelley v. Stop & Shop Cos., 26 Mass.App.Ct. 557, 558 (1988), quoting from Restatement (Second) ofTorts §682.

2005The Fabre court first noted the elements of an abuse of process claim, focusing on the description of the tort as involving a “subsequent misuse of the process.” Id. at 519 n.3, quoting from Kelley v. Stop & Shop Cos., 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 558.

2005See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-211 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party); Jacoby v. S

2005See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-11 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party); Jacoby v. Sp

2005See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-211 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party); Jacoby v. S

2005See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-11 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party); Jacoby v. Sp

2005See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-211 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party); Jacoby v. S

2005See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-11 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party); Jacoby v. Sp

2009As such, this court finds that the Plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim is based solely on the Defendants’ petitioning activities and has “no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.” See Duracraft Corp., 427 Mass. at 167-68 ; see also Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 524 (2002) (holding that, where Plaintiffs complaint only complained of Defendant’s petitioning activity and failed to allege any other wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs abuse of process claim was based solely on Defendant’s petitioning activities and had no other basis).

2007At the first stage of the analysis, O’Marah must show that the abuse of process claim is based solely on petitioning activity, and has “no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.” Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 550 (2001); Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 161 (1998).

2005See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-211 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party); Jacoby v. S

2005See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-11 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party); Jacoby v. Sp

2026L. c. 231, § 59H, where the special motion opponent "alleges that the [special motion proponent] engaged in any conduct germane to [the] abuse of process claim, apart from [the] invocations of process, which can provide a 'substantial basis' for [the] claim." Harrison I, 477 Mass. at 169 .

2024“An abuse of process claim involves three elements: ‘[1] that process was used, [2] for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose, [3] resulting in damage.’” 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Bos., LLC, 477 Mass. 162 , 168 - 169 (2017) (quotations and citation omitted).

2025In Keystone Freight Corp., 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 315 , we held that the plaintiff's abuse of process claim had a substantial basis in addition to the defendant's filing of a collection action, where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in fraudulent billing practices before filing the action, and then after filing the action made a settlement offer that was "arguably consistent with an attempt . . . to 11 coerce payment of its inflated bill." This case is analogous to Keystone Freight Corp. and unlike Hidalgo v. Watch City Constr.

2017See, e.g., Keystone Freight Corp. v. Bartlett Consol., Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 315-316 (2010).

2019See also Blanchard I , 477 Mass. at 156 & n.21, 75 N.E.3d 21 .

2018However, we must remand for a determination under the augmented Duracraft framework announced in Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp ., 477 Mass. 141 (2017).

2018As Lopez met the initial burden, the analysis then shifts to El-Werfalli to demonstrate, "by a preponderance of the evidence," that Lopez's petitioning activity upon which the abuse of process claim is based is illegitimate -- i.e., that it "lacked any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law," Baker , 434 Mass. at 553 -555 , and caused it "actual injury." G.

2017Because the defendants have met their threshold burden with respect to the plaintiff’s abuse of process claim, the plaintiff may defeat the special motion to dismiss this claim by demonstrating, “by a preponderance of the evidence,” that the defendants’ petitioning activity upon which its abuse of process claim is based is illegitimate — i.e., that it “lacked any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law,” Baker, 434 Mass. at 553-555 , and caused it “actual injury,” G.

2014See Silvia v. Building Inspector of West Bridgewater, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 451, 453 (1993) (“Abuse of process presupposes the use of legal action for an ulterior purpose, i.e., to achieve some end other than the apparent end. of the litigation process which has been launched”); see also Ladd v. Marcella, 424 Mass. 196, 198-200 (1997) (finding that plaintiff could not establish an abuse of process claim based on an attachment of property, even if the action was groundless, absent allegations of an ulterior motive).

2014See Silvia v. Building Inspector of West Bridgewater, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 451, 453 (1993) (“Abuse of process presupposes the use of legal action for an ulterior purpose, i.e., to achieve some end other than the apparent end. of the litigation process which has been launched”); see also Ladd v. Marcella, 424 Mass. 196, 198-200 (1997) (finding that plaintiff could not establish an abuse of process claim based on an attachment of property, even if the action was groundless, absent allegations of an ulterior motive).

2013Statements made during the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged even if they are uttered “maliciously or in bad faith.” Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 73 (1970), quoting Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 236 (1954). “[C]onduct which maybe tortious between strangers may not be tortious between spouses because of the mutual concessions implied in the marital relationship.” Garrity v. Garrity, 399 Mass. 367, 370 (1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2013Statements made during the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged even if they are uttered “maliciously or in bad faith.” Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 73 (1970), quoting Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 236 (1954). “[C]onduct which maybe tortious between strangers may not be tortious between spouses because of the mutual concessions implied in the marital relationship.” Garrity v. Garrity, 399 Mass. 367, 370 (1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).