abuse of process claim (Montana) · Go Syfert
← Montana issues

abuse of process claim in Montana

12 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Brault v. Smithgreen
mont · 1984 · cited in 4 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2022
2 sentences

2022It argues, moreover, that the Second Amended Complaint does not set forth the elements of an abuse of process claim because its complaint in intervention and request for preliminary injunction cannot be an abuse of process and because Landowners have failed to allege an ulterior purpose. 7 ¶18 To prevail on an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must show two elements: “(1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 57 , 336 Mont. 225 , 154 P.3d 561 (citing Brault v. Smith, 209 Mont

2022It argues, moreover, that the Second Amended Complaint does not set forth the elements of an abuse of process claim because its complaint in intervention and request for preliminary injunction cannot be an abuse of process and because Landowners have failed to allege an ulterior purpose. 7 ¶18 To prevail on an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must show two elements: “(1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 57 , 336 Mont. 225 , 154 P.3d 561 (citing Brault v. Smith, 209 Mont

24
Seltzer v. Mortongreen
mont · 2007 · cited in 8 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2022
2 sentences

2022It argues, moreover, that the Second Amended Complaint does not set forth the elements of an abuse of process claim because its complaint in intervention and request for preliminary injunction cannot be an abuse of process and because Landowners have failed to allege an ulterior purpose. 7 ¶18 To prevail on an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must show two elements: “(1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 57 , 336 Mont. 225 , 154 P.3d 561 (citing Brault v. Smith, 209 Mont

2022It argues, moreover, that the Second Amended Complaint does not set forth the elements of an abuse of process claim because its complaint in intervention and request for preliminary injunction cannot be an abuse of process and because Landowners have failed to allege an ulterior purpose. 7 ¶18 To prevail on an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must show two elements: “(1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 57 , 336 Mont. 225 , 154 P.3d 561 (citing Brault v. Smith, 209 Mont

18
Lawrence Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, an Illinois Corporation David's Restaurant Supplygreen
ca9 · 2001 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Therefore, Saddlebrook argues, judicial estoppel does not apply because the Trustee knew of the claim, pursued it, and gave notice to all creditors before assigning and then abandoning it. ¶44 Krohne Fund responds that the District Court correctly applied the rule in Hamilton that judicial estoppel will be imposed “when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action as a contingent asset.” Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784 (citations

11
Wilhelm v. City of Great Fallsgreen
mont · 1987 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007It is well settled that “[a] showing of prejudice is required to reverse a verdict because of an alleged improper instruction.” Stockman Bank of Montana v. Potts, 2006 MT 64, ¶ 80 , 331 Mont. 381, ¶ 80 , 132 P.3d 546, ¶ 80 ; Wilhelm v. City of Great Falls, 225 Mont. 251, 262 , 732 P.2d 1315, 1322 (1987) (stating that a judgment will not be reversed based on an *245 erroneous jury instruction unless the error prejudiced the complaining party).

2007It is well settled that “[a] showing of prejudice is required to reverse a verdict because of an alleged improper instruction.” Stockman Bank of Montana v. Potts, 2006 MT 64, ¶ 80 , 331 Mont. 381, ¶ 80 , 132 P.3d 546, ¶ 80 ; Wilhelm v. City of Great Falls, 225 Mont. 251, 262 , 732 P.2d 1315, 1322 (1987) (stating that a judgment will not be reversed based on an *245 erroneous jury instruction unless the error prejudiced the complaining party).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Leasing, Inc. v. Discovery Ski Corp. green
mont · 1988
2 sentences

2008The Leasing, Inc. Court did directly cite to that portion of Brault which states that to constitute an abuse of process “there must be an attempt by the plaintiff to use process to coerce the defendant to do some collateral thing which he could not be legally and regularly compelled to do.” Leasing, Inc., 235 Mont. at 136 , 765 P.2d at 178 (citing Brault, 209 Mont. at 28-29 , 679 P.2d at 240 ). ¶34 The requirement of a collateral purpose to sustain an abuse of process claim was reiterated in the Court’s latest case on the subject, Seltzer.

2008The Leasing, Inc. Court did directly cite to that portion of Brault which states that to constitute an abuse of process “there must be an attempt by the plaintiff to use process to coerce the defendant to do some collateral thing which he could not be legally and regularly compelled to do.” Leasing, Inc., 235 Mont. at 136 , 765 P.2d at 178 (citing Brault, 209 Mont. at 28-29 , 679 P.2d at 240 ). ¶34 The requirement of a collateral purpose to sustain an abuse of process claim was reiterated in the Court’s latest case on the subject, Seltzer.

42008–2009
Hughes v. Lynch green
mont · 2007
2 sentences

2009As the Defendants correctly observe, abuse of process requires the plaintiff show both “(1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a willful act in the use of process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Hughes v. Lynch, 2007 MT 177, ¶ 21 , 338 Mont. 214 , 164 P.3d 913 (quotation omitted).

2009As the Defendants correctly observe, abuse of process requires the plaintiff show both “(1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a willful act in the use of process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Hughes v. Lynch, 2007 MT 177, ¶ 21 , 338 Mont. 214 , 164 P.3d 913 (quotation omitted).

32009–2009
Walker v. Jensen green
calctapp · 1949
2 sentences

2009This rule will apply prospectively to all situations in which a party wishes to rely upon this defense. ¶58 Issue Three: Did the District Court err in denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Retirees’ abuse of process claim? 5 Masterson relies upon Walker v. Jensen, 212 P.2d 569 (Cal. App. 3 Dist 1949), which relies on Levy and a few other cases, all of which ultimately derive their authority from Levy. 25 ¶59 During trial, the Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Retirees’ abuse of process claims, arguing that the Retirees failed to satisfy the

2009This rule will apply prospectively to all situations in which a party wishes to rely upon this defense. ¶58 Issue Three: Did the District Court err in denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Retirees’ abuse of process claim? 5 Masterson relies upon Walker v. Jensen, 212 P.2d 569 (Cal. App. 3 Dist 1949), which relies on Levy and a few other cases, all of which ultimately derive their authority from Levy. 25 ¶59 During trial, the Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Retirees’ abuse of process claims, arguing that the Retirees failed to satisfy the

32009–2009
First Bank v. District Court for the Fourth Judicial District green
mont · 1987
2 sentences

2020Because of such a claim’s separate nature, the parties do not share “one circumstance without which neither party would have found it necessary to seek relief.” First Bank, 226 Mont. at 521 , 737 P.2d at 1136 . ¶30 Without commenting on the validity of any such claims, we conclude that Jarrett and Anderson’s counterclaims were not compulsory under Rule 13(a), and they should be 16 allowed to assert them in future litigation, should they so choose.

2020Because of such a claim’s separate nature, the parties do not share “one circumstance without which neither party would have found it necessary to seek relief.” First Bank, 226 Mont. at 521 , 737 P.2d at 1136 . ¶30 Without commenting on the validity of any such claims, we conclude that Jarrett and Anderson’s counterclaims were not compulsory under Rule 13(a), and they should be 16 allowed to assert them in future litigation, should they so choose.

12020–2020
State v. Houchin green
mont · 1988
1 sentence

2008The Leasing, Inc. Court did directly cite to that portion of Brault which states that to constitute an abuse of process “there must be an attempt by the plaintiff to use process to coerce the defendant to do some collateral thing which he could not be legally and regularly compelled to do.” Leasing, Inc., 235 Mont. at 136, 765 P.2d at 178 (citing Brault, 209 Mont. at 28-29, 679 P.2d at 240). ¶34 The requirement of a collateral purpose to sustain an abuse of process claim was reiterated in the Court’s latest case on the subject, Seltzer.

12008–2008
Stockman Bank of Montana v. Potts green
mont · 2006
2 sentences

2007It is well settled that “[a] showing of prejudice is required to reverse a verdict because of an alleged improper instruction.” Stockman Bank of Montana v. Potts, 2006 MT 64, ¶ 80 , 331 Mont. 381, ¶ 80 , 132 P.3d 546, ¶ 80 ; Wilhelm v. City of Great Falls, 225 Mont. 251, 262 , 732 P.2d 1315, 1322 (1987) (stating that a judgment will not be reversed based on an *245 erroneous jury instruction unless the error prejudiced the complaining party).

2007It is well settled that “[a] showing of prejudice is required to reverse a verdict because of an alleged improper instruction.” Stockman Bank of Montana v. Potts, 2006 MT 64, ¶ 80 , 331 Mont. 381, ¶ 80 , 132 P.3d 546, ¶ 80 ; Wilhelm v. City of Great Falls, 225 Mont. 251, 262 , 732 P.2d 1315, 1322 (1987) (stating that a judgment will not be reversed based on an *245 erroneous jury instruction unless the error prejudiced the complaining party).

12007–2007

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MT § Mont. Code Ann. § 28-10-702 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 53 (1994–2025) MA 51 (1986–2026) CA 44 (1986–2026) NY 25 (1986–2026) CT 22 (1991–2025) PA 20 (2001–2025) CO 20 (1986–2026) TX 19 (1993–2025) SC 17 (1994–2026) NM 17 (1987–2024) NV 16 (1986–2022) IN 16 (1994–2025) AL 15 (1981–2024) ME 15 (1984–2023) IA 14 (1982–2021) NC 13 (1986–2025) MO 12 (1993–2022) MT 12 (2000–2024) MS 10 (1999–2025) WA 10 (2008–2026) AZ 10 (1982–2024) RI 8 (1989–2010) MI 8 (1984–2024) LA 8 (1993–2024) AR 8 (1993–2021) VA 8 (1989–2021) KY 7 (2013–2024) HI 7 (1990–2024) UT 7 (2004–2025) IL 7 (1996–2023) KS 6 (1988–2021) FL 6 (1984–2025) NJ 6 (1992–2026) WI 5 (1979–2026) AK 5 (1988–2025) TN 5 (2000–2020) DE 4 (2014–2024) ND 4 (2015–2020) OR 3 (1986–2023) OK 3 (2000–2020) SD 3 (1991–2022) NH 3 (1995–2019) MN 2 (1979–2014) NE 2 (1998–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check