44 California opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rusheen v. Cohengreen2 sentences2024Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 ,] 1009.)” (Bui v. Ngo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1061 , 1071.) To make a prima facie showing sufficient to prevail on an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must prove “the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process, and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057 (Rusheen).) In addition, the plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered some harm as a result of the defendant’s misuse of the process. 2022(Booker v. Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370 [“[a]buse of process claims are subject to a special motion to strike”]; see ValueRock TN Properties, LLC v. PK II Larwin Square SC LP (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1046 [section 425.16 protection for petitioning activities “includes the filing of lawsuits, and statements and pleadings made in or in preparation for civil litigation”]; see generally Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1065 [trial court properly granted anti-SLAPP motion on an abuse of process claim arising from execution of a default judgment procured through the filing of allege | 4 | 13 |
Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernard, Weiss & Karma Inc.green2 sentences2021Kaur claims (1) the ulterior motive for Manlin’s filing of the unpaid legal fees claim was to use it as a “club” against Singh, and (2) the willful use of process was including Kaur in the lawsuit even though Manlin’s dispute was with Singh. 10 But an abuse of process claim requires more. “[W]hile a defendant’s act of improperly instituting or maintaining an action may, in an appropriate case, give rise to a cause of action for malicious prosecution, the mere filing or maintenance of a lawsuit—even for an improper purpose—is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action.” (Oren Royal Oaks 2011In Oren, we concluded that while Civil Code section 47 prohibited an action based on a party’s statements made during settlement negotiations, it did not preclude the use of those statements as evidence of the party’s intent to establish an abuse of process claim. ( Oren, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1167-1168.) . . . | 3 | 9 |
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn.green2 sentences2022Carol does not allege an abuse of the court’s process by “the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit.” (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 22 Carol relies on Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d 94 , which offers no support for her position that the complaint here contained allegations sufficient to support an abuse of process claim. 2022Carol does not allege an abuse of the court’s process by “the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit.” (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 22 Carol relies on Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d 94 , which offers no support for her position that the complaint here contained allegations sufficient to support an abuse of process claim. | 3 | 6 |
Booker v. Rountreegreen2 sentences2025(See Booker v. Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370 [“it is hard to imagine an abuse of process claim that would not fall under the protection of the [anti-SLAPP statute”].) We therefore turn to the question of whether plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claim. 15. 2022By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. [[Citation.]” (Jarrow Formulas, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 734-735, fn. omitted.) Likewise, since “the essence of the tort of abuse of process . . . [is] some misuse of process in a prior action[,] . . . it is hard to imagine an abuse of process claim that . 10 would not fall under the protection of the [anti-SLAPP] statute.” (Booker v. Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370 .) A motion to strike under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) is analyzed and resolved by “the court . . . eng | 2 | 5 |
Silberg v. Andersongreen2 sentences2014The privilege "applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi- judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that ha[s] some connection or logical relation to the action." (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).) If a communication satisfies these criteria, the privilege defeats an abuse of process claim based on the communication. 2014Although we do not condone Dillon's failure to comply with the statutory restrictions on pretrial discovery of Carl's financial condition, our Supreme Court has held that " 'it is desirable to create an absolute privilege . . . not because we desire to protect the shady practitioner, but because we do not want the honest one to have to be 25 concerned with [subsequent derivative] actions . . . .' " (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1064 .) "The salutary policy reasons for an absolute privilege supersede individual litigants' interests in recovering damages for injurious publications made durin | 2 | 4 |
1100 PARK LANE ASSOCIATES v. Feldmangreen2 sentences2021(Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1492 (Feldman) [“Clearly, the litigation privilege applies to the tort causes of action of the cross-complaint to the extent that the gravamen of the cause of action is the assertedly tortious filing of the [lawsuit]”]; accord Nelson v. Tucker Ellis, LLP (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 827 , 846–847 [litigation privilege applied to defendant’s alleged failures to act because they were necessary corollaries to defendants’ communicative act].) In view of our conclusion that the litigation privilege precluded the abuse of process claim, we 2021(Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1492 (Feldman) [“Clearly, the litigation privilege applies to the tort causes of action of the cross-complaint to the extent that the gravamen of the cause of action is the assertedly tortious filing of the [lawsuit]”]; accord Nelson v. Tucker Ellis, LLP (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 827 , 846–847 [litigation privilege applied to defendant’s alleged failures to act because they were necessary corollaries to defendants’ communicative act].) In view of our conclusion that the litigation privilege precluded the abuse of process claim, we | 2 | 2 |
Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp.green2 sentences2024(Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1062 ; Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 886 [“Statements made in the course of litigation are subject to the [litigation] privilege . . . and cannot provide the basis for an abuse of process action”].) Specifically, the process servers’ repeated attempts to serve process on Jeffrey’s attorneys, even after being informed the attorneys were not authorized to accept service on Jeffrey’s behalf, and interrogating Jeffrey’s tenants to learn his whereabouts in order to effectuate service are communications “ ‘(1) made in judicial . . . proceedings; (2) by litigants 2021Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 792 .) As to the second element, 21 “‘there is no abuse of process’” if the process “‘is used for its proper purpose even though the person uses it for wrongful and malicious motives.’” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 886 .) “[T]here is no tort where process is used properly albeit with a bad motive.” (Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 826 ; accord, Cantu, at p. 886 [“merely filing or maintaining a lawsuit is not a proper basis for an abuse of process claim”].) An improper purpose that will support an abuse | 1 | 3 |
Pollock v. University of Southern Californiagreen2 sentences2026“The litigation privilege bars an abuse of process claim insofar as the claim is premised on conduct within the privilege . . . .” (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 522, fn. 7 .) “[Civil Code] [s]ection 47, subdivision (b)(2) is a defense to an abuse of process action. [Citations.] ‘The privilege is broadly applied to protect most publications within lawsuits provided there is some connection between the lawsuit and the publication. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] 15 Doubts about the privilege’s applicability are resolved in favor of its use.” (Pollock v. University 2005However, NASRS’s counsel decided that because the statute of limitations for challenging the December 13 addendum was about to expire, NASRS had to file its petition to preserve its ability to challenge RUSD’s action. 4 After the court issued its ruling, RUSD held a board meeting at which it clarified that “[a]ny and all formerly proposed changes to the Project addressed by the Addendum are no longer being pursued.” 5 The record does not contain RUSD’s September 19, 2003 motion for sanctions. 6 The record does not contain RUSD’s March 2004 motion for sanctions. 7 The litigation privilege bars | 1 | 2 |
Rubin v. Greengreen2 sentences2006(See Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168-1169 , 232 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 728 P.2d 1202 [abuse of process does not lie for filing and maintenance of prior lawsuit, even if done for an improper purpose].) Likewise, the interference with contract claim appears barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). ( Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1202-1203 , 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 828 , 847 P.2d 1044 [litigation privilege rendered the defendants' conduct "absolutely immune from civil tort liability, including plaintiff 2006(See Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168-1169 , 232 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 728 P.2d 1202 [abuse of process does not lie for filing and maintenance of prior lawsuit, even if done for an improper purpose].) Likewise, the interference with contract claim appears barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). ( Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1202-1203 , 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 828 , 847 P.2d 1044 [litigation privilege rendered the defendants' conduct "absolutely immune from civil tort liability, including plaintiff | 1 | 2 |
Kimmel v. Golandgreen2 sentences1998“To establish a cause of action for abuse of process, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: that the defendant (1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the process and (2) committed a wilful act in a wrongful manner. [Citations.]” (Coleman, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 792 .) *65 Respondents contend that the complained of action was absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). 2 This statute provides in pertinent part: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] • • • [¶] (b) In any . . . judicial proceeding . . . .” The litigation privilege applies whe 1998“To establish a cause of action for abuse of process, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: that the defendant (1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the process and (2) committed a wilful act in a wrongful manner. [Citations.]” (Coleman, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 792 .) *65 Respondents contend that the complained of action was absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). 2 This statute provides in pertinent part: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] • • • [¶] (b) In any . . . judicial proceeding . . . .” The litigation privilege applies whe | 1 | 2 |
Ramona Unified School District v. Tsiknasgreen1 sentence2026“The litigation privilege bars an abuse of process claim insofar as the claim is premised on conduct within the privilege . . . .” (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 522, fn. 7 .) “[Civil Code] [s]ection 47, subdivision (b)(2) is a defense to an abuse of process action. [Citations.] ‘The privilege is broadly applied to protect most publications within lawsuits provided there is some connection between the lawsuit and the publication. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] 15 Doubts about the privilege’s applicability are resolved in favor of its use.” (Pollock v. University | 1 | 1 |
Spellens v. Spellensgreen1 sentence2024(Yee v. Superior Court (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 26, 37 , citing Rest.2d Torts, § 682; CACI No. 1520.) “ ‘[T]he essence of the tort [of abuse of process is] . . . misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done in the name of the court and under its authority for the purpose of perpetrating an injustice.’ ” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057 .) Evidence of misuse of this power is “essential as ‘ “there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.’ (Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49 Cal.2d 21 | 1 | 1 |
Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Districtgreen1 sentence2023(See Sheppard v. North Orange County Regional Occupational Program (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 289 , 296–297 [“[a] judgment on the pleadings and a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer are reviewed under the same de novo standard”]; Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852 [“[i]n the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action”].) 28 original [complaint].” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408-409 , | 1 | 1 |
| City of Alhambra v. D'Ausiliogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Valuerock TN Props., LLC v. PK II Larwin Square SC LPgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston Purina Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Golden v. Dungangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shaffer v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Palmer v. Ageegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Drum v. Bleau, Fox & Associatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Long Beach v. Bozekgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tranchina v. Arcinasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| CHARLES J. VACANTI v. State Comp. Ins. Fundgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. Western Title Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche
green
2 sentences2022By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. [[Citation.]” (Jarrow Formulas, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 734-735, fn. omitted.) Likewise, since “the essence of the tort of abuse of process . . . [is] some misuse of process in a prior action[,] . . . it is hard to imagine an abuse of process claim that . 10 would not fall under the protection of the [anti-SLAPP] statute.” (Booker v. Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370 .) A motion to strike under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) is analyzed and resolved by “the court . . . eng 2022By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. [[Citation.]” (Jarrow Formulas, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 734-735, fn. omitted.) Likewise, since “the essence of the tort of abuse of process . . . [is] some misuse of process in a prior action[,] . . . it is hard to imagine an abuse of process claim that . 10 would not fall under the protection of the [anti-SLAPP] statute.” (Booker v. Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370 .) A motion to strike under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) is analyzed and resolved by “the court . . . eng | 3 | 2014–2022 |
Coleman v. Gulf Insurance Group
green
2 sentences2021Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 792 .) As to the second element, 21 “‘there is no abuse of process’” if the process “‘is used for its proper purpose even though the person uses it for wrongful and malicious motives.’” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 886 .) “[T]here is no tort where process is used properly albeit with a bad motive.” (Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 826 ; accord, Cantu, at p. 886 [“merely filing or maintaining a lawsuit is not a proper basis for an abuse of process claim”].) An improper purpose that will support an abuse 1998“To establish a cause of action for abuse of process, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: that the defendant (1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the process and (2) committed a wilful act in a wrongful manner. [Citations.]” (Coleman, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 792 .) *65 Respondents contend that the complained of action was absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). 2 This statute provides in pertinent part: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] • • • [¶] (b) In any . . . judicial proceeding . . . .” The litigation privilege applies whe | 3 | 1998–2021 |
Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski
green
2 sentences1986In support of its contention, Greenberg cited the then-recent decision in Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d 832 [184 *1162 Cal. Rptr. 317, 30 A.L.R.4th 561 ], which had rejected an abuse of process claim on similar facts. 1986In support of its contention, Greenberg cited the then-recent decision in Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d 832 [184 *1162 Cal. Rptr. 317, 30 A.L.R.4th 561 ], which had rejected an abuse of process claim on similar facts. | 2 | 1986–2024 |
Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital
green
2 sentences2023Moreover, an abuse of process claim does not exist “where process is used properly albeit with a bad motive.” (Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 826 .) Based on our review of the record, we decide Lai did not substantiate his allegations with any evidence that Melen improperly presented declarations in the dissolution action.13 13 Melen filed, on December 5, 2017, a declaration in the marital dissolution action in San Mateo County stating she was attorney of record in that case and was submitting a declaration in support of Wang’s request for attorney fees base 2021Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 792 .) As to the second element, 21 “‘there is no abuse of process’” if the process “‘is used for its proper purpose even though the person uses it for wrongful and malicious motives.’” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 886 .) “[T]here is no tort where process is used properly albeit with a bad motive.” (Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 826 ; accord, Cantu, at p. 886 [“merely filing or maintaining a lawsuit is not a proper basis for an abuse of process claim”].) An improper purpose that will support an abuse | 2 | 2021–2023 |
Bidna v. Rosen
green
2 sentences2022Carol does not allege an abuse of the court’s process by “the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit.” (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 22 Carol relies on Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d 94 , which offers no support for her position that the complaint here contained allegations sufficient to support an abuse of process claim. 2022Carol does not allege an abuse of the court’s process by “the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit.” (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 22 Carol relies on Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d 94 , which offers no support for her position that the complaint here contained allegations sufficient to support an abuse of process claim. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Parrish v. Latham & Watkins
green
2 sentences2021The plaintiff must establish there was an underlying litigation that was “(i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with malice.” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767 , 775–776.) The trial court found Jiang did not demonstrate a probability of success on his malicious prosecution claim for several reasons. 2021The plaintiff must establish there was an underlying litigation that was “(i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with malice.” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767 , 775–776.) The trial court found Jiang did not demonstrate a probability of success on his malicious prosecution claim for several reasons. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021For the malicious prosecution claim, the court found Jiang: (1) did not establish that the underlying action terminated in his favor; (2) did not plead a legally sufficient claim because he did not plead the element of malice; and (3) did “not address the element of damages ….” Finally, the court found Jiang did not plead a legally sufficient UCL claim because there were “no underlying facts alleged in the [complaint] to support any of the violations of the Penal Code ….”4 Based on these findings, the court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and struck the complaint. 4 The court expressly declined 2021For the malicious prosecution claim, the court found Jiang: (1) did not establish that the underlying action terminated in his favor; (2) did not plead a legally sufficient claim because he did not plead the element of malice; and (3) did “not address the element of damages ….” Finally, the court found Jiang did not plead a legally sufficient UCL claim because there were “no underlying facts alleged in the [complaint] to support any of the violations of the Penal Code ….”4 Based on these findings, the court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and struck the complaint. 4 The court expressly declined | 2 | 2021–2021 |
S.A. v. Maiden
green
2 sentences2021Kaur claims (1) the ulterior motive for Manlin’s filing of the unpaid legal fees claim was to use it as a “club” against Singh, and (2) the willful use of process was including Kaur in the lawsuit even though Manlin’s dispute was with Singh. 10 But an abuse of process claim requires more. “[W]hile a defendant’s act of improperly instituting or maintaining an action may, in an appropriate case, give rise to a cause of action for malicious prosecution, the mere filing or maintenance of a lawsuit—even for an improper purpose—is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action.” (Oren Royal Oaks 2014Therefore, the first 27 anti-SLAPP prong is satisfied.” (S.A. v. Maiden, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 42 , mod. 229 Cal.App.4th 497a.) (c) Second step – probability of prevailing on claim (i) required showing “‘The common law tort of abuse of process arises when one uses the court’s process for a purpose other than that for which the process was designed. [Citations.] It has been “interpreted broadly to encompass the entire range of ‘procedures’ incident to litigation.” [Citation.] [¶] “[T]he essence of the tort [is] . . . misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done in the name of the | 2 | 2014–2021 |
Adams v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2015“Merely obtaining or seeking process is not enough; there must be subsequent abuse, by a misuse of the judicial process for a purpose other than that which it was intended to serve. [Citations.] The gist of the tort is the improper use of the process after it is issued.” (Adams v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 521 , 530- 531.) The court sustained without leave to amend the causes of action for wrongful foreclosure based on defects in the notice of sale, right of redemption, and injunctive relief; sustained with leave to amend the abuse of process and quiet title claims; and overruled the 2005Even disregarding the absolutely privileged nature of this motion, 7 an abuse of process claim cannot be premised on merely seeking or obtaining a court ruling on a motion, but instead requires some proof there was a “subsequent abuse, by a misuse of the judicial process for a purpose other than that which it was intended to serve. [Citations.] The gist of the tort is the improper use of the process after it is issued. [Citation.]” (Adams v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 521, 530-531 .) Because defendants’ motion was unsuccessful, there was no legal process that was subsequently imprope | 2 | 2005–2015 |
Vogel v. Felice
green
2 sentences2006(See Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 350 ] [finding that the plaintiff opposing anti-SLAPP motion neither pleaded nor established by admissible evidence valid defamation claim].) The abuse of process claim clearly appears to have been barred. 2006(See Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 350 ] [finding that the plaintiff opposing anti-SLAPP motion neither pleaded nor established by admissible evidence valid defamation claim].) The abuse of process claim clearly appears to have been barred. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025To establish a probability of prevailing on the merits, a plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63 .) “ ‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ’ ” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 .) “ ‘[T]he plaintiff [must] establish a probability he or she will prevail on the clai | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Assn.
green
1 sentence2025To establish a probability of prevailing on the merits, a plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63 .) “ ‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ’ ” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 .) “ ‘[T]he plaintiff [must] establish a probability he or she will prevail on the clai | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Yee v. Superior Court of the City & Cnty. of S.F.
green
1 sentence2024(Yee v. Superior Court (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 26, 37 , citing Rest.2d Torts, § 682; CACI No. 1520.) “ ‘[T]he essence of the tort [of abuse of process is] . . . misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done in the name of the court and under its authority for the purpose of perpetrating an injustice.’ ” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057 .) Evidence of misuse of this power is “essential as ‘ “there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.’ (Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49 Cal.2d 21 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Meadows v. Bakersfield Savings & Loan Ass'n
green
1 sentence2023Assn. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 749, 753 .) Thus, “[a]pplication of the tort to administrative proceedings would not serve the purpose of the tort, which is to preserve the integrity of the court.” (Stolz v. Wong Communications Limited Partnership (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1811, 1823 .) The complaint alleges defendants presented a “forged document” (presumably the spreadsheet attached to the arbitration brief) and “intentionally used the arbitration for the 21 purpose of perpetrating an injustice.” Since there is no allegation in the abuse of process claim that defendants misused the power of the cour | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Norgart v. Upjohn Co.
green
1 sentence2023(See Sheppard v. North Orange County Regional Occupational Program (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 289 , 296–297 [“[a] judgment on the pleadings and a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer are reviewed under the same de novo standard”]; Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852 [“[i]n the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action”].) 28 original [complaint].” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408-409 , | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Stolz v. Wong Communications Limited Partnership
green
1 sentence2023Assn. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 749, 753 .) Thus, “[a]pplication of the tort to administrative proceedings would not serve the purpose of the tort, which is to preserve the integrity of the court.” (Stolz v. Wong Communications Limited Partnership (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1811, 1823 .) The complaint alleges defendants presented a “forged document” (presumably the spreadsheet attached to the arbitration brief) and “intentionally used the arbitration for the 21 purpose of perpetrating an injustice.” Since there is no allegation in the abuse of process claim that defendants misused the power of the cour | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Sheppard v. North Orange County Regional Occupational Program
green
1 sentence2023(See Sheppard v. North Orange County Regional Occupational Program (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 289 , 296–297 [“[a] judgment on the pleadings and a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer are reviewed under the same de novo standard”]; Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852 [“[i]n the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action”].) 28 original [complaint].” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408-409 , | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Pimentel v. Houk green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Fults v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Jabro v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Richards v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Tellefsen v. Key System Transit Lines green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Brown v. Kennard green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Thing v. La Chusa green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Microsoft Corp. v. A-Tech Corp. neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| James B. Lunsford Regina T. Charboneau Bay Vista Enterprises, Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.