15 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Potter, Prescott, Jamieson & Nelson, P.A. v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2023“The most common forms of such process are subpoenas, warrants, and writs of garnishment or attachment.” Id. § 26 cmt. c; see also Campbell, 1998 ME 70, ¶ 7 , 708 A.2d 283 . [¶16] For an abuse of process claim to succeed, there must be an assertion that the alleged tortfeasor used process. 2023“The most common forms of such process are subpoenas, warrants, and writs of garnishment or attachment.” Id. § 26 cmt. c; see also Campbell, 1998 ME 70, ¶ 7 , 708 A.2d 283 . [¶16] For an abuse of process claim to succeed, there must be an assertion that the alleged tortfeasor used process. | 2 | 5 |
Tanguay v. Asengreen2 sentences2014In 29 Advanced Const. Corp. v. Pilecki, the Law Court explained that "[t]he filing of a lawsuit qualifies as a regular use of process and cannot constitute abuse of process, even if the filing was influenced by an ulterior purpose." ( 2006 ME 84 , ~ 23, 901 A.2d 189 (citing Tanguay, 1998 ME 277 , ~ 5, 722 A.2d 49 ).) Although Advanced Construction appears to stand for the general proposition that the filing of a complaint cannot serve as the basis for an abuse of process claim, a closer inspection reveals a more nuanced rule. 2014In 29 Advanced Const. Corp. v. Pilecki, the Law Court explained that "[t]he filing of a lawsuit qualifies as a regular use of process and cannot constitute abuse of process, even if the filing was influenced by an ulterior purpose." ( 2006 ME 84 , ~ 23, 901 A.2d 189 (citing Tanguay, 1998 ME 277 , ~ 5, 722 A.2d 49 ).) Although Advanced Construction appears to stand for the general proposition that the filing of a complaint cannot serve as the basis for an abuse of process claim, a closer inspection reveals a more nuanced rule. | 1 | 3 |
Pepperell Trust Co. v. Mountain Heir Financial Corp.green2 sentences2014When an appeal is taken, 'the proceedings are not terminated until the final disposition of the appeal and of any further proceedings that it may entail.' Pepperell Trust Co., 1998 ME 46 , 'i[18, 708 A.2d 651 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674, cmt. j). 5 Attorney Bergen has also argued, and this court agrees, that Mr. Going cannot prevail on an abuse of process claim, since he has not set forth a claim that Attorney Bergen wrongfully used individual legal procedures against him after the suit was commenced. 2014When an appeal is taken, 'the proceedings are not terminated until the final disposition of the appeal and of any further proceedings that it may entail.' Pepperell Trust Co., 1998 ME 46 , 'i[18, 708 A.2d 651 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674, cmt. j). 5 Attorney Bergen has also argued, and this court agrees, that Mr. Going cannot prevail on an abuse of process claim, since he has not set forth a claim that Attorney Bergen wrongfully used individual legal procedures against him after the suit was commenced. | 1 | 2 |
Nadeau v. Stategreen1 sentence2023We disagree. [¶15] The elements necessary to sustain an abuse of process claim are (1) “a use of the process in a manner not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings” and (2) “the existence of an ulterior motive.” Nadeau v. State, 395 A.2d 107, 117 (Me. 1978); see also Nader v. Me. | 1 | 1 |
City of Angoon v. Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, and Shee Atika, Inc.green1 sentence2023Compare Angoon v. Hodel, 836 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Because lis pendens is not ‘process,’ its filing does not trigger an action for abuse of process.”), and Cent. | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Charlesgreen1 sentence2004Cf. Baker v. Charles, 919 F. Supp 41, 46 (D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Advanced Construction Corp. v. Pilecki
green
2 sentences2014In 29 Advanced Const. Corp. v. Pilecki, the Law Court explained that "[t]he filing of a lawsuit qualifies as a regular use of process and cannot constitute abuse of process, even if the filing was influenced by an ulterior purpose." ( 2006 ME 84 , ~ 23, 901 A.2d 189 (citing Tanguay, 1998 ME 277 , ~ 5, 722 A.2d 49 ).) Although Advanced Construction appears to stand for the general proposition that the filing of a complaint cannot serve as the basis for an abuse of process claim, a closer inspection reveals a more nuanced rule. 2014In 29 Advanced Const. Corp. v. Pilecki, the Law Court explained that "[t]he filing of a lawsuit qualifies as a regular use of process and cannot constitute abuse of process, even if the filing was influenced by an ulterior purpose." ( 2006 ME 84 , ~ 23, 901 A.2d 189 (citing Tanguay, 1998 ME 277 , ~ 5, 722 A.2d 49 ).) Although Advanced Construction appears to stand for the general proposition that the filing of a complaint cannot serve as the basis for an abuse of process claim, a closer inspection reveals a more nuanced rule. | 5 | 2012–2023 |
George Jennings v. Christopher K. MacLean
green
2 sentences2022Count III and Count VI (Abuse of Process) An abuse of process claim may arise from "misuse of individual legal procedures, such as discovery, subpoenas, and attachment, after a lawsuit has been filed, and the misuse of the procedures for obtaining a lien." Jennings, 2015 ME 42 , ,r 7, 114 A.3d 667 . 2022Count III and Count VI (Abuse of Process) An abuse of process claim may arise from "misuse of individual legal procedures, such as discovery, subpoenas, and attachment, after a lawsuit has been filed, and the misuse of the procedures for obtaining a lien." Jennings, 2015 ME 42 , ,r 7, 114 A.3d 667 . | 3 | 2020–2023 |
Simon, II v. Navon
green
2 sentences1998In Simon v. Navon, 71 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.1995), the court held that under Maine law the filing of a complaint alone cannot be the basis for an abuse of process claim and explained that the “COiling of a lawsuit is a ‘regular’ use of process, and therefore may not on its own fulfill the requirement of an abusive act, even if the decision to sue was influenced by a wrongful motive, purpose or intent.” Id. at 16 . 1998In Simon v. Navon, 71 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.1995), the court held that under Maine law the filing of a complaint alone cannot be the basis for an abuse of process claim and explained that the “COiling of a lawsuit is a ‘regular’ use of process, and therefore may not on its own fulfill the requirement of an abusive act, even if the decision to sue was influenced by a wrongful motive, purpose or intent.” Id. at 16 . | 2 | 1998–2010 |
Nader v. Maine Democratic Party
green
2 sentences2023Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 38 , 41 A.3d 551 (same). 2023Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 38 , 41 A.3d 551 (same). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bradbury v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC
green
1 sentence2014(Bradbury, 780 F.Supp.2d at 111 n.ll.) Bradbury stated: Generally the term refers to "legal process" invoking state power such as a subpoena, attachment, and a mechanic's lien. [S]ome of the cases, however, refer to "discovery" as "process," e.g. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Saliem v. Glovsky
green
1 sentence2014Tanguay, upon which Advanced Construction relies for the aforementioned proposition, cites to Potter, Prescott, Jamieson & Nelson, P.A. v. Campbell, 1998 ME 70 , ~ 7, 708 A.2d 283 ("Campbell"), and Simon v. Navon, 71 F .3d 9 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Simon") for support. ( 1998 ME 277 , ~ 5, 722 A.2d 49 .) Campbell notes that Simon and its holding are consistent with Maine decisions which involve abuse of process claims. ( 1998 ME 70 , ~ 7, 708 A.2d 283 .) Specifically Campbell approved of Simon's assertion that "[f]iling of a lawsuit is a 'regular' use of process, and therefore may not on its own ful | 1 | 2014–2014 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1984CMP cross-appeals, assigning error to the court’s exclusion of evidence concerning the two polygraph tests Packard had taken, and to the court’s failure to rule Packard a “public official” under the New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), standard, for purposes of the defamation claim. 1 II. 1984CMP cross-appeals, assigning error to the court’s exclusion of evidence concerning the two polygraph tests Packard had taken, and to the court’s failure to rule Packard a “public official” under the New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), standard, for purposes of the defamation claim. 1 II. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.