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10 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crackel v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences2017Co., 208 Ariz. 252, 257, ¶ 14 (App. 2004) ("[A] plaintiff must prove that one or more specific judicially sanctioned processes have been abused to establish an abuse-of-process claim."); see also 3 Dan B. 2017Cf. Crackel, 208 Ariz. at 258, ¶ 15 (noting that an abuse of process claim "must be based on something more than the opposing party's mere persistence in the litigation"). | 3 | 3 |
Nienstedt v. Wetzelgreen2 sentences2016Father therefore asserts Van Cott’s filing a motion to continue based on those allegations was motivated by a desire to “deprive Father of his day in court.” Father also asserts Van Cott engaged in ex parte contact with the minor children’s counselor in order to sway the counselor in favor of Mother. ¶13 An abuse of process claim is appropriate when a party misuses the legal process “for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish.” Nienstedt, 133 Ariz. at 353 . 2004Because this issue could be dispositive, we address it first, starting with the law of abuse of process and then applying that law to Allstate’s JMOL motion. ¶ 11 The elements of an abuse-of-process claim are “(1) a willful act in the use of judicial process; (2) for an ulterior purpose not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 353 , 651 P.2d 876, 881 (App.1982). | 3 | 3 |
Rondelli v. County of Pimagreen2 sentences2004Although, “process” for purposes of an abuse-of-process claim is not confined to the strict legal definition of the word, it is still “‘an act done under the authority of the court for the purpose of perpetrating an injustice, i.e., a perversion of the judicial process to the accomplishment of an improper purpose.’ ” Morn, 152 Ariz. at 167 , 730 P.2d at 876 , quoting Rondelli v. County of Pima, 120 Ariz. 483, 489 , 586 P.2d 1295, 1301 (App.1978). 2004Although, “process” for purposes of an abuse-of-process claim is not confined to the strict legal definition of the word, it is still “‘an act done under the authority of the court for the purpose of perpetrating an injustice, i.e., a perversion of the judicial process to the accomplishment of an improper purpose.’ ” Morn, 152 Ariz. at 167 , 730 P.2d at 876 , quoting Rondelli v. County of Pima, 120 Ariz. 483, 489 , 586 P.2d 1295, 1301 (App.1978). | 2 | 2 |
Glaze v. Larsengreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 176 Ariz. 340 (1993) (recognizing strict liability and negligence as causes of action to recover damages); Piner v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 182, ¶ 11 (1998) (requiring damages to sustain negligence claim); Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, ¶ 13 (2004) (requiring damages as element in attorney-malpractice claim). ¶25 Our abuse-of-process case law has never explicitly identified damages as an element. | 1 | 1 |
Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co.green1 sentence2024See, e.g., Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 176 Ariz. 340 (1993) (recognizing strict liability and negligence as causes of action to recover damages); Piner v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 182, ¶ 11 (1998) (requiring damages to sustain negligence claim); Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, ¶ 13 (2004) (requiring damages as element in attorney-malpractice claim). ¶25 Our abuse-of-process case law has never explicitly identified damages as an element. | 1 | 1 |
Piner v. Superior Court in and for County of Maricopagreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 176 Ariz. 340 (1993) (recognizing strict liability and negligence as causes of action to recover damages); Piner v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 182, ¶ 11 (1998) (requiring damages to sustain negligence claim); Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, ¶ 13 (2004) (requiring damages as element in attorney-malpractice claim). ¶25 Our abuse-of-process case law has never explicitly identified damages as an element. | 1 | 1 |
McCleaf v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See State v. Murphy, 113 Ariz. 416, 418 (1976) (recognizing that the "duty and discretion to conduct prosecutions for public offenses rests with the county attorney"); see also Arizona Revised Statutes section 11-532(A) (duties of county attorney); cf. McCleaf v. State, 190 Ariz. 167, 170, 172 (App. 1997) (finding that judge's decision not to issue arrest warrant for probationer accused of violating probation effectually superseded the probation officer's recommendation to do so). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Murphygreen1 sentence2017See State v. Murphy, 113 Ariz. 416, 418 (1976) (recognizing that the "duty and discretion to conduct prosecutions for public offenses rests with the county attorney"); see also Arizona Revised Statutes section 11-532(A) (duties of county attorney); cf. McCleaf v. State, 190 Ariz. 167, 170, 172 (App. 1997) (finding that judge's decision not to issue arrest warrant for probationer accused of violating probation effectually superseded the probation officer's recommendation to do so). | 1 | 1 |
Funk v. Cablegreen1 sentence1982See Funk v. Cable, 251 F.Supp. 598 (N.D.Pa.1966); Sachs v. Levy, 216 F.Supp. 44 (E.D.Pa.1963); Sie-brand v. Eyerly Aircraft Company, 185 F.Supp. 538 (D.Or.1960). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morn v. City of Phoenix
green
2 sentences2004Although, “process” for purposes of an abuse-of-process claim is not confined to the strict legal definition of the word, it is still “‘an act done under the authority of the court for the purpose of perpetrating an injustice, i.e., a perversion of the judicial process to the accomplishment of an improper purpose.’ ” Morn, 152 Ariz. at 167 , 730 P.2d at 876 , quoting Rondelli v. County of Pima, 120 Ariz. 483, 489 , 586 P.2d 1295, 1301 (App.1978). 2004Although, “process” for purposes of an abuse-of-process claim is not confined to the strict legal definition of the word, it is still “‘an act done under the authority of the court for the purpose of perpetrating an injustice, i.e., a perversion of the judicial process to the accomplishment of an improper purpose.’ ” Morn, 152 Ariz. at 167 , 730 P.2d at 876 , quoting Rondelli v. County of Pima, 120 Ariz. 483, 489 , 586 P.2d 1295, 1301 (App.1978). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Fuller v. Local Union No. 106 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners
green
1 sentence2017But a report to the police is not sufficient to constitute 'legal process' required for an abuse-of-process claim."3 Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lewis v. Swenson
green
2 sentences1999Citing Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 189 Ariz. 398 , 943 P.2d 758 (App.1997), and Lewis v. Swenson, 126 Ariz. 561 , 617 P.2d 69 (App.1980), HLM responds, as it persuaded the trial court, that the only claim that may be brought against opposing counsel is a claim for malicious prosecution. 1999Citing Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 189 Ariz. 398 , 943 P.2d 758 (App.1997), and Lewis v. Swenson, 126 Ariz. 561 , 617 P.2d 69 (App.1980), HLM responds, as it persuaded the trial court, that the only claim that may be brought against opposing counsel is a claim for malicious prosecution. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Linder v. Brown & Herrick
green
2 sentences1999Citing Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 189 Ariz. 398 , 943 P.2d 758 (App.1997), and Lewis v. Swenson, 126 Ariz. 561 , 617 P.2d 69 (App.1980), HLM responds, as it persuaded the trial court, that the only claim that may be brought against opposing counsel is a claim for malicious prosecution. 1999Citing Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 189 Ariz. 398 , 943 P.2d 758 (App.1997), and Lewis v. Swenson, 126 Ariz. 561 , 617 P.2d 69 (App.1980), HLM responds, as it persuaded the trial court, that the only claim that may be brought against opposing counsel is a claim for malicious prosecution. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Joseph, Md v. Markovitz, Md
green
2 sentences1986This court, citing Rondelli and Joseph v. Markovitz, 27 Ariz.App. 122 , 551 P.2d 571 (1976), found that there was no evidence of subsequent misuse of process after process lawfully issued, and “[a]n ulterior purpose alone cannot constitute abuse of process. 1986This court, citing Rondelli and Joseph v. Markovitz, 27 Ariz.App. 122 , 551 P.2d 571 (1976), found that there was no evidence of subsequent misuse of process after process lawfully issued, and “[a]n ulterior purpose alone cannot constitute abuse of process. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Sachs v. Levy
green
1 sentence1982See Funk v. Cable, 251 F.Supp. 598 (N.D.Pa.1966); Sachs v. Levy, 216 F.Supp. 44 (E.D.Pa.1963); Sie-brand v. Eyerly Aircraft Company, 185 F.Supp. 538 (D.Or.1960). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Siebrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co.
green
1 sentence1982See Funk v. Cable, 251 F.Supp. 598 (N.D.Pa.1966); Sachs v. Levy, 216 F.Supp. 44 (E.D.Pa.1963); Sie-brand v. Eyerly Aircraft Company, 185 F.Supp. 538 (D.Or.1960). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.