abuse of process claim in Connecticut

2024Comment b to § 682 explains that the addition of primarily is meant to exclude liability when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogan v. Rungee, 165 Conn. App. 209, 220 , 140 A.3d 979 (2016). ‘‘[A]lthough the definition of process may be broad enough to cover a wide range of judicial procedures, to prevail on an abuse of process claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant used a judicial process for an improper pur- pose.’’

2024Comment b to § 682 explains that the addition of primarily is meant to exclude liability when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogan v. Rungee, 165 Conn. App. 209, 220 , 140 A.3d 979 (2016). ‘‘[A]lthough the definition of process may be broad enough to cover a wide range of judicial procedures, to prevail on an abuse of process claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant used a judicial process for an improper pur- pose.’’

2016In QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343 , 773 A.2d 906 (2001), the Connecticut Supreme Court pointed out that the distinction between a vexatious suit claim and one for abuse of process was that the former focused on the purported wrongful issuance of process while the latter concerned the subsequent proceedings.

2016In QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343 , 773 A.2d 906 (2001), the Connecticut Supreme Court pointed out that the distinction between a vexatious suit claim and one for abuse of process was that the former focused on the purported wrongful issuance of process while the latter concerned the subsequent proceedings.

2025As to the litigation privilege, it is a ‘‘long-standing [common-law] rule that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families, 351 Conn. 656, 665 , 332 A.3d 180 (2025).

2024Comment b to § 682 explains that the addition of primarily is meant to exclude liability when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogan v. Rungee, 165 Conn. App. 209, 220 , 140 A.3d 979 (2016). ‘‘[A]lthough the definition of process may be broad enough to cover a wide range of judicial procedures, to prevail on an abuse of process claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant used a judicial process for an improper pur- pose.’’

2024Comment b to § 682 explains that the addition of primarily is meant to exclude liability when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogan v. Rungee, 165 Conn. App. 209, 220 , 140 A.3d 979 (2016). ‘‘[A]lthough the definition of process may be broad enough to cover a wide range of judicial procedures, to prevail on an abuse of process claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant used a judicial process for an improper pur- pose.’’

2022They are, therefore, the type of process that will support an abuse of process claim.’’), review denied, 168 Wn. 2d 1043 , 234 P.3d 1173 (2010).

2022They are, therefore, the type of process that will support an abuse of process claim.’’), review denied, 168 Wn. 2d 1043 , 234 P.3d 1173 (2010).

2022Ed. 2d 166 (1981); Azer v. Myers, 8 Haw.

2022Jur. 2d 492, Abuse of Process § 2 (2016) (‘‘ ‘process,’ the abuse of which may support an abuse of process claim, is not limited to the original pleadings; depositions, motions, interrogatories and other requests for dis- covery, or legal maneuverings to compel or prohibit action by an opponent all invoke the authority of the court and are, therefore, the type of process that will support an abuse of process claim’’ (emphasis added)). 12 But see Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 602 , 627 P.2d 1097 (App. 1981) (‘‘[t]here was no proof of an improper use of judicial process . . . as the purpose of

2022Jur. 2d 492, Abuse of Process § 2 (2016) (‘‘ ‘process,’ the abuse of which may support an abuse of process claim, is not limited to the original pleadings; depositions, motions, interrogatories and other requests for dis- covery, or legal maneuverings to compel or prohibit action by an opponent all invoke the authority of the court and are, therefore, the type of process that will support an abuse of process claim’’ (emphasis added)). 12 But see Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 602 , 627 P.2d 1097 (App. 1981) (‘‘[t]here was no proof of an improper use of judicial process . . . as the purpose of

2022Jur. 2d 492, Abuse of Process § 2 (2016) (‘‘ ‘process,’ the abuse of which may support an abuse of process claim, is not limited to the original pleadings; depositions, motions, interrogatories and other requests for dis- covery, or legal maneuverings to compel or prohibit action by an opponent all invoke the authority of the court and are, therefore, the type of process that will support an abuse of process claim’’ (emphasis added)). 12 But see Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 602 , 627 P.2d 1097 (App. 1981) (‘‘[t]here was no proof of an improper use of judicial process . . . as the purpose of

2022Jur. 2d 492, Abuse of Process § 2 (2016) (‘‘ ‘process,’ the abuse of which may support an abuse of process claim, is not limited to the original pleadings; depositions, motions, interrogatories and other requests for dis- covery, or legal maneuverings to compel or prohibit action by an opponent all invoke the authority of the court and are, therefore, the type of process that will support an abuse of process claim’’ (emphasis added)). 12 But see Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 602 , 627 P.2d 1097 (App. 1981) (‘‘[t]here was no proof of an improper use of judicial process . . . as the purpose of

2022Jur. 2d 492, Abuse of Process § 2 (2016) (‘‘ ‘process,’ the abuse of which may support an abuse of process claim, is not limited to the original pleadings; depositions, motions, interrogatories and other requests for dis- covery, or legal maneuverings to compel or prohibit action by an opponent all invoke the authority of the court and are, therefore, the type of process that will support an abuse of process claim’’ (emphasis added)). 12 But see Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 602 , 627 P.2d 1097 (App. 1981) (‘‘[t]here was no proof of an improper use of judicial process . . . as the purpose of

2022They are, therefore, the type of process that will support an abuse of process claim.’’), review denied, 168 Wn. 2d 1043 , 234 P.3d 1173 (2010).

2022They are, therefore, the type of process that will support an abuse of process claim.’’), review denied, 168 Wn. 2d 1043 , 234 P.3d 1173 (2010).

2020See Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 702 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997) (appellate court ‘‘may affirm the court’s judgment on a dispositive alternat[ive] ground for which there is support in the trial court record’’); Vollemans v. Wall- ingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 219 , 928 A.2d 586 (2007) (‘‘[a]lthough the trial court did not rule on those alternat[ive] grounds for summary judgment, it is within our discretion to do so on appeal’’), aff’d, 289 Conn. 57 , 956 A.2d 579 (2008); Vaillancourt v. Latifi, 81 Conn. App. 541 , 544 n.4, 840 A.2d 1209 (2004) (‘‘[w]e may affirm the [summary] jud

2020See Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 702 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997) (appellate court ‘‘may affirm the court’s judgment on a dispositive alternat[ive] ground for which there is support in the trial court record’’); Vollemans v. Wall- ingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 219 , 928 A.2d 586 (2007) (‘‘[a]lthough the trial court did not rule on those alternat[ive] grounds for summary judgment, it is within our discretion to do so on appeal’’), aff’d, 289 Conn. 57 , 956 A.2d 579 (2008); Vaillancourt v. Latifi, 81 Conn. App. 541 , 544 n.4, 840 A.2d 1209 (2004) (‘‘[w]e may affirm the [summary] jud

2020See Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 702 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997) (appellate court ‘‘may affirm the court’s judgment on a dispositive alternat[ive] ground for which there is support in the trial court record’’); Vollemans v. Wall- ingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 219 , 928 A.2d 586 (2007) (‘‘[a]lthough the trial court did not rule on those alternat[ive] grounds for summary judgment, it is within our discretion to do so on appeal’’), aff’d, 289 Conn. 57 , 956 A.2d 579 (2008); Vaillancourt v. Latifi, 81 Conn. App. 541 , 544 n.4, 840 A.2d 1209 (2004) (‘‘[w]e may affirm the [summary] jud

2020See Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 702 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997) (appellate court ‘‘may affirm the court’s judgment on a dispositive alternat[ive] ground for which there is support in the trial court record’’); Vollemans v. Wall- ingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 219 , 928 A.2d 586 (2007) (‘‘[a]lthough the trial court did not rule on those alternat[ive] grounds for summary judgment, it is within our discretion to do so on appeal’’), aff’d, 289 Conn. 57 , 956 A.2d 579 (2008); Vaillancourt v. Latifi, 81 Conn. App. 541 , 544 n.4, 840 A.2d 1209 (2004) (‘‘[w]e may affirm the [summary] jud

2020See Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 702 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997) (appellate court ‘‘may affirm the court’s judgment on a dispositive alternat[ive] ground for which there is support in the trial court record’’); Vollemans v. Wall- ingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 219 , 928 A.2d 586 (2007) (‘‘[a]lthough the trial court did not rule on those alternat[ive] grounds for summary judgment, it is within our discretion to do so on appeal’’), aff’d, 289 Conn. 57 , 956 A.2d 579 (2008); Vaillancourt v. Latifi, 81 Conn. App. 541 , 544 n.4, 840 A.2d 1209 (2004) (‘‘[w]e may affirm the [summary] jud

2020See Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 702 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997) (appellate court ‘‘may affirm the court’s judgment on a dispositive alternat[ive] ground for which there is support in the trial court record’’); Vollemans v. Wall- ingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 219 , 928 A.2d 586 (2007) (‘‘[a]lthough the trial court did not rule on those alternat[ive] grounds for summary judgment, it is within our discretion to do so on appeal’’), aff’d, 289 Conn. 57 , 956 A.2d 579 (2008); Vaillancourt v. Latifi, 81 Conn. App. 541 , 544 n.4, 840 A.2d 1209 (2004) (‘‘[w]e may affirm the [summary] jud

2005See Hopper v. Drysdale, supra, 1041; Nienstedt v. Wetzel, supra, 353 ; Twyford v. Twyford, supra, 923 ; Kensington Land Co. v. Zelnick, supra, 184 ; Foothill Industrial Bank v. Mikkelson, supra, 757 .

2000See Long v. Long, 136 N.H. 25 , 30 , 611 A.2d 620 (1992) (defining process "`as some activity or procedure involving the exercise, or dependent upon the existence, of judicial authority.'"); Wells v. Waukesha County Marine Bank, 135 Wis.2d 519 , 537 , 401 N.W.2d 18 (1986), cert. denied, 136 Wis.2d 562 , 407 N.W.2d 559 (1987) (defining process as "the means of compelling the CT Page 12760 defendant to appear in court after the suing out of the original writ in a civil case and after indictment in a criminal case.").

2000See Long v. Long, 136 N.H. 25 , 30 , 611 A.2d 620 (1992) (defining process "`as some activity or procedure involving the exercise, or dependent upon the existence, of judicial authority.'"); Wells v. Waukesha County Marine Bank, 135 Wis.2d 519 , 537 , 401 N.W.2d 18 (1986), cert. denied, 136 Wis.2d 562 , 407 N.W.2d 559 (1987) (defining process as "the means of compelling the CT Page 12760 defendant to appear in court after the suing out of the original writ in a civil case and after indictment in a criminal case.").

1999The cornerstone of the plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim is Caslagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336 , 684 A.2d 1181 (1996), in which our Supreme Court concluded that to bring a visitation petition pursuant to § 46b-59, the party seeking visitation must demonstrate, as a threshold matter, a “disruption of the family sufficient to justify state intervention.” Id., 338.

1999The cornerstone of the plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim is Caslagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336 , 684 A.2d 1181 (1996), in which our Supreme Court concluded that to bring a visitation petition pursuant to § 46b-59, the party seeking visitation must demonstrate, as a threshold matter, a “disruption of the family sufficient to justify state intervention.” Id., 338.

1997CT Page 812 "`Res judicata or claim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits. . . .'" In re John B., 20 Conn. App. 725 , 570 A.2d 237 (1990); quoting Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497 , 501 , 551 A.2d 1243 (1988).

1997CT Page 812 "`Res judicata or claim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits. . . .'" In re John B., 20 Conn. App. 725 , 570 A.2d 237 (1990); quoting Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497 , 501 , 551 A.2d 1243 (1988).

1997CT Page 812 "`Res judicata or claim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits. . . .'" In re John B., 20 Conn. App. 725 , 570 A.2d 237 (1990); quoting Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497 , 501 , 551 A.2d 1243 (1988).

1997CT Page 812 "`Res judicata or claim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits. . . .'" In re John B., 20 Conn. App. 725 , 570 A.2d 237 (1990); quoting Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497 , 501 , 551 A.2d 1243 (1988).

1993“The purpose of a law suit is not only to do substantial justice but to bring an end to controversy. ...” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Orselet v. DeMatteo, 206 Conn. 542, 550 , 539 A.2d 95 (1988).

1993“The purpose of a law suit is not only to do substantial justice but to bring an end to controversy. ...” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Orselet v. DeMatteo, 206 Conn. 542, 550 , 539 A.2d 95 (1988).

1993The abuse of process claim arises out of the legal actions of the city in Powers v. Ulichny, supra, appeals of the Planning and Zoning Commission's approvals for housing, a claimed misrepresentation to the court in the first zoning appeal and the withdrawal of the second zoning appeal after the city acquired the cafe CT Page 6259 parcel.