emphasized factors in Pennsylvania

1993The Court emphasized that the error arose because the declarant “does not testify and cannot be tested by cross examination,” Id., at 136 , 88 S.Ct. at 1628 , and further stated that “[i]t was against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed.” Id.

1993The Court emphasized that the error arose because the declarant “does not testify and cannot be tested by cross examination,” Id., at 136 , 88 S.Ct. at 1628 , and further stated that “[i]t was against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed.” Id.

2026Id.

2026Id. (quoting City of Phila. v. Hart, 224 A.3d 815 , 822 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020)).

2019Cornwall, 158 A.3d at 162 .

2014That is, “physicians must have and employ the same skill and knowledge typically used by physicians in the medical profession, ' and must keep themselves informed of contemporary developments in the profession.” Pringle, supra at 170 , citing Incollingo, supra at 217.

2012Finally, in Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids School District, 327 Wis.2d 572 , 786 N.W.2d 177 (2010), the Wisconsin Supreme Court examined a request for all emails of public school teachers sent and received via school district email accounts on school district-owned computers.

2012Finally, in Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids School District, 327 Wis.2d 572 , 786 N.W.2d 177 (2010), the Wisconsin Supreme Court examined a request for all emails of public school teachers sent and received via school district email accounts on school district-owned computers.

2007In applying the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Court emphasized that those factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).

2007Nevertheless tracking those factors in its analysis, the Court rejected, in turn, arguments that notification was tantamount to colonial-era, “shaming” punishments, id. at 97-99, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , and that onerous registration requirements were an affirmative disability or restraint, cf. Seling, Hendricks, supra, noting that the provisions neither imposed a physical restraint nor were even as onerous as the various debarments the Court had formerly found remedial and non-punitive, Smith, 538 U.S. at 99-102 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citing, inter alia, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 , 118 S.Ct. 48

2007Nevertheless tracking those factors in its analysis, the Court rejected, in turn, arguments that notification was tantamount to colonial-era, “shaming” punishments, id. at 97-99, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , and that onerous registration requirements were an affirmative disability or restraint, cf. Seling, Hendricks, supra, noting that the provisions neither imposed a physical restraint nor were even as onerous as the various debarments the Court had formerly found remedial and non-punitive, Smith, 538 U.S. at 99-102 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citing, inter alia, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 , 118 S.Ct. 48

2007Nevertheless tracking those factors in its analysis, the Court rejected, in turn, arguments that notification was tantamount to colonial-era, “shaming” punishments, id. at 97-99, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , and that onerous registration requirements were an affirmative disability or restraint, cf. Seling, Hendricks, supra, noting that the provisions neither imposed a physical restraint nor were even as onerous as the various debarments the Court had formerly found remedial and non-punitive, Smith, 538 U.S. at 99-102 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citing, inter alia, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 , 118 S.Ct. 48

2007Nevertheless tracking those factors in its analysis, the Court rejected, in turn, arguments that notification was tantamount to colonial-era, “shaming” punishments, id. at 97-99, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , and that onerous registration requirements were an affirmative disability or restraint, cf. Seling, Hendricks, supra, noting that the provisions neither imposed a physical restraint nor were even as onerous as the various debarments the Court had formerly found remedial and non-punitive, Smith, 538 U.S. at 99-102 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citing, inter alia, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 , 118 S.Ct. 48

2007Nevertheless tracking those factors in its analysis, the Court rejected, in turn, arguments that notification was tantamount to colonial-era, “shaming” punishments, id. at 97-99, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , and that onerous registration requirements were an affirmative disability or restraint, cf. Seling, Hendricks, supra, noting that the provisions neither imposed a physical restraint nor were even as onerous as the various debarments the Court had formerly found remedial and non-punitive, Smith, 538 U.S. at 99-102 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citing, inter alia, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 , 118 S.Ct. 48

2007In applying the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Court emphasized that those factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).

2007In applying the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Court emphasized that those factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).

1996Another case in which the court emphasized factors similar to those outlined by defendant Kim is Vogel v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 370 Pa. Super. 315 , 536 A.2d 422 (1988).

1996Another case in which the court emphasized factors similar to those outlined by defendant Kim is Vogel v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 370 Pa. Super. 315 , 536 A.2d 422 (1988).

1995Acknowledging that the legal right to the death benefit arises from the contractual beneficiary designation and not from the marital relationship, this court emphasized that the inquiry does not end with the contractual designation. 413 Pa.Super. at 92 , 604 A.2d at 1035 . [T]he question is whether the right to the lump sum pension death benefit, which arises from the beneficiary designation, falls within the separation/settlement agreement---- We believe ... that a lay person entering into a comprehensive separation/settlement agreement, which includes a provision wherein each party has relin

1995Acknowledging that the legal right to the death benefit arises from the contractual beneficiary designation and not from the marital relationship, this court emphasized that the inquiry does not end with the contractual designation. 413 Pa.Super. at 92 , 604 A.2d at 1035 . [T]he question is whether the right to the lump sum pension death benefit, which arises from the beneficiary designation, falls within the separation/settlement agreement---- We believe ... that a lay person entering into a comprehensive separation/settlement agreement, which includes a provision wherein each party has relin

1993Some may be governed by partnership agreements that allow them to realize values corresponding to some or all of the elements that enter into the computation of a firm’s value as a “going concern.” Id. at 30 , 575 A.2d at 89 .

1993Some may be governed by partnership agreements that allow them to realize values corresponding to some or all of the elements that enter into the computation of a firm’s value as a “going concern.” Id. at 30 , 575 A.2d at 89 .

1989Duquesne Light Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Klein), 77 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 67 , 465 A.2d 81 (1983), relied upon by the Board, does not require that a referee accept, as comparable, wages of employees whose production and earnings are totally incomparable.

1989Duquesne Light Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Klein), 77 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 67 , 465 A.2d 81 (1983), relied upon by the Board, does not require that a referee accept, as comparable, wages of employees whose production and earnings are totally incomparable.

1981The United States Supreme Court stated a similar requirement in construing the federal escape statute 4 in United States v. Bailey, supra. *18 There, the Court held that where a criminal defendant is charged with escape and claims that he is entitled to an instruction on the theory of duress or necessity, he must proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force. 444 U.S. at 415 , 100 S.Ct. at 637 .

1981The United States Supreme Court stated a similar requirement in construing the federal escape statute 4 in United States v. Bailey, supra. *18 There, the Court held that where a criminal defendant is charged with escape and claims that he is entitled to an instruction on the theory of duress or necessity, he must proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force. 444 U.S. at 415 , 100 S.Ct. at 637 .

1981In Commonwealth v. Stanley, supra, this Court emphasized that the defense of duress is available only if a defendant “return[s] to official detention as expeditiously as possible after absenting himself from the danger that initially prompted his escape.” 265 Pa.Super. at 206 , 401 A.2d at 1173 .

1981In Commonwealth v. Stanley, supra, this Court emphasized that the defense of duress is available only if a defendant “return[s] to official detention as expeditiously as possible after absenting himself from the danger that initially prompted his escape.” 265 Pa.Super. at 206 , 401 A.2d at 1173 .

1972In Koch, supra, the court emphasized that the error alleged was the fault of the election board and not of the candidate seeking the right to appeal, that the candidate had a right to rely on the accuracy of the results posted at the polling place, that he was under no obligation to attend the official canvass of the vote, (although he had a right to do so), and that he had no knowledge that would put him on notice that action on his part was necessary to protect his apparent victory until after the two-day appeal period expired.

1963According to his contention, that clause might just as well have not been included in the carefully worded act, notwithstanding that we are admonished by long established and firmly entrenched rules of statutory construction that “every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions” and that the legislature, in the enactment of a law, is to be presumed to have intended the entire statute to be effective and certain: Bowers v. Pa. Labor Relations Board, 402 Pa. 542 .