emphasized rule in California

2018(See also McNerlin v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 575 , 84 S.Ct. 1933 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 [directing appeals court to apply Jackson v. Denno retroactively].) In Linkletter , however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its past approach was not required. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." ( Linkletter , supra , 381 U.S. at p. 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 .) As a result, the court reasoned, "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case [of applying a new rule retroactively] by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether

2018(See also McNerlin v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 575 , 84 S.Ct. 1933 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 [directing appeals court to apply Jackson v. Denno retroactively].) In Linkletter , however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its past approach was not required. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." ( Linkletter , supra , 381 U.S. at p. 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 .) As a result, the court reasoned, "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case [of applying a new rule retroactively] by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether

2018(See also McNerlin v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 575 , 84 S.Ct. 1933 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 [directing appeals court to apply Jackson v. Denno retroactively].) In Linkletter , however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its past approach was not required. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." ( Linkletter , supra , 381 U.S. at p. 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 .) As a result, the court reasoned, "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case [of applying a new rule retroactively] by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether

2018(See also McNerlin v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 575 , 84 S.Ct. 1933 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 [directing appeals court to apply Jackson v. Denno retroactively].) In Linkletter , however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its past approach was not required. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." ( Linkletter , supra , 381 U.S. at p. 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 .) As a result, the court reasoned, "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case [of applying a new rule retroactively] by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether

2015In Saddler, the court rejected an argument that CALJIC No. 2.62 violated due 14 process rights by denying a defendant the presumption of innocence and raising an inference of guilt. ( Saddler, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 679-680.) The court emphasized that the instruction cautions that the failure of a defendant to deny or explain “‘does not create a presumption of guilt or by itself warrant an inference of guilt, nor does it relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving every essential element of the crime and the guilt of defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Id. at p. 680.) CALCRIM No. 361

2009While the language of CALCRIM No. 361 differs somewhat from CALJIC No. 2.62, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Saddler, supra, 24 Cal.3d at page 680 applies with equal force to CALCRIM No. 361 because language preserving the presumption of innocence and explaining the prosecution’s burden of proof appears in each.

2000Rejecting that argument, the court emphasized the principle that a parent's petition should be construed liberally in favor of granting a hearing. ( Ibid .) The court in In re Heather P., supra , at page 891, construed the requirement in section 388 imposed on a parent to petition the juvenile court for a hearing in the context of dependency proceedings as a whole.

2000(Ibid.) The court in In re Heather P., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at page 891 , construed the requirement in section 388 imposed on a parent to petition the juvenile court for a hearing in the context of dependency proceedings as a whole.

2025Analogizing to Ferris, the court explained the training facility is different from a typical workplace, where employees go home at the end of their workday; employees in this situation can be expected to “‘band together for society and socialize as a matter of course.’” ( Lapka, supra, at p. 983 , quoting Ferris, supra, 277 F.3d at p. 135 .) Together, these cases provide persuasive guidance that the work-related nature of conduct is examined under the totality of the circumstances.

2024(Ibid.) Indeed, “[a]lthough its reach is broad, the UCL ‘ “ ‘is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Potter Handy, LLP (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 938 , 950.) In substance, that is exactly what Chavez held; a plaintiff cannot plead around the absolute bar imposed by the Colgate doctrine by resurrecting a failed antitrust claim as an unfair business practice under the UCL (Chavez, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 ), especially when, as here, the only other cause of action alleged in the SAC was a violation of the Cartwright Act.

2023In Hughes v. Atlantic Pacific Construction Co. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 987, 998 , the court emphasized that the doctrine applies only when the risk is “something other than an ordinary and customary danger which may arise in the course of the work or of normal human activity.” In Hughes, therefore, the doctrine did not apply even though “the building plans envisioned a seismic joint of over 24-1/2 inches in width, running the length of the fifth floor of the west and central towers of this high rise project.” (Id. at p. 999.) Noting that “seismic joints are quite common in earthquake-prone Calif

2021In reviewing “the prosecutor’s comments to the jury, we determine whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the remarks in an objectionable fashion.” (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 184-185 .) “[W]e presume that the jury relied on the instructions, not the arguments, in convicting defendant. ‘[I]t should be noted that the jury, of course, could totally disregard all the arguments of counsel.’ [Citation.] Though we have focused on the prosecutor’s closing arguments, we do not do so at the expense of our presumption that ‘the jury treated the co

2021(Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 355 .) Despite the court’s statement that Velazquez was “argumentative and uncooperative” at the scene of the crime, it is clear this fact was not “critical to its decision.” (Cluff, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 998 .) Rather, the court emphasized that the factors it found material were Velazquez’s prior alcohol- related misdemeanor convictions—in particular her prior DUI—and the fact that she was on probation for her prior offense when this crime occurred.

2021(Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 355 .) Despite the court’s statement that Velazquez was “argumentative and uncooperative” at the scene of the crime, it is clear this fact was not “critical to its decision.” (Cluff, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 998 .) Rather, the court emphasized that the factors it found material were Velazquez’s prior alcohol- related misdemeanor convictions—in particular her prior DUI—and the fact that she was on probation for her prior offense when this crime occurred.

2018(See also McNerlin v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 575 , 84 S.Ct. 1933 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 [directing appeals court to apply Jackson v. Denno retroactively].) In Linkletter , however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its past approach was not required. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." ( Linkletter , supra , 381 U.S. at p. 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 .) As a result, the court reasoned, "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case [of applying a new rule retroactively] by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether

2014Both group beating theories exclude persons who 8. merely assist someone else in producing injury, and who do not personally and directly inflict it themselves.” (Modiri, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 494 .) The Court emphasized the instruction “contemplates acts that contribute substantially to the victim’s injured state[,]” and the instruction’s “group beating theories preclude a section 1192.7[, subd.] (c)(8) finding where the defendant’s conduct ‘could [not] have,’ or ‘would [not have],’ caused or contributed to the requisite harm.” (Modiri, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 494 .) The Court explained tha

2014Both group beating theories exclude persons who 8. merely assist someone else in producing injury, and who do not personally and directly inflict it themselves.” (Modiri, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 494 .) The Court emphasized the instruction “contemplates acts that contribute substantially to the victim’s injured state[,]” and the instruction’s “group beating theories preclude a section 1192.7[, subd.] (c)(8) finding where the defendant’s conduct ‘could [not] have,’ or ‘would [not have],’ caused or contributed to the requisite harm.” (Modiri, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 494 .) The Court explained tha

2009"In the absence of any apparent state policy to the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe that relevant information would not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the information is `material' to the defense of the accused." ( Id. at p. 58.) The high court concluded the defendant was "entitled to have the [confidential] file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains information that probably would have changed the outcome of his trial." ( Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 58 , italics added.) The court emphasized that de

2009“In the absence of any apparent state policy to the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe that relevant information would not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the information is ‘material’ to the defense of the accused.” (Id. at p. 58.) The high court concluded the defendant was “entitled to have the [confidential] file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains information that probably would have changed the outcome of his trial.” (Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 58 , italics added.) The court emphasized that defe

2007(See also NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1197-1207 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 778 , 980 P.2d 337 ], and cases cited therein.) 11 Although the victim, Autumn Wallace, was nine years of age when she was murdered, defense counsel mistakenly stated her age as eight years in the proposed questionnaires and during his voir dire questioning of some prospective jurors. 12 The prosecution’s proposed questionnaire included questions regarding the prospective jurors’ health, personality traits, and attitudes toward the death penalty, including a series of proposed question

2007(See also NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1197-1207 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 778 , 980 P.2d 337 ], and cases cited therein.) 11 Although the victim, Autumn Wallace, was nine years of age when she was murdered, defense counsel mistakenly stated her age as eight years in the proposed questionnaires and during his voir dire questioning of some prospective jurors. 12 The prosecution’s proposed questionnaire included questions regarding the prospective jurors’ health, personality traits, and attitudes toward the death penalty, including a series of proposed question

2007(See People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1333, fn. 9; People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 155-156 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 44 , 383 P.2d 452 ].) Accordingly, we observed in dictum, “[i]t is not clear to us that section 1192.4 would bar a defendant from offering in mitigation his expressed willingness to plead guilty—when that expressed willingness does in fact tend to show remorse, etc.” (Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1333, fn. 9 , italics omitted.) 10 The court also emphasized the presumption that a trial should remain open to the public as discussed in our decision in People v. Pompa-Orti

2007(See People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1333, fn. 9; People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 155-156 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 44 , 383 P.2d 452 ].) Accordingly, we observed in dictum, “[i]t is not clear to us that section 1192.4 would bar a defendant from offering in mitigation his expressed willingness to plead guilty—when that expressed willingness does in fact tend to show remorse, etc.” (Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1333, fn. 9 , italics omitted.) 10 The court also emphasized the presumption that a trial should remain open to the public as discussed in our decision in People v. Pompa-Orti

2005(Boghos, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 506; Armendariz, supra, 24 Ca.4th at pp. 100-101.) 8 Thus, in Boghos, supra, 36 Cal.4th 495 , the Supreme Court declined to extend the holding of Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 , to insurance disputes involving claims for breach of contract or tort (violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

2005(Boghos, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 506; Armendariz, supra, 24 Ca.4th at pp. 100-101.) 8 Thus, in Boghos, supra, 36 Cal.4th 495 , the Supreme Court declined to extend the holding of Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 , to insurance disputes involving claims for breach of contract or tort (violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

2003(N.D.Fla. 1989) 726 F.Supp. 822 ; Hantover, Inc., S.N.C. of Volentieri & C. v. Omet (W.D.Mo. 1988) 688 F.Supp. 1377 .) For example, in Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corporation, supra, 889 F.2d 172 , the court emphasized the principle of statutory construction that a legislative body acts intentionally and purposely by including language in one part of a statute but excluding it from another, (id. at p. 174.) Since article 10(a) uses the word “send” as opposed to the word “service,” these courts reason that “send” does not mean “service of process” and that article 10(a) therefore authorizes the se

2003(N.D.Fla. 1989) 726 F.Supp. 822 ; Hantover, Inc., S.N.C. of Volentieri & C. v. Omet (W.D.Mo. 1988) 688 F.Supp. 1377 .) For example, in Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corporation, supra, 889 F.2d 172 , the court emphasized the principle of statutory construction that a legislative body acts intentionally and purposely by including language in one part of a statute but excluding it from another, (id. at p. 174.) Since article 10(a) uses the word “send” as opposed to the word “service,” these courts reason that “send” does not mean “service of process” and that article 10(a) therefore authorizes the se

2003(N.D.Fla. 1989) 726 F.Supp. 822 ; Hantover, Inc., S.N.C. of Volentieri & C. v. Omet (W.D.Mo. 1988) 688 F.Supp. 1377 .) For example, in Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corporation, supra, 889 F.2d 172 , the court emphasized the principle of statutory construction that a legislative body acts intentionally and purposely by including language in one part of a statute but excluding it from another, (id. at p. 174.) Since article 10(a) uses the word “send” as opposed to the word “service,” these courts reason that “send” does not mean “service of process” and that article 10(a) therefore authorizes the se

2003(N.D.Fla. 1989) 726 F.Supp. 822 ; Hantover, Inc., S.N.C. of Volentieri & C. v. Omet (W.D.Mo. 1988) 688 F.Supp. 1377 .) For example, in Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corporation, supra, 889 F.2d 172 , the court emphasized the principle of statutory construction that a legislative body acts intentionally and purposely by including language in one part of a statute but excluding it from another, (id. at p. 174.) Since article 10(a) uses the word “send” as opposed to the word “service,” these courts reason that “send” does not mean “service of process” and that article 10(a) therefore authorizes the se

2003(Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corporation, supra, 889 F.2d 174 .) Indeed, our own court has followed this view and decided article 10(a) does not allow service of process by mail upon a Japanese defendant.