emphasized rule in Texas

2012In Schlumberger, the court emphasized that the principle recited in earlier cases recognizing fraud vitiates a contract must be weighed against the competing concern that parties should be able to fully and finally resolve their disputes by bargaining for and executing a release barring all further disputes. 959 S.W.2d at 179 .

2012In Schlumberger, the court emphasized that the principle recited in earlier cases recognizing fraud vitiates a contract must be weighed against the competing concern that parties should be able to fully and finally resolve their disputes by 13 bargaining for and executing a release barring all further disputes. 959 S.W.2d at 179 .

2017The Court emphasized the principle that a “watercraft need not be in motion to qualify as a vessel” and observed, “a watercraft [does not] pass in and out of Jones Act coverage depending on whether it was moving at the time of the accident.” Id. at 495–96 (emphasis added and quotations and citations omitted). 27 Our analysis of Gold and the 534 presents no conceivable snapshot dilemma.

2017The Court emphasized the principle that a “watercraft need not be in motion to- qualify as a vessel” and observed, “a watercraft [does not] pass in and out of Jones Act coverage depending on whether it was moving at the time of the accident.” Id. at 495-96, 125 S.Ct. 1118 (emphasis added and quotations and citations omitted).

2015The Court emphasized the rule expressed in precedent that "a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving particular parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different parties." Finley, 109 S.Ct. at 2010 .

1991The Court emphasized the rule expressed in precedent that “a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving particular parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different parties.” Finley, 109 S.Ct. at 2010 .

2015In Snowden, this Court emphasized that the factors earlier set forth in Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim.

2015In Snowden, this Court emphasized that the factors earlier set forth in Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim.

2014We recently recognized, citing Summers and Bailey, that even when police officers do not have reasonable suspicion, or any suspicion, that a particular individual has been involved in criminal activity, they may detain that individual incident to the execution of a proper search warrant as long as the individual is found within or immediately outside a residence at the moment the officers execute the warrant. 7 Shed v. State, No. 02-12-00229-CR, 2013 WL 3064554 , at 6 In Summers, the Court emphasized that the rule from that case does not depend on an ad hoc determination about the “extent of t

2013The Court also stated that in determining whether an individual is in the “immediate vicinity” of a premises to be searched and is therefore subject to the categorical rule of Summers that allows detention, courts should consider “the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was 7 In Summers, the Court emphasized that the rule from that case does not depend on an ad hoc determination about the extent of the intrusion caused by the seizure or the quantum of proof justifying the detention. 452 U.S. at 705 n.19, 101 S. Ct. at 2595 n.19. 8 within the line of sight of his dwelling, the e

2025Id. at 673 .

2018For “unreasonable discomfort or annoyance,” the court emphasized that the inquiry is focused on the effect of the conduct, not the conduct itself, id. at 596–99; that the test is objective, id. at 599–600; and that numerous factors are considered in determining unreasonableness and substantial interference, id. at 600–01.

2018For “unreasonable discomfort or annoyance,” the court emphasized that the inquiry is focused on the effect of the conduct, not the conduct itself, id. at 596–99; that the test is objective, id. at 599–600; and that numerous factors are considered in determining unreasonableness and substantial interference, id. at 600–01.

2017As a matter of plain English, it is hard to imagine how observing the 534’s status throughout the entirety of Gold’s purported Jones Act connection—almost 5 months—can fairly be considered a “snapshot.” And fortunately, there is no need to ponder the term’s meaning; the Supreme Court made explicit that the type of prohibited snapshot is one that focuses on the “instant of injury,” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363 , or the “time of the accident,” Stewart, 543 U.S. 495–96.

2015Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 , 104 S. Ct. 2069 .

2015Machines Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 852 N.W.2d at 887 (McCormack, J. dissenting, referring to McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1991)). 33 U.S. Const., art.

2014Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 715 , 720–21 (Tex. Crim.

2012Id.

2011Id. at 179 .

2005Although the court emphasized that the rule is necessary "to discourage `fishing expeditions' in an effort to impeach a jury verdict," it explained that "such an affidavit is not absolutely necessary but that the failure to secure it might satisfactorily be explained or accounted for, in which event it would be the duty of the trial court to hear evidence in support of the allegations." Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 163 Tex.Crim. 54 , 289 S.W.2d 288, 290 (1956)).

2005Although the court emphasized that the rule is necessary “to discourage ‘fishing expeditions’ in an effort to impeach a jury verdict,” it explained that “such an affidavit is not absolutely necessary but that the failure to secure it might satisfactorily be explained or accounted for, in which event it would be the duty of the trial court to hear evidence in support of the allegations.” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 163 Tex.Crim. 54 , 289 S.W.2d 288, 290 (1956)).

1998The Court emphasized that the inquiry is "a flexible one." Id.

1998The Court emphasized that the inquiry is “a flexible one.” Id.

1996The court emphasized that the claim did not im *639 plicate the plan’s administration of benefits or “affect the relations among the principal ERISA entities (the employer, the plan fiduciaries, the plan, and the beneficiaries).” See also Hardy v. Fisher, 901 F.Supp. 228 (E.D.Tex.1995) (sponsor’s claim alleging that insurance agent violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act not preempted by ERISA); Barnet v. Wainman, 830 F.Supp. 610, 613 (S.D.Fla.1993) (participant’s state law negligence and fraud claims against insurance agent not preempted by ERISA); Ingram v. American Chambers Life In

1996Co., 643 So.2d 575 (Ala.1994) (participant’s state law fraudulent inducement claim against insurance agent not preempted by ERISA).

1993In Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), the court emphasized this requirement, stating: In both situations the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.

1993In Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.App.1984), the court emphasized this requirement, stating: In both situations the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.

1974Neither plaintiff’s petition nor any evidence presented in the record indicates that Charles Cohen is either the president, vice president or the registered agent for Cohen, Inc. The plaintiff’s petition merely refers to Charles Cohen as the “agent for service.” In United States Leasing Corp. v. Centennial Liquor Stores, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas, 1963, n. w. h.), the Court emphasized the requirement of Art. 2.11 that service be on the “registered agent” and held plaintiff’s petition in that case to be insufficient when it referred to the “authorized agent.” Further, there is n

1948This court emphasized this rule of law in Texas Public Utilities Corp. v. Holland, Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 1028 , writ dismissed, but in the cited case the precise question now before us was not presented by that appeal.