letter rule in Pennsylvania

1912Railway Company, 114 Pa. 535 , Mr. Justice Clark, delivering the opinion of the court, says: ‘The shares in a corporation constitute a species of property entirely distinct from the corporate property; a shareholder has no distinct and individual title to the moneys or property of the corporation, nor any actual control over it; the shares represent a right to participate in profits only’”: Mr. Justice Mestrezat, in Monongahela Bridge Company v. Pittsburgh & Birmingham Traction Company, 196 Pa. 25 .

1900Railway Company, 114 Pa. 535 , Mr. Justice Clark, delivering the opinion of the court, says : “ The shares in a corporation constitute a species of property entirely distinct from the corporate property; a shareholder has no distinct and individual title to the moneys or property of the corporation, nor any actual control over it; the shares represent a right to participate in profits only.” It is clear, therefore, that the purchase of the stock of the Monongahela Bridge Company by the city of Pittsburg did not dissolve the corporation or vest in the city the title to its corporate property, o

1912Railway Company, 114 Pa. 535 , Mr. Justice Clark, delivering the opinion of the court, says: ‘The shares in a corporation constitute a species of property entirely distinct from the corporate property; a shareholder has no distinct and individual title to the moneys or property of the corporation, nor any actual control over it; the shares represent a right to participate in profits only’”: Mr. Justice Mestrezat, in Monongahela Bridge Company v. Pittsburgh & Birmingham Traction Company, 196 Pa. 25 .

1906It was pointed out in Bridge Co. v. Traction Co., 196 Pa. 25 , that under the authorities, a corporation is an entity irrespective of, and entirely distinct from, the persons who own its stock. “ It is well settled that all the shares in a corporation may be held by a single person, and yet the corporation continue to exist; and if the charter or by-laws should require certain acts to be done by more than one shareholder, the sole owner may transfer a portion of his shares to other persons, so as to conform to the letter of the rule : ” Morawetz on Private Corporations, sec. 1009.

2020Appellant argues that, pursuant to Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855 (2017), the juror bias shown in the letter provides an exception to the rule that jury deliberation is not subject to impeachment.3 Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 606(b) dictates that “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict.” Pa.R.E. 606(b)(1).

2015It is important to note that we granted this 2 see also Jones v. Trexler, 419 A.2d 24 (Pa.super. 1980) (counsel for plaintiffs failed to file for argument a brief on their petition to open or to strike the judgment until the date of argument, contrary to the court's order and the local rules of court, there was a lack of prosecution, and the lower court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs' petition to open and to strike judgment.) 8 Circulated 11/13/2015 11:47 AM extension at the specific request of defense counsel. r.. ,.; '\ Nevertheless, Wife still failed to file a brief.

1998The present case is readily distinguished from the case of Clinger v. Tilley, 423 Pa.Super. 121 , 620 A.2d 529 (Pa.Super.1993), which appellees cite.

1998The present case is readily distinguished from the case of Clinger v. Tilley, 423 Pa.Super. 121 , 620 A.2d 529 (Pa.Super.1993), which appellees cite.

1994Upon amendment the court may grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in the interests of justice.” The defendant argues that by adding the additional charges of rape by threat of forcible compulsion and I.D.S.I. by threat of forcible compulsion, Judge Smith violated the letter of the rule that prohibits an amendment that charges “additional or different offense[s].” To assist in our resolution of the issue we turn for guidance to Commonwealth v. Grekis, 411 Pa. Super. 513 , 601 A.2d 1284 (1992).

1994Upon amendment the court may grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in the interests of justice.” The defendant argues that by adding the additional charges of rape by threat of forcible compulsion and I.D.S.I. by threat of forcible compulsion, Judge Smith violated the letter of the rule that prohibits an amendment that charges “additional or different offense[s].” To assist in our resolution of the issue we turn for guidance to Commonwealth v. Grekis, 411 Pa. Super. 513 , 601 A.2d 1284 (1992).

1988The appeal period does not commence to run until issuance of notice of the decision or report of the board.” Id. at 511-3, 275 A.2d at 903-4 .

1985The prosecution also states that the "letter, as edited, was properly admitted." Id.

1983In Com. v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346 (1977) we upheld the principle that the historic power to “nol pros” belongs exclusively to the office of the prosecutor (except for dismissals which vindicate personal rights, such as protection against double jeopardy), and cannot even be ordered by the court without the permission of the prosecutor.

1983In Com. v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346 (1977) we upheld the principle that the historic power to “nol pros” belongs exclusively to the office of the prosecutor (except for dismissals which vindicate personal rights, such as protection against double jeopardy), and cannot even be ordered by the court without the permission of the prosecutor.

1979A.P. 311(b).” (Letter brief for Commonwealth, Page 1.) Pa.R.A.P. 311(b) [now Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(5)] stated: “An appeal may be taken from ... an order in a criminal proceeding awarding a new trial where the defendant claims that the proper disposition of the motion would be an absolute discharge." The comments to the rule cite Commonwealth v. Gabor, 209 Pa. 201 , 58 A. 278 (1904) as authority for the rule.

1979A.P. 311(b).” (Letter brief for Commonwealth, Page 1.) Pa.R.A.P. 311(b) [now Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(5)] stated: “An appeal may be taken from ... an order in a criminal proceeding awarding a new trial where the defendant claims that the proper disposition of the motion would be an absolute discharge." The comments to the rule cite Commonwealth v. Gabor, 209 Pa. 201 , 58 A. 278 (1904) as authority for the rule.

1970The Court's opinion recognizes that existing circumstances may render valid a search which is not strictly contemporaneous with the arrest, Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512 , 246 A. 2d 325 (1968), but ignores the extenuating circumstances which are present here.

1970The Court's opinion recognizes that existing circumstances may render valid a search which is not strictly contemporaneous with the arrest, Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512 , 246 A. 2d 325 (1968), but ignores the extenuating circumstances which are present here.

1916From Deal v. Erie Coal Company, 248 Pa. 48 , we quote the following excerpts from the opinion of Mr. Justice Potter : “In the third division, into which the assignments were grouped, the question is raised as to the power of the court below under the circumstances to appoint a master to hold the election.

1910The power of attorney authorizing Schalcher & Co., as the agents of Keesey, to sell the land, taken in connection with the letter of instruction to his agents authorizing a payment of the proceeds did not constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and created no trust in favor of creditors as to the fund: Beans v. Bullitt, 57 Pa. 221 ; Burger v. Burger, 135 Pa. 499 ; Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. 263 ; Painter’s Est., 42 Pa. 156 .

1910The power of attorney authorizing Schalcher & Co., as the agents of Keesey, to sell the land, taken in connection with the letter of instruction to his agents authorizing a payment of the proceeds did not constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and created no trust in favor of creditors as to the fund: Beans v. Bullitt, 57 Pa. 221 ; Burger v. Burger, 135 Pa. 499 ; Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. 263 ; Painter’s Est., 42 Pa. 156 .

1910The power of attorney authorizing Schalcher & Co., as the agents of Keesey, to sell the land, taken in connection with the letter of instruction to his agents authorizing a payment of the proceeds did not constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and created no trust in favor of creditors as to the fund: Beans v. Bullitt, 57 Pa. 221 ; Burger v. Burger, 135 Pa. 499 ; Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. 263 ; Painter’s Est., 42 Pa. 156 .

1910The power of attorney authorizing Schalcher & Co., as the agents of Keesey, to sell the land, taken in connection with the letter of instruction to his agents authorizing a payment of the proceeds did not constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and created no trust in favor of creditors as to the fund: Beans v. Bullitt, 57 Pa. 221 ; Burger v. Burger, 135 Pa. 499 ; Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. 263 ; Painter’s Est., 42 Pa. 156 .

1910The power of attorney authorizing Schalcher & Co., as the agents of Keesey, to sell the land, taken in connection with the letter of instruction to his agents authorizing a payment of the proceeds did not constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and created no trust in favor of creditors as to the fund: Beans v. Bullitt, 57 Pa. 221 ; Burger v. Burger, 135 Pa. 499 ; Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. 263 ; Painter’s Est., 42 Pa. 156 .

1910The power of attorney authorizing Schalcher & Co., as the agents of Keesey, to sell the land, taken in connection with the letter of instruction to his agents authorizing a payment of the proceeds did not constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and created no trust in favor of creditors as to the fund: Beans v. Bullitt, 57 Pa. 221 ; Burger v. Burger, 135 Pa. 499 ; Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. 263 ; Painter’s Est., 42 Pa. 156 .

1906In Rhawn v. Edge Hill Furnace Co., 201 Pa. 637 (644), it was again held that “ the fact that one person owns all of the stock does not make him and the corporation one and the same person,” and in Kendall v. Klapperthal Co., 202 Pa. 596 , Judge Endlich said in an opinion approved by this court (p. 607) : “ A corporation does not lose its legally distinct and separate personality by reason of the ownership of the bulk or the whole of its stock by another: ” citing Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Traction Co., 196 Pa. 25 . “ The judicial decisions seem to be unanimous to the effect that the mere fact

1906In Rhawn v. Edge Hill Furnace Co., 201 Pa. 637 (644), it was again held that “ the fact that one person owns all of the stock does not make him and the corporation one and the same person,” and in Kendall v. Klapperthal Co., 202 Pa. 596 , Judge Endlich said in an opinion approved by this court (p. 607) : “ A corporation does not lose its legally distinct and separate personality by reason of the ownership of the bulk or the whole of its stock by another: ” citing Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Traction Co., 196 Pa. 25 . “ The judicial decisions seem to be unanimous to the effect that the mere fact

1896“It is the duty of a judge,” said Mr. Justice Williams, “to instruct the jury upon every question of law involved in a ease trying; but it is not his duty to answer points that raise questions in thesi merely, or that rest upon the assumption of a fact of which there is no such evidence as to justify the jury in finding it: ” Heffner v. Chambers, 121 Pa. 84 .