letter rule in Utah

2023In the dissent’s view, the supreme court drew a distinction between a “general rule that service of process must comply with the letter of rule (continued…) 20210494-CA 11 2023 UT App 88 Griffin v. Snow Christensen ¶32 This is the legal backdrop for our assessment of the question before us in this appeal: whether Chapman qualified as a managing or general agent of Snow Christensen under rule 4(d)(1)(E)” and an “exception[] to this general rule” under which service is proper if the employee plays a sufficiently large role in the corporation.

2023And on that basis, it “reversed with directions to quash the service of summons and set aside the judgment.” Id. ¶41 In the second case, In re Schwenke, 2004 UT 17 , 89 P.3d 117 , our supreme court identified the two competing approaches to determining whether service on a receptionist was effective under rule 4(d)(1)(E). 6 The first approach adheres to the general rule that service of process must comply with the letter of rule 4(d)(1)(E).

2023And on that basis, it “reversed with directions to quash the service of summons and set aside the judgment.” Id. ¶41 In the second case, In re Schwenke, 2004 UT 17 , 89 P.3d 117 , our supreme court identified the two competing approaches to determining whether service on a receptionist was effective under rule 4(d)(1)(E). 6 The first approach adheres to the general rule that service of process must comply with the letter of rule 4(d)(1)(E).

2023And on that basis, it “reversed with directions to quash the service of summons and set aside the judgment.” Id. ¶41 In the second case, In re Schwenke, 2004 UT 17 , 89 P.3d 117 , our supreme court identified the two competing approaches to determining whether service on a receptionist was effective under rule 4(d)(1)(E). 6 The first approach adheres to the general rule that service of process must comply with the letter of rule 4(d)(1)(E).

1988Co., supra. On the other hand, it was held in Hogenson v. Service Armament Co., 77 Wash.2d 209 , 461 P.2d 311 (1969), that a statement by a plaintiffs attorney in a letter of claim to the defendant as to how the plaintiffs injury occurred which was inconsistent with the plaintiffs later theory presented at trial was inadmissible.

1988Co., supra. On the other hand, it was held in Hogenson v. Service Armament Co., 77 Wash.2d 209 , 461 P.2d 311 (1969), that a statement by a plaintiffs attorney in a letter of claim to the defendant as to how the plaintiffs injury occurred which was inconsistent with the plaintiffs later theory presented at trial was inadmissible.

1939The statement is correct that under the law plaintiff “has the right to the use of this strip without paying for it.” James v. Anderson, 39 N. M. 535, 51 P. 2d 601 ; McWhorter v. McWhorter, 99 Cal. App. 293 , 278 P. 454 ; Tolen v. Tolen, supra. Note the letter does not claim this right is exclusive even though the letter conceded defendant the exclusive use of the south sixty-six feet.

1939The statement is correct that under the law plaintiff “has the right to the use of this strip without paying for it.” James v. Anderson, 39 N. M. 535, 51 P. 2d 601 ; McWhorter v. McWhorter, 99 Cal. App. 293 , 278 P. 454 ; Tolen v. Tolen, supra. Note the letter does not claim this right is exclusive even though the letter conceded defendant the exclusive use of the south sixty-six feet.

1939The statement is correct that under the law plaintiff “has the right to the use of this strip without paying for it.” James v. Anderson, 39 N. M. 535, 51 P. 2d 601 ; McWhorter v. McWhorter, 99 Cal. App. 293 , 278 P. 454 ; Tolen v. Tolen, supra. Note the letter does not claim this right is exclusive even though the letter conceded defendant the exclusive use of the south sixty-six feet.

1939The statement is correct that under the law plaintiff “has the right to the use of this strip without paying for it.” James v. Anderson, 39 N. M. 535, 51 P. 2d 601 ; McWhorter v. McWhorter, 99 Cal. App. 293 , 278 P. 454 ; Tolen v. Tolen, supra. Note the letter does not claim this right is exclusive even though the letter conceded defendant the exclusive use of the south sixty-six feet.

1896In Hunn v. Railway Co., 78 Mich. 513 , Mr. Justice Champlin, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “We think it was competent to show what was usually and habitually done in the running of trains, because, if the company permitted or had so framed the rules as to require the employé to exercise some discretion in the matter of strict obedience, it ought not to be permitted to hold its employés to the very letter of the rule, in order to shield the company from liability for what it had tacitly permitted.” So in Railway Co. v. Nichels, 1 C.

1896In Hunn v. Railway Co., 78 Mich. 513 , Mr. Justice Champlin, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “We think it was competent to show what was usually and habitually done in the running of trains, because, if the company permitted or had so framed the rules as to require the employé to exercise some discretion in the matter of strict obedience, it ought not to be permitted to hold its employés to the very letter of the rule, in order to shield the company from liability for what it had tacitly permitted.” So in Railway Co. v. Nichels, 1 C.