refused instruction in Florida

1926Easterlin v. State, 43 Fla. 565 , 31 So. 350 ." See also Robertson v. State, 64 Fla. 437 , 60 So. 118 .

1906Easterling v. State, 43 Fla. 565 .

2003Crocker, 778 So.2d at 988 -89 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). [5] Nevertheless, the court refused to rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs' inability to prove bad faith, maliciousness, or wanton and willful conduct on the officials' part precluded them from proving a deliberate deprivation of rights for purposes of their § 1983 claim.

2003Crocker, 778 So.2d at 989 .

2003Crocker, 778 So.2d at 988 -89 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). [5] Nevertheless, the court refused to rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs' inability to prove bad faith, maliciousness, or wanton and willful conduct on the officials' part precluded them from proving a deliberate deprivation of rights for purposes of their § 1983 claim.

2003Crocker, 778 So.2d at 988 -89 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). [5] Nevertheless, the court refused to rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs' inability to prove bad faith, maliciousness, or wanton and willful conduct on the officials' part precluded them from proving a deliberate deprivation of rights for purposes of their § 1983 claim.

2001As the First District held, however, “[although the validity of a breathalyzer test may be essential to its admissibility in a criminal proceeding, the hypothetical validity of a refused test is not relevant to review the administrative suspension of a driver’s license.” Riggen, 654 So.2d at 221-22 .

1998LeRetilley v. Harris, 354 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

1995The first part of this claim — that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and due *370 process when the trial court refused defense counsel's request that co-counsel be appointed — is without merit based on our recent decision in Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1994).

1995In that case, we explained that "[a]ppointment of multiple counsel to represent an indigent defendant is within the discretion of the trial court judge and is based on a determination of the complexity of a given case and the attorney's effectiveness therein." Id. at 737 .

1995Although the validity of a breathalyzer test may be essential to its admissibility in a criminal proceeding, the hypothetical *222 validity of a refused test is not relevant to review the administrative suspension of a driver's license. § 322.2615(7)(b)1. -4., Fla. Stat. (1993); see Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Berry, 619 So.2d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Conahan v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 619 So.2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

1995Although the validity of a breathalyzer test may be essential to its admissibility in a criminal proceeding, the hypothetical *222 validity of a refused test is not relevant to review the administrative suspension of a driver's license. § 322.2615(7)(b)1. -4., Fla. Stat. (1993); see Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Berry, 619 So.2d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Conahan v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 619 So.2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

1987In Martin v. Pinellas County, 483 So.2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), the court was asked to apply the Speedy Trial Rule to an indirect criminal contempt matter, but it held that no time periods of the Speedy Trial Rule had been violated. 4 Similarly, in Mann v. State, 476 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), the court refused to rule whether or not the Speedy Trial Rule should be applied to indirect criminal contempt cases.

1987In Martin v. Pinellas County, 483 So.2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), the court was asked to apply the Speedy Trial Rule to an indirect criminal contempt matter, but it held that no time periods of the Speedy Trial Rule had been violated. 4 Similarly, in Mann v. State, 476 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), the court refused to rule whether or not the Speedy Trial Rule should be applied to indirect criminal contempt cases.

1985Prior to 1983, Section 794.022, Florida Statutes, entitled "Rules of Evidence," provided as follows: (1) The testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under s. 794.011 [sexual battery]; however, the court may instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence. [emphasis added] The underscored language was omitted on amendment by Chapter 83-258, Laws of Florida (1983), effective June 24, 1983. [12] Cf. Howell v. State, 136 So. 456 (Fla. 1931), set aside on other grounds, 102 Fla. 612 , 139 So. 187 (1931), an incest case wherein the trial court refuse

1985Prior to 1983, Section 794.022, Florida Statutes, entitled "Rules of Evidence," provided as follows: (1) The testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under s. 794.011 [sexual battery]; however, the court may instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence. [emphasis added] The underscored language was omitted on amendment by Chapter 83-258, Laws of Florida (1983), effective June 24, 1983. [12] Cf. Howell v. State, 136 So. 456 (Fla. 1931), set aside on other grounds, 102 Fla. 612 , 139 So. 187 (1931), an incest case wherein the trial court refuse

1985Prior to 1983, Section 794.022, Florida Statutes, entitled "Rules of Evidence," provided as follows: (1) The testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under s. 794.011 [sexual battery]; however, the court may instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence. [emphasis added] The underscored language was omitted on amendment by Chapter 83-258, Laws of Florida (1983), effective June 24, 1983. [12] Cf. Howell v. State, 136 So. 456 (Fla. 1931), set aside on other grounds, 102 Fla. 612 , 139 So. 187 (1931), an incest case wherein the trial court refuse

1981While Bailey, Kelly, Bell and Bassett, supra, contain language condemning “the failure to state distinctly the grounds for objection,” this language is obvious dicta, since the decisions are grounded on the total failure to make a timely objection. .The Fourth District recently held in Williams v. State, 395 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), that not even objection to a refused instruction is required when the basis for the request has been once stated: “If a jury instruction is requested and the basis for the request verbalized to the court and made a part of the record, failure to object to re

1981While Bailey, Kelly, Bell and Bassett, supra, contain language condemning “the failure to state distinctly the grounds for objection,” this language is obvious dicta, since the decisions are grounded on the total failure to make a timely objection. .The Fourth District recently held in Williams v. State, 395 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), that not even objection to a refused instruction is required when the basis for the request has been once stated: “If a jury instruction is requested and the basis for the request verbalized to the court and made a part of the record, failure to object to re

1978Appellant argues that this was error citing Moore v. State, 341 So.2d 814 (Fla.2d DCA 1977).

1974The instruction *342 submitted was only a portion of the instruction approved by the Supreme Court in Harrison v. State, 149 Fla. 365 , 5 So.2d 703 (1942).

1974The instruction *342 submitted was only a portion of the instruction approved by the Supreme Court in Harrison v. State, 149 Fla. 365 , 5 So.2d 703 (1942).

1961Co., 1955, 5 Ill.2d 135 , 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 , 50 A.L.R.2d 661 .

1961Co., 1955, 5 Ill.2d 135 , 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 , 50 A.L.R.2d 661 .

1926Easterlin v. State, 43 Fla. 565 , 31 So. 350 ." See also Robertson v. State, 64 Fla. 437 , 60 So. 118 .

1899The authorities are in conflict as to whether trial judges have the power thus to limit the time within which they will entertain requests for instructions, but we are of the opinion that the greater weight of reason is with those cases that hold that it is the right of either party to request instructions on the law of the case at any time up to the retirement of the jury to consider of their verdict, and even after the jury have retired, in cases where they, before verdict, come into court for new instructions from the court, if the new instructions then given suggest other proper instructio

1893State, 9 Fla., 516 . in which it was held that different language did not show that they were charged on the law of the case; and though the charge may have been oral, we do not wish to be understood as admitting that it is not to be presumed that that charge covered the refused instruction.