refused rule in Massachusetts

2000In Wolff, supra, the Court refused to rule that the disciplinary proceedings were not sufficiently impartial because there was no record evidence of arbitrary decision making violative of due process.

2000Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571 .

1986On November 9, 1982, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the board’s motion, citing our decision in Flynn v. Cambridge, supra, and remanded the case to the board for further proceedings. 4 On November 19, 1982, the board filed a motion for clarification, but the court refused to rule on that motion.

1972While it is true that recovery has been denied in cases involving glass doors, Rosenberg v. Hartman, 313 Mass. 54 .

1888In giving the opinion, after pointing out that driving at a rate of speed forbidden by the ordinance might have occurred without fault of the driver, and might have been justified by circumstances authorizing the jury to find that there was no negligence, Mr. Justice Colt said, “ It is not true that, if an unlawful rate of speed contributed to the injury, that alone would give the plaintiff a right to recover, if he was without fault.” There are intimations, without adjudication, to the same effect, in Wright v. Malden & Melrose Railroad, 4 Allen, 283 , and in Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass.

1888The plaintiff relies with great confidence upon the case of Hanlon v. South Boston Horse Railroad, 129 Mass. 310 , in which the presiding judge at the trial refused to rule, that, “ if the defendant was driving at a rate of speed prohibited by the ordinance of the city of Boston, and this speed contributed to the injury, this fact would itself constitute negligence on the part of the defendant, and would entitle the plaintiff to recover if he was in the exercise of due care,” and his refusal was held right by this court.