refused instruction in Arizona

1970This court has held in State v. Michael, 103 Ariz. 46, 51 , 436 P.2d 595, 600 , that “Where requested instructions are adequately covered by other instructions of the court * * * it is not error to refuse them.” In the instant case we feel that the matters dealt with in the refused instruction No. 3 were adequately covered by the instructions given and hence no error resulted from the refusal to give it.

1970This court has held in State v. Michael, 103 Ariz. 46, 51 , 436 P.2d 595, 600 , that “Where requested instructions are adequately covered by other instructions of the court * * * it is not error to refuse them.” In the instant case we feel that the matters dealt with in the refused instruction No. 3 were adequately covered by the instructions given and hence no error resulted from the refusal to give it.

2004Id. at 369, ¶ 4 , 10 P.3d at 627 . ¶ 9 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the City.

2000The trial court refused this instruction based upon State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437 , 924 P.2d 441 (1996), where we abandoned the “acquittal first” procedure for lesser-included offenses in favor of the “reasonable efforts” procedure.

2000The trial court refused this instruction based upon State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437 , 924 P.2d 441 (1996), where we abandoned the “acquittal first” procedure for lesser-included offenses in favor of the “reasonable efforts” procedure.

1995The trial court refused the instruction, relying on State v. Engram, 171 Ariz. 363 , 831 P.2d 362 (App.1991), which stated: “In State v. McDonald, 70 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 54, 1990 WL 139445 (Ct.App.

1995The trial court refused the instruction, relying on State v. Engram, 171 Ariz. 363 , 831 P.2d 362 (App.1991), which stated: “In State v. McDonald, 70 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 54, 1990 WL 139445 (Ct.App.

1984The court refused the instruction, and that refusal was approved by the court of appeals, 142 Ariz. at 10 , 688 P.2d at 656 , on the authority of Hiser v. Randolph, supra. Hiser held that proof of the loss of a chance of recovery — the “increase in the risk of harm” — established only a possibility of causation.

1984The court refused the instruction, and that refusal was approved by the court of appeals, 142 Ariz. at 10 , 688 P.2d at 656 , on the authority of Hiser v. Randolph, supra. Hiser held that proof of the loss of a chance of recovery — the “increase in the risk of harm” — established only a possibility of causation.

1984In this jurisdiction the tortious act of malpractice must be shown to have been the probable and not merely the possible cause of death or other untoward results. 126 Ariz. at 612 , 617 P.2d at 778 .

1984In this jurisdiction the tortious act of malpractice must be shown to have been the probable and not merely the possible cause of death or other untoward results. 126 Ariz. at 612 , 617 P.2d at 778 .

1984State v. Britson, 130 Ariz. 380 , 636 P.2d 628 (1981).

1984State v. Britson, 130 Ariz. 380 , 636 P.2d 628 (1981).

1984The court of appeals stated in dicta that: [I]t is highly prejudicial and improper to read statutes to the jury which have been expressly held not applicable by the trial court____ To disregard the trial court’s ruling and read to the jury the stricken statute cannot be condoned. 11 Ariz.App. at 551 , 466 P.2d at 770 .

1984The court of appeals stated in dicta that: [I]t is highly prejudicial and improper to read statutes to the jury which have been expressly held not applicable by the trial court____ To disregard the trial court’s ruling and read to the jury the stricken statute cannot be condoned. 11 Ariz.App. at 551 , 466 P.2d at 770 .

1978A person who molests a child under the age of fifteen years by fondling, playing with, or touching the private parts of such child, or who causes a child under the age of fifteen years to fondle, play with, or touch the private parts of such person, is guilty of the crime of molestation of a child.” The court refused an instruction offered by appellant which contained as an additional element: “[wjhere said fondling, playing or touching is caused by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intentions with respect to children.” Appellant, in objecting to the refusal of the instruction and on ap

1978A person who molests a child under the age of fifteen years by fondling, playing with, or touching the private parts of such child, or who causes a child under the age of fifteen years to fondle, play with, or touch the private parts of such person, is guilty of the crime of molestation of a child.” The court refused an instruction offered by appellant which contained as an additional element: “[wjhere said fondling, playing or touching is caused by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intentions with respect to children.” Appellant, in objecting to the refusal of the instruction and on ap

1978A person who molests a child under the age of fifteen years by fondling, playing with, or touching the private parts of such child, or who causes a child under the age of fifteen years to fondle, play with, or touch the private parts of such person, is guilty of the crime of molestation of a child.” The court refused an instruction offered by appellant which contained as an additional element: “[wjhere said fondling, playing or touching is caused by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intentions with respect to children.” Appellant, in objecting to the refusal of the instruction and on ap

1978A person who molests a child under the age of fifteen years by fondling, playing with, or touching the private parts of such child, or who causes a child under the age of fifteen years to fondle, play with, or touch the private parts of such person, is guilty of the crime of molestation of a child.” The court refused an instruction offered by appellant which contained as an additional element: “[wjhere said fondling, playing or touching is caused by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intentions with respect to children.” Appellant, in objecting to the refusal of the instruction and on ap

1978In both Berry and Stinson , attacks on the statute for vagueness were rejected with a reference to the following language from Trenary , quoting in turn from People v. Pallares, 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895 , 246 P.2d 173 (1952): “ ‘When the words annoy or molest are used in reference to offenses against children, there is a connotation of abnormal sexual motivation on the part of the offender.

1978In both Berry and Stinson , attacks on the statute for vagueness were rejected with a reference to the following language from Trenary , quoting in turn from People v. Pallares, 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895 , 246 P.2d 173 (1952): “ ‘When the words annoy or molest are used in reference to offenses against children, there is a connotation of abnormal sexual motivation on the part of the offender.

1978A person who molests a child under the age of fifteen years by fondling, playing with, or touching the private parts of such child, or who causes a child under the age of fifteen years to fondle, play with, or touch the private parts of such person, is guilty of the crime of molestation of a child.” The court refused an instruction offered by appellant which contained as an additional element: “[wjhere said fondling, playing or touching is caused by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intentions with respect to children.” Appellant, in objecting to the refusal of the instruction and on ap

1978A person who molests a child under the age of fifteen years by fondling, playing with, or touching the private parts of such child, or who causes a child under the age of fifteen years to fondle, play with, or touch the private parts of such person, is guilty of the crime of molestation of a child.” The court refused an instruction offered by appellant which contained as an additional element: “[wjhere said fondling, playing or touching is caused by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intentions with respect to children.” Appellant, in objecting to the refusal of the instruction and on ap

1975State v. Carrillo, 108 Ariz. 524 , 502 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Riley, 106 Ariz. 318 , 475 P.2d 932 (1970); State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380 , 453 P. 2d 951 (1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 965 , 90 S.Ct. 1000 , 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970).

1975State v. Carrillo, 108 Ariz. 524 , 502 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Riley, 106 Ariz. 318 , 475 P.2d 932 (1970); State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380 , 453 P. 2d 951 (1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 965 , 90 S.Ct. 1000 , 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970).

1975State v. Carrillo, 108 Ariz. 524 , 502 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Riley, 106 Ariz. 318 , 475 P.2d 932 (1970); State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380 , 453 P. 2d 951 (1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 965 , 90 S.Ct. 1000 , 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970).

1975State v. Carrillo, 108 Ariz. 524 , 502 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Riley, 106 Ariz. 318 , 475 P.2d 932 (1970); State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380 , 453 P. 2d 951 (1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 965 , 90 S.Ct. 1000 , 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970).

1975State v. Carrillo, 108 Ariz. 524 , 502 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Riley, 106 Ariz. 318 , 475 P.2d 932 (1970); State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380 , 453 P. 2d 951 (1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 965 , 90 S.Ct. 1000 , 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970).

1975State v. Carrillo, 108 Ariz. 524 , 502 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Riley, 106 Ariz. 318 , 475 P.2d 932 (1970); State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380 , 453 P. 2d 951 (1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 965 , 90 S.Ct. 1000 , 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970).

1975State v. Carrillo, 108 Ariz. 524 , 502 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Riley, 106 Ariz. 318 , 475 P.2d 932 (1970); State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380 , 453 P. 2d 951 (1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 965 , 90 S.Ct. 1000 , 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970).

1968Co., 64 Ariz. 116, 123 , 166 P.2d 825 (1946).

1968Co., 64 Ariz. 116, 123 , 166 P.2d 825 (1946).

1912In the absence of the facts shown in the evidence, it will be presumed that the law as laid down in the instructions was applicable thereto, and that the law as stated in a refused instruction was inapplicable or unnecessary. 3 Cyc. 303-305; Cheda v. Skinner, 6 Ariz. 196 , 57 Pac. 64 .

1912In the absence of the facts shown in the evidence, it will be presumed that the law as laid down in the instructions was applicable thereto, and that the law as stated in a refused instruction was inapplicable or unnecessary. 3 Cyc. 303-305; Cheda v. Skinner, 6 Ariz. 196 , 57 Pac. 64 .

1912In Stokes v. Territory, ante, p. 242, 127 Pac. 742 , decided October 9, 1912, this court criticised an instruction defining murder of the second degree in the words of o’ur statute.