search violation in Massachusetts

2012Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.” We also considered in Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 Mass. 156, 159 (1988) (Madera), whether the search of the defendant’s gym bag was proscribed by G.

1992Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.” See Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 Mass. 156, 159-160 (1988).

1992While the judge apparently denied the defendant’s motion on the ground presented by the prosecutor that the search was valid pursuant to the Douglas police department’s vehicle inventory search policy, the Commonwealth, in its brief, concedes that the policy is invalid under Commonwealth v. Bishop, 402 Mass. 449, 451 (1988).

1989Commonwealth v. Bishop, 402 Mass. 449 (1988).

2018See generally United States v. Henry , 827 F.3d 16 , 27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 374 , 196 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016), and cases cited.

2018See generally United States v. Henry , 827 F.3d 16 , 27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 374 , 196 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016), and cases cited.

2018See generally United States v. Henry , 827 F.3d 16 , 27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 374 , 196 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016), and cases cited.

2017Cf. Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496 , 502 & n.11 (2016) (noting that “what might have been an appropriate limitation [on searches] in the physical world becomes a limitation without consequence in the virtual one”); id. at 505 (Lenk, J., dissenting) (transposing protections of art. 14 and Fourth Amendment to digital contexts “is an ongoing and challenging task”); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. 790, 797 (2012) (noting that developments in cellular telephone technology “present novel and important questions about the relationship between the modern doctrine of search *424 incident to a

2017Cf. Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496 , 502 & n.11 (2016) (noting that “what might have been an appropriate limitation [on searches] in the physical world becomes a limitation without consequence in the virtual one”); id. at 505 (Lenk, J., dissenting) (transposing protections of art. 14 and Fourth Amendment to digital contexts “is an ongoing and challenging task”); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. 790, 797 (2012) (noting that developments in cellular telephone technology “present novel and important questions about the relationship between the modern doctrine of search *424 incident to a

2017Cf. Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496 , 502 & n.11 (2016) (noting that “what might have been an appropriate limitation [on searches] in the physical world becomes a limitation without consequence in the virtual one”); id. at 505 (Lenk, J., dissenting) (transposing protections of art. 14 and Fourth Amendment to digital contexts “is an ongoing and challenging task”); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. 790, 797 (2012) (noting that developments in cellular telephone technology “present novel and important questions about the relationship between the modern doctrine of search *424 incident to a

2015See Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2010) (DNA profile provides genetic fingerprint to uniquely identify individual but does not provide additional information about that person); Raynor, 440 Md. at 96 (“DNA testing of the [thirteen] identifying . . . loci within genetic material, not obtained by means of a physical intrusion into the person’s body, is no more a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment [of the United States Constitution], than is the testing of fingerprints”).

2015See Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2010) (DNA profile provides genetic fingerprint to uniquely identify individual but does not provide additional information about that person); Raynor, 440 Md. at 96 (“DNA testing of the [thirteen] identifying . . . loci within genetic material, not obtained by means of a physical intrusion into the person’s body, is no more a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment [of the United States Constitution], than is the testing of fingerprints”).

2013“In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress,1 [w]e accept the judge’s subsidiary findings absent clear error but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law.’ ” Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 148 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 619 (2008).

2013“In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress,1 [w]e accept the judge’s subsidiary findings absent clear error but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law.’ ” Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 148 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 619 (2008).

2005Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) We just as soundly rejected the proposition that a visual body cavity search requires the heightened probable cause standard described in Rodriques v. Furtado, 410 Mass. 878, 888 (1991), as “a strong showing of particularized need supported by a high degree of probable cause” needed to justify a manual body cavity search.

2005See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 403, 408 (1999).

2003This paragraph “authorizes a search to be made incident to an arrest only (1) for the purpose of seizing evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made in order to prevent its destruction or concealment or (2) for the purpose of removing any weapon the person arrested might use to resist arrest or to escape.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 389 Mass. 115, 118 (1983).

2002Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.” See Commonwealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455, 459 (1985).

2001Commonwealth v. Beasley, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 64 (1982).

2000Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.” See Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997) (“An appellate court is free to affirm a ruling on grounds different from those relied on by the motion judge if the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is supported by the record and the findings”).

1999See Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 686-687 (1995).

1991Indeed, the Commonwealth acknowledges in its brief: “At the time they entered the defendant’s business, the police were admittedly looking for a particular vehicle which they suspected was stolen and believed was located on the premises.” What the Commonwealth contends, relying on Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 393 (1981), is that in conducting the search, the police were acting in aid of one of the regulatory purposes of G.

1989Commonwealth v. Miller, 366 Mass. 387, 389 (1974).

1983Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.” 4 The dissent cited Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), where the Court suggested limitations on the scope of searches made incident to a lawful arrest.