search violation in Oregon

2024As that body of law further reflects, warrantless entries and searches of areas in which a defendant has a privacy interest are per se unreasonable unless they fall “within one of the few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237-38 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (citing Katz Cite as 336 Or App 830 (2024) 839 v. United States, 389 US 347, 357 , 88 S Ct 507 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2024As that body of law further reflects, warrantless entries and searches of areas in which a defendant has a privacy interest are per se unreasonable unless they fall “within one of the few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237-38 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (citing Katz Cite as 336 Or App 830 (2024) 839 v. United States, 389 US 347, 357 , 88 S Ct 507 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2024As that body of law further reflects, warrantless entries and searches of areas in which a defendant has a privacy interest are per se unreasonable unless they fall “within one of the few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237-38 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (citing Katz Cite as 336 Or App 830 (2024) 839 v. United States, 389 US 347, 357 , 88 S Ct 507 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2024As that body of law further reflects, warrantless entries and searches of areas in which a defendant has a privacy interest are per se unreasonable unless they fall “within one of the few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237-38 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (citing Katz Cite as 336 Or App 830 (2024) 839 v. United States, 389 US 347, 357 , 88 S Ct 507 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2024As that body of law further reflects, warrantless entries and searches of areas in which a defendant has a privacy interest are per se unreasonable unless they fall “within one of the few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237-38 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (citing Katz Cite as 336 Or App 830 (2024) 839 v. United States, 389 US 347, 357 , 88 S Ct 507 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2024As that body of law further reflects, warrantless entries and searches of areas in which a defendant has a privacy interest are per se unreasonable unless they fall “within one of the few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237-38 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (citing Katz Cite as 336 Or App 830 (2024) 839 v. United States, 389 US 347, 357 , 88 S Ct 507 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2010City of Eugene v. Silva, 198 Or App 101, 107 , 108 P3d 23 (2005); State v. Somfleth, 168 Or App 414, 424 , 8 P3d 221 (2000).

2010City of Eugene v. Silva, 198 Or App 101, 107 , 108 P3d 23 (2005); State v. Somfleth, 168 Or App 414, 424 , 8 P3d 221 (2000).

2010City of Eugene v. Silva, 198 Or App 101, 107 , 108 P3d 23 (2005); State v. Somfleth, 168 Or App 414, 424 , 8 P3d 221 (2000).

2010City of Eugene v. Silva, 198 Or App 101, 107 , 108 P3d 23 (2005); State v. Somfleth, 168 Or App 414, 424 , 8 P3d 221 (2000).

2015See State v. Combest, 271 Or App 38 , 350 P3d 222 (2015); State v. Pugh, 255 Or App 357 , 297 P3d 27 , rev den, 353 Or 748 (2013). 3 A detailed description of the facts is unnecessary.

2015See State v. Combest, 271 Or App 38 , 350 P3d 222 (2015); State v. Pugh, 255 Or App 357 , 297 P3d 27 , rev den, 353 Or 748 (2013). 3 A detailed description of the facts is unnecessary.

1998The state counters that the officer’s inquiry was permissible under ORS 810.410(3)(b) and for purposes of officer safety. 1 ORS 810.410(3)(b) provides that a police officer “[m]ay stop and detain a person for a traffic infraction for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction, identification and issuance of citation.” According to the state, “[ijnquiries made to ensure that the investigation proceeds safely are reasonably related to the process of issuing a traffic citation.” In State v. Senn, 145 Or App 538, 542-43 , 930 P2d 874 (1996), we held that an officer’

1998The state counters that the officer’s inquiry was permissible under ORS 810.410(3)(b) and for purposes of officer safety. 1 ORS 810.410(3)(b) provides that a police officer “[m]ay stop and detain a person for a traffic infraction for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction, identification and issuance of citation.” According to the state, “[ijnquiries made to ensure that the investigation proceeds safely are reasonably related to the process of issuing a traffic citation.” In State v. Senn, 145 Or App 538, 542-43 , 930 P2d 874 (1996), we held that an officer’

1993State v. Newman, supra, 292 Or at 222 .

1973On p 146 thereof we said: “Cooper [Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 , 87 S Ct 788 , 17 L Ed 2d 730 (1967)] has been construed by the Oregon Supreme Court in McCoy [State v. McCoy, 249 Or 160 , 437 P2d 734 (1968)] as holding that when a vehicle has been seized as the instrumentality of a crime it may thereafter be lawfully examined (searched) for further evidence of that crime without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant * * Accordingly, in Keith we approved a warrantless search of a vehicle, which was an instrumentality of a crime, for evidence of the crime where there was an arrest of t

1973On p 146 thereof we said: “Cooper [Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 , 87 S Ct 788 , 17 L Ed 2d 730 (1967)] has been construed by the Oregon Supreme Court in McCoy [State v. McCoy, 249 Or 160 , 437 P2d 734 (1968)] as holding that when a vehicle has been seized as the instrumentality of a crime it may thereafter be lawfully examined (searched) for further evidence of that crime without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant * * Accordingly, in Keith we approved a warrantless search of a vehicle, which was an instrumentality of a crime, for evidence of the crime where there was an arrest of t

1973The search at bar may be justified, however, on the basis of State v. Keith, 2 Or App 133, 465 P2d 724 , Sup Ct review denied (1970).

1973The search at bar may be justified, however, on the basis of State v. Keith, 2 Or App 133, 465 P2d 724 , Sup Ct review denied (1970).

1973On p 146 thereof we said: “Cooper [Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 , 87 S Ct 788 , 17 L Ed 2d 730 (1967)] has been construed by the Oregon Supreme Court in McCoy [State v. McCoy, 249 Or 160 , 437 P2d 734 (1968)] as holding that when a vehicle has been seized as the instrumentality of a crime it may thereafter be lawfully examined (searched) for further evidence of that crime without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant * * Accordingly, in Keith we approved a warrantless search of a vehicle, which was an instrumentality of a crime, for evidence of the crime where there was an arrest of t

1973On p 146 thereof we said: “Cooper [Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 , 87 S Ct 788 , 17 L Ed 2d 730 (1967)] has been construed by the Oregon Supreme Court in McCoy [State v. McCoy, 249 Or 160 , 437 P2d 734 (1968)] as holding that when a vehicle has been seized as the instrumentality of a crime it may thereafter be lawfully examined (searched) for further evidence of that crime without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant * * Accordingly, in Keith we approved a warrantless search of a vehicle, which was an instrumentality of a crime, for evidence of the crime where there was an arrest of t

1971Eemembering that “the burden of making an express announcement [of authority and purpose] is certainly slight,” Miller v. United States, 357 US 301, 309 , 78 S Ct 1190 , 2 L Ed 2d 1332 (1958), and reviewing all the above factors relevant to whether the officers reasonably believed the apartment to be vacant, we conclude that since that belief was unwarranted, the search was in violation of ORS 133.290.

1971Eemembering that “the burden of making an express announcement [of authority and purpose] is certainly slight,” Miller v. United States, 357 US 301, 309 , 78 S Ct 1190 , 2 L Ed 2d 1332 (1958), and reviewing all the above factors relevant to whether the officers reasonably believed the apartment to be vacant, we conclude that since that belief was unwarranted, the search was in violation of ORS 133.290.

1943R. *370 393; Boynton v. Modern Woodmen of America, 148 Minn. 150 , 181 N. W. 327 , 17 A. L.

1943R. *370 393; Boynton v. Modern Woodmen of America, 148 Minn. 150 , 181 N. W. 327 , 17 A. L.

1943Under proper instructions, the sufficiency of the search and inquiry is one for the jury, upon consideration of the evidence, and the jury’s determination that same was sufficient will not be disturbed by this court on appeal, unless, from an examination and consideration of all the evidence in the record, we can say, as a matter of law, that the minds of all reasonable men should concur in holding same insufficient under the rule announced.” See, to the same effect, Modern Woodmen of America v. White, 70 Colo. 207 , 199 P. 965 , 17 A. L.

1943Under proper instructions, the sufficiency of the search and inquiry is one for the jury, upon consideration of the evidence, and the jury’s determination that same was sufficient will not be disturbed by this court on appeal, unless, from an examination and consideration of all the evidence in the record, we can say, as a matter of law, that the minds of all reasonable men should concur in holding same insufficient under the rule announced.” See, to the same effect, Modern Woodmen of America v. White, 70 Colo. 207 , 199 P. 965 , 17 A. L.