search clause in California

2023(Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 857 (Samson).) A valid parole search, however, is “limited in scope to the terms articulated in the search clause.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 681 [probation].) Section 3067 provides that every California parolee, the parolee’s residence, and any property under the parolee’s control is “subject to search or seizure by a probation or parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant or with or without cause.” (§ 3067, subd. (b)(3); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2511, subd. (b).) Whether l

2004In People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 , the Supreme Court recognized officers can search an area over which consent is given by a person who has common authority over the area. ( Id. at p. 675, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 .) The court held valid the search of a residence of a probationer who had given a search waiver even though the officers used the waiver as a pretext to search for contraband of the probationer's boyfriend. ( Id. at pp. 672, 678-679, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 .) In People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 797 , 97 Cal.

2018(Bumper v. No. Carolina (1968) 391 U.S. 543, 550 .) Because blood-alcohol breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving.

2018(Bumper v. No. Carolina (1968) 391 U.S. 543, 550 .) Because blood-alcohol breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving.

2018(People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 106 .) Under settled constitutional principles, a party may waive the warrant requirement and consent to a search if the waiver is voluntary, authorized properly and solicited without threat, coercion or fraud.

2018(People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 106 .) Under settled constitutional principles, a party may waive the warrant requirement and consent to a search if the waiver is voluntary, authorized properly and solicited without threat, coercion or fraud.

2004In People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 , the Supreme Court recognized officers can search an area over which consent is given by a person who has common authority over the area. ( Id. at p. 675, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 .) The court held valid the search of a residence of a probationer who had given a search waiver even though the officers used the waiver as a pretext to search for contraband of the probationer's boyfriend. ( Id. at pp. 672, 678-679, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 .) In People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 797 , 97 Cal.

2004In People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 , the Supreme Court recognized officers can search an area over which consent is given by a person who has common authority over the area. ( Id. at p. 675, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 .) The court held valid the search of a residence of a probationer who had given a search waiver even though the officers used the waiver as a pretext to search for contraband of the probationer's boyfriend. ( Id. at pp. 672, 678-679, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 .) In People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 797 , 97 Cal.

2024(Id. at pp. 2219, 2223.) Maintaining the special level of privacy for cell phones set forth in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 , 403, which held cell-site records “hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life’ ” (id. at p. 2213, quoting Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616, 630 ), the Court concluded that a person “does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protecting by venturing into the public sphere.” (Carpenter, at p. 2217.) In Beautiful Struggle, the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision applied the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Carpenter to an aerial surveillance pr

2024(Id. at pp. 2219, 2223.) Maintaining the special level of privacy for cell phones set forth in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 , 403, which held cell-site records “hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life’ ” (id. at p. 2213, quoting Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616, 630 ), the Court concluded that a person “does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protecting by venturing into the public sphere.” (Carpenter, at p. 2217.) In Beautiful Struggle, the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision applied the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Carpenter to an aerial surveillance pr

2021Defendant contends that even as so limited, condition 6(n) is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent) and In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.) The People contend the “recordable media” portion of condition 6(n) was properly imposed, but state the matter nonetheless should be remanded to clarify whether the trial court intended to include “computers” in the search waiver.

2021The People note that during sentencing, the court stated defendant could return if it appeared probation was defining “recordable media” to include his “laptop or his cell phone or his tablet,” after stating condition 6(n) would not apply to “electronic devices.” According to the People, it thus appeared the court was excluding “computers” (i.e., a laptop or tablet) from condition 6(n). 10 Our high court in Ricardo P. recently clarified that the reasonableness inquiry of Lent’s third prong “contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the leg

2014Respect for privacy is the rule—a search is the exception.” (In re William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 564 .) “[T]his standard requires articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, warranting an objectively reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be searched are violating or have violated a rule, regulation, or statute.” (Ibid.) A search is permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in the context of the age and sex of the student.

2005Respect for privacy is the rule—a search is the exception.” (In re William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 564 .) In William G., a search by a school official of a student he suspected was tardy for class disclosed contraband.

2004Relying primarily on People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668 , People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 , 3 P.3d 311 ], People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 73 P.3d 496 ], People v. Cruz (1964) 61 Cal.2d 861 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 395 P.2d 889 ], and People v. Tidalgo (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 301 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 463 ], Pleasant argues the officers could not search areas over which he had complete control and the trial court here erred in finding that the officers reasonably believed Ms. Pleasant had access to her son’s room.

2004Relying primarily on People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668 , People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 , 3 P.3d 311 ], People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 73 P.3d 496 ], People v. Cruz (1964) 61 Cal.2d 861 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 395 P.2d 889 ], and People v. Tidalgo (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 301 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 463 ], Pleasant argues the officers could not search areas over which he had complete control and the trial court here erred in finding that the officers reasonably believed Ms. Pleasant had access to her son’s room.

2004(People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 675-676 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 ].) Since Ms. Pleasant gave a search waiver as a condition of probation, law enforcement authorities could, without a warrant or probable cause, search areas used exclusively by Ms. Pleasant, areas within “common authority” (ibid.) of the probationer and fellow occupants and areas which she “normally had access.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 884, 888 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 746 ]; People v. La Jocies (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 947 , 955 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) Since Ms. Pleasant had access to the keys to the roo

2004(People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 675-676 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019 ].) Since Ms. Pleasant gave a search waiver as a condition of probation, law enforcement authorities could, without a warrant or probable cause, search areas used exclusively by Ms. Pleasant, areas within “common authority” (ibid.) of the probationer and fellow occupants and areas which she “normally had access.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 884, 888 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 746 ]; People v. La Jocies (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 947 , 955 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) Since Ms. Pleasant had access to the keys to the roo

2004However, the officer did have verbal permission from a judge to search this location prior to searching it, which reaches the bad faith issue that was discussed.” Defense counsel argued that there was reason to believe the California Supreme Court was retreating from its holding in In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68 .

2004(Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 89 .) In contrast, the court in Robles stated, “Allowing the People to validate a warrantless residential search, after the fact, by means of showing a sufficient connection between the residence and any one of a number of occupants who happens to be subject to a search clause, would encourage the police to engage in facially invalid searches with increased odds that a justification could be found later.

2004Relying primarily on People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668 , People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 , 3 P.3d 311 ], People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 73 P.3d 496 ], People v. Cruz (1964) 61 Cal.2d 861 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 395 P.2d 889 ], and People v. Tidalgo (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 301 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 463 ], Pleasant argues the officers could not search areas over which he had complete control and the trial court here erred in finding that the officers reasonably believed Ms. Pleasant had access to her son’s room.

2004Relying primarily on People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668 , People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 , 3 P.3d 311 ], People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 73 P.3d 496 ], People v. Cruz (1964) 61 Cal.2d 861 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 395 P.2d 889 ], and People v. Tidalgo (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 301 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 463 ], Pleasant argues the officers could not search areas over which he had complete control and the trial court here erred in finding that the officers reasonably believed Ms. Pleasant had access to her son’s room.

1999But whether the purpose of the search is to monitor the probationer or to serve some other law enforcement purpose, or both, the search in any case remains limited in scope to the terms articulated in the search clause (Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 605 ) and to those areas of the residence over which the probationer is believed to exercise complete or joint authority (United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 170-171 [94 S.Ct. at pp. 992-993]; People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 276 ; People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 856 ).

1999But whether the purpose of the search is to monitor the probationer or to serve some other law enforcement purpose, or both, the search in any case remains limited in scope to the terms articulated in the search clause ( Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 605 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 282 , 738 P.2d 336 ) and to those areas of the residence over which the probationer is believed to exercise complete or joint authority ( United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 170-171, 94 S.Ct. 988 ; People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 276 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 96 , 768 P.2d 610 ; People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at

1999But whether the purpose of the search is to monitor the probationer or to serve some other law enforcement purpose, or both, the search in any case remains limited in scope to the terms articulated in the search clause (Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 605 ) and to those areas of the residence over which the probationer is believed to exercise complete or joint authority (United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 170-171 [94 S.Ct. at pp. 992-993]; People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 276 ; People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 856 ).

1999But whether the purpose of the search is to monitor the probationer or to serve some other law enforcement purpose, or both, the search in any case remains limited in scope to the terms articulated in the search clause ( Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 605 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 282 , 738 P.2d 336 ) and to those areas of the residence over which the probationer is believed to exercise complete or joint authority ( United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 170-171, 94 S.Ct. 988 ; People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 276 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 96 , 768 P.2d 610 ; People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at

2025(People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 .) 3 “When executing a parole or probation search, the searching officer may look into closed containers that he or she reasonably believes are in the complete or joint control of the parolee or probationer.” (People v. Baker (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1159 .) “A probationer explicitly agrees to being placed on probation” and is “subject to a search clause” that he or she “has explicitly consented to.” (People v. Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) Our Supreme Court held, “[A]n officer conducting a search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment

2025Code § 3517) applies in criminal law.” ( Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1408–1409, citing People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77 , 81–82 [a defendant who absconds from custody during trial is estopped to argue that the court violated his constitutional right to be present at trial by proceeding in his absence] and Pearson, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 742 , 744–747 [a criminal defendant mandated by statute for every probationer, and probation search clauses are not worded uniformly.” (Id. at p. 863, italics added.) “Thus, in the case of probation searches, the officer must have some

2025Code § 3517) applies in criminal law.” ( Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1408–1409, citing People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77 , 81–82 [a defendant who absconds from custody during trial is estopped to argue that the court violated his constitutional right to be present at trial by proceeding in his absence] and Pearson, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 742 , 744–747 [a criminal defendant mandated by statute for every probationer, and probation search clauses are not worded uniformly.” (Id. at p. 863, italics added.) “Thus, in the case of probation searches, the officer must have some

2025(People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 .) 3 “When executing a parole or probation search, the searching officer may look into closed containers that he or she reasonably believes are in the complete or joint control of the parolee or probationer.” (People v. Baker (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1159 .) “A probationer explicitly agrees to being placed on probation” and is “subject to a search clause” that he or she “has explicitly consented to.” (People v. Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) Our Supreme Court held, “[A]n officer conducting a search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment

2025(People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 .) 3 “When executing a parole or probation search, the searching officer may look into closed containers that he or she reasonably believes are in the complete or joint control of the parolee or probationer.” (People v. Baker (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1159 .) “A probationer explicitly agrees to being placed on probation” and is “subject to a search clause” that he or she “has explicitly consented to.” (People v. Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) Our Supreme Court held, “[A]n officer conducting a search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment

2025Code § 3517) applies in criminal law.” ( Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1408–1409, citing People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77 , 81–82 [a defendant who absconds from custody during trial is estopped to argue that the court violated his constitutional right to be present at trial by proceeding in his absence] and Pearson, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 742 , 744–747 [a criminal defendant mandated by statute for every probationer, and probation search clauses are not worded uniformly.” (Id. at p. 863, italics added.) “Thus, in the case of probation searches, the officer must have some

2025(People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 .) 3 “When executing a parole or probation search, the searching officer may look into closed containers that he or she reasonably believes are in the complete or joint control of the parolee or probationer.” (People v. Baker (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1159 .) “A probationer explicitly agrees to being placed on probation” and is “subject to a search clause” that he or she “has explicitly consented to.” (People v. Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) Our Supreme Court held, “[A]n officer conducting a search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment

2025Then he claimed that this ploy entitled him to suppress evidence obtained from what would otherwise plainly have been a lawful probation search.” (Watkins, at p. 1409.) “[D]efendant committed a wrong and then tried to profit from it. . . . [W]e conclude that this misconduct results in an estoppel.” (Ibid.) In Mathews, Division One of this court, following Watkins, held that “when a probationer gives a false name to a police officer, and a record check of that name fails to reveal that the probationer is in fact subject to a search condition, the probationer is estopped from challenging the leg

2024These arguments are misplaced, because they focus on probable cause to arrest or detain, rather than probable cause to search. “ ‘[T]he focus of the arrest inquiry is different from that of the search inquiry.’ ” (United States v. Rodgers (9th Cir. 2011) 656 F.3d 1023, 1028-1029 ; see also United States v. Rojas (5th Cir. 1982) 671 F.2d 159, 165 [“the facts necessary to show probable cause to arrest are not necessarily the same as those required to show probable cause to search”].) Although the probable cause standard governs both inquiries, and the same quantum of evidence is necessary to est