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6 Tennessee opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Georgia v. Randolphgreen1 sentence2021In Fernandez, however, the Court observed that “a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search” operates as an exception to the general rule that “consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search” “only when the objector is standing in the door saying ‘stay out’ when officers propose to make a consent search.” Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 300, 306 (2014) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122-23 (2006)). | 1 | 1 |
Fernandez v. Californiagreen2 sentences2021Victim’s Consent to Search The defendant, citing Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292 (2014), originally posited that because his arrest was illegal, the victim’s consent was insufficient to permit the search of the Zinc Road residence. 2021In Fernandez, however, the Court observed that “a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search” operates as an exception to the general rule that “consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search” “only when the objector is standing in the door saying ‘stay out’ when officers propose to make a consent search.” Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 300, 306 (2014) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122-23 (2006)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Munngreen1 sentence2019State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Tenn. 2001). “[A] person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Marylandred1 sentence2019State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Tenn. 2001). “[A] person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen1 sentence2016We note that the United States Supreme Court instructed the bench and bar that while the analysis of a defendant‟s standing to challenge a search and the analysis of whether a defendant‟s personal Fourth Amendment rights have been violated are generally the same, “the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant‟s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978). -3- The trial court denied appellant‟s motion for new trial. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence2014Davis, 191 S.W.3d at 121-22 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Peters v. State
neutral
1 sentence2011Peters v. State, 215 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1948), citing Seals v. State, 11 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1929). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Seals v. State
green
1 sentence2011Peters v. State, 215 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1948), citing Seals v. State, 11 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1929). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Manning
green
2 sentences1973However, with the utmost respect for their wisdom I respectfully disagree with the search principle expounded in State v. Manning, supra. I think that a person has the right to assert the issue of the constitutionality of a search under the Fourth Amendment and, that if the ruling is against his claim, to except to that ruling. 1973However, with the utmost respect for their wisdom I respectfully disagree with the search principle expounded in State v. Manning, supra. I think that a person has the right to assert the issue of the constitutionality of a search under the Fourth Amendment and, that if the ruling is against his claim, to except to that ruling. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.