search violation in New York

1992The defendant could not have had a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the exterior of the car (see, People v Lewis, 162 AD2d 760, 763 ) and the officers’ observations through the car’s windows did not constitute a search in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights (see, People v Maltese, 149 AD2d 626 ; People v Crapo, supra).

1989Thus, the officer did not intrude into any area in which the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy (see, People v Kozlowski, 69 NY2d 761 ) and his observations through a window situated next to the door to the defendant’s apartment of objects in open view did not constitute a search in violation of the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment (see, People v Farenga, 42 NY2d 1092 ; People v Alberti, 111 AD2d 860 ; People v Crapo, 103 AD2d 943 ; 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3 [c], at 390).

2025This Court affirmed on different grounds, concluding that a canine sniff of the body does constitute a search and that the standard necessary to effectuate such a search is reasonable suspicion ( 196 AD3d at 31 ).

2025This Court affirmed on different grounds, concluding that a canine sniff of the body does constitute a search and that the standard necessary to effectuate such a search is reasonable suspicion ( 196 AD3d at 31 ).

1998Given that the testimony regarding the search was properly admitted, that defendant elicited further testimony concerning the search and that the defense summation was exclusively concerned with assertion of the insanity defense and refutation of the conclusions stated by the People’s psychiatric expert, the People’s argument that no weapon was produced because defendant, knowing his actions were wrong, disposed of the weapon used, was both fair comment on the evidence and a proper response to the defense summation (People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396 ; People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109 ).

1998Given that the testimony regarding the search was properly admitted, that defendant elicited further testimony concerning the search and that the defense summation was exclusively concerned with assertion of the insanity defense and refutation of the conclusions stated by the People’s psychiatric expert, the People’s argument that no weapon was produced because defendant, knowing his actions were wrong, disposed of the weapon used, was both fair comment on the evidence and a proper response to the defense summation (People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396 ; People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109 ).

1995By logical extension through Atkins (supra) then, there is no obligation on the part of law enforcement officials to advise a suspect of anything regarding the administration of a breathalyzer examination even when the request to submit to a search test occurs beyond two hours of arrest.

1992Finally, the use of flashlights was not an unreasonable intrusion and did not convert a proper observation into an impermissible search (see, People v Perez, 135 AD2d 582, 583 ).

1992The defendant could not have had a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the exterior of the car (see, People v Lewis, 162 AD2d 760, 763 ) and the officers’ observations through the car’s windows did not constitute a search in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights (see, People v Maltese, 149 AD2d 626 ; People v Crapo, supra).

1992The defendant could not have had a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the exterior of the car (see, People v Lewis, 162 AD2d 760, 763 ) and the officers’ observations through the car’s windows did not constitute a search in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights (see, People v Maltese, 149 AD2d 626 ; People v Crapo, supra).

1989Nor was suppression of the photographs taken through the same window required as they simply recorded the officer’s observations of those objects in open view (see, State v Dickerson, 313 NW2d 526 [Iowa]; State v Louis, 296 Ore 57, 672 P2d 708 ).

1989Thus, the officer did not intrude into any area in which the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy (see, People v Kozlowski, 69 NY2d 761 ) and his observations through a window situated next to the door to the defendant’s apartment of objects in open view did not constitute a search in violation of the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment (see, People v Farenga, 42 NY2d 1092 ; People v Alberti, 111 AD2d 860 ; People v Crapo, 103 AD2d 943 ; 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3 [c], at 390).

1989Nor was suppression of the photographs taken through the same window required as they simply recorded the officer’s observations of those objects in open view (see, State v Dickerson, 313 NW2d 526 [Iowa]; State v Louis, 296 Ore 57, 672 P2d 708 ).

1989Thus, the officer did not intrude into any area in which the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy (see, People v Kozlowski, 69 NY2d 761 ) and his observations through a window situated next to the door to the defendant’s apartment of objects in open view did not constitute a search in violation of the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment (see, People v Farenga, 42 NY2d 1092 ; People v Alberti, 111 AD2d 860 ; People v Crapo, 103 AD2d 943 ; 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3 [c], at 390).

1989In upholding the police action, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of this court holding such a search to be a violation of both the Federal and State Constitutions (People v Class, 63 NY2d 491 ).

1989Thus, the officer did not intrude into any area in which the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy (see, People v Kozlowski, 69 NY2d 761 ) and his observations through a window situated next to the door to the defendant’s apartment of objects in open view did not constitute a search in violation of the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment (see, People v Farenga, 42 NY2d 1092 ; People v Alberti, 111 AD2d 860 ; People v Crapo, 103 AD2d 943 ; 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3 [c], at 390).

1989On remand, we adhered to our prior determination, basing our decision on article I, § 12 of the State Constitution (People v Class, 67 NY2d 431 ). .

1988Furthermore, we cannot conclude that a routine search of an inmate’s cell and person is other than a reasonable procedure for the purpose of maintaining security at a correctional institution, or that such a search is in violation of any constitutional right to the expectation of privacy (see, Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520 ; Katz v United States, 389 US 347 ; Lanza v New York, 370 US 139 ).

1988Furthermore, we cannot conclude that a routine search of an inmate’s cell and person is other than a reasonable procedure for the purpose of maintaining security at a correctional institution, or that such a search is in violation of any constitutional right to the expectation of privacy (see, Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520 ; Katz v United States, 389 US 347 ; Lanza v New York, 370 US 139 ).

1988Furthermore, we cannot conclude that a routine search of an inmate’s cell and person is other than a reasonable procedure for the purpose of maintaining security at a correctional institution, or that such a search is in violation of any constitutional right to the expectation of privacy (see, Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520 ; Katz v United States, 389 US 347 ; Lanza v New York, 370 US 139 ).

1987Nor does the fact that the vehicle was searched after being removed to the police headquarters affect the validity of the search at bar (see, United States v Johns, 469 US 478 ; People v Jackson, 111 AD2d 412, 413 ).

1987Nor does the fact that the vehicle was searched after being removed to the police headquarters affect the validity of the search at bar (see, United States v Johns, 469 US 478 ; People v Jackson, 111 AD2d 412, 413 ).

1985In People v Ellis (supra, at p 397), the Court of Appeals stated: "Thus, as we held in People v Belton ( 55 NY2d 49, 54-55 , supra): "a valid arrest for a crime authorizes a warrantless search * * * of a vehicle and of a closed container visible in the passenger compartment of the vehicle which the arrested person is driving * * * when the circumstances give reason to believe that the vehicle or its visible contents may be related to the crime for which the arrest is being made * * * or there is reason to believe that a weapon may be discovered” ”.

1983On November 19,1981, the Court of Appeals, in the case of People v Ponder ( 54 NY2d 160 ) adopted the rule defined in United States v Salvucci ( 448 US 83 ), which abrogated the “automatic standing” rule for a defendant to challenge a search which was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.