indemnity clause in New Jersey

2025Cole supports this conclusion, as it counsels the waiver "analysis is not affected by the fact that non-arbitrable claims initially were present in the lawsuit." 215 N.J. at 283 .

2024Ibid.

2021If "such A-4086-19 10 evidence fail[s] to resolve the ambiguity, however, an indemnity clause must be strictly construed against the indemnitee." Ibid.

2015Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987) (permitting the negligence and the indemnification issues to be tried together, but granting a directed verdict to the employer before submitting the case to the jury); Severino v. Schuyler Meadows Club, 639 N.Y.S.2d 869 (N.Y.

2015Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987) (permitting the negligence and the indemnification issues to be tried together, but granting a directed verdict to the employer before submitting the case to the jury); Severino v. Schuyler Meadows Club, 639 N.Y.S.2d 869 (N.Y.

1997Id. at 796-97 , 667 N.E.2d at 905 .

1997Id. at 796-97 , 667 N.E.2d at 905 .

1997Plaintiff then refers to Justice Stein’s dissent wherein the Justice wrote, “It is difficult to conceive that the legislative grant of Workers Compensation immunity was ever intended to protect from a manufacturer’s indemnity claim an employer who prevented the manufacturer from repairing a defective machine.” Id. at 217 , 510 A.2d 1161 .

1997Plaintiff then refers to Justice Stein’s dissent wherein the Justice wrote, “It is difficult to conceive that the legislative grant of Workers Compensation immunity was ever intended to protect from a manufacturer’s indemnity claim an employer who prevented the manufacturer from repairing a defective machine.” Id. at 217 , 510 A.2d 1161 .

1997In Seeley v. Cincinnati Shaper Co., Ltd. 256 N.J.Super. 1 , 606 A.2d 378 (App.Div.1992), the plaintiff was injured while operating a press brake in the course of his employment.

1997In Seeley v. Cincinnati Shaper Co., Ltd. 256 N.J.Super. 1 , 606 A.2d 378 (App.Div.1992), the plaintiff was injured while operating a press brake in the course of his employment.

1997Id. at 491-92 , 566 A.2d 234 .

1997Id. at 491-92 , 566 A.2d 234 .

1995Cf. Secallus v. Muscarelle, 245 N.J.

1995Other courts have sought to reconcile the two conflicting sentences by construing them to mean “agreements to indemnify or hold harmless are enforceable between the parties but not against the government.” Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206, 211 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F. 2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 , 109 S.Ct. 837 , 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989)); see also Kerr-McGee Chem Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321 , 327 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir.1993); Hatco Corp. v

1995Other courts have sought to reconcile the two conflicting sentences by construing them to mean “agreements to indemnify or hold harmless are enforceable between the parties but not against the government.” Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206, 211 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F. 2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 , 109 S.Ct. 837 , 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989)); see also Kerr-McGee Chem Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321 , 327 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir.1993); Hatco Corp. v

1995Other courts have sought to reconcile the two conflicting sentences by construing them to mean “agreements to indemnify or hold harmless are enforceable between the parties but not against the government.” Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206, 211 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F. 2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 , 109 S.Ct. 837 , 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989)); see also Kerr-McGee Chem Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321 , 327 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir.1993); Hatco Corp. v

1993Super. 275, 282-86 , 411 A. 2d 1150 (App.Div.), appeal dismissed, 84 N.J. 433 , 420 A. 2d 339 (1980).

1993Such a provision would make an indemnity claim, if it is disputed, a "contested case" as defined by N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2(b), and the final agency determination would be appealable as of right to this court pursuant to R. *598 2:2-3(a)(2). [2] See Application of Orange Savings Bank, 172 N.J.

1993Super. 275, 282-86 , 411 A. 2d 1150 (App.Div.), appeal dismissed, 84 N.J. 433 , 420 A. 2d 339 (1980).

1993Super. 275, 282-86 , 411 A. 2d 1150 (App.Div.), appeal dismissed, 84 N.J. 433 , 420 A. 2d 339 (1980).

1986However, recovery on such a theory is contrary to the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act since it would amount to holding the employer liable to the employee on account of the employer's negligence. [ Id. ] The majority opinion rejects out-of-hand the indemnity claim at issue based on its conclusion in Ramos that implied indemnity may arise "only when a special legal relationship exists between the employer and the third party, and the liability of the third party is vicarious." 103 N.J. at 189 (emphasis added).

1986The Appellate Division disagreed with the Law Division’s interpretation of the indemnification clause, finding that LCA agreed to indemnify BFI in all instances except “when the [container] is being physically handled by the employees of [BFI].” Additionally, the court stated that the Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar enforcement of such an express indemnification agreement against the employer. 194 N.J.Super. at 101-02 .

1985It cannot be seriously contended by Bee Gee that retroactive application of the amended section will work a "manifest injustice," see Gibbons v. Gibbons, supra, 86 N.J. at 523 .