indemnity clause in Arkansas

2026Id.

2025See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Grayson v. Ross, 369 Ark. 241 , 253 S.W.3d 428 (2007).

2025See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Grayson v. Ross, 369 Ark. 241 , 253 S.W.3d 428 (2007).

2014Beason & Nalley moved for dismissal on three grounds: first, that United Systems’ claim for contract damages must fail because the damages sought were consequential, and the contract demonstrated that there was no tacit agreement by Beason & Nalley to be liable for consequential damages; second, that the indemnity clause of the contract barred United Systems from bringing any claim against Beason & Nalley with respect to their contract or its performance; and third, that no action against Beason & Nalley would lie because United 2 Cite as 2014 Ark.

2013The Cannon indemnity clause, is therefore, easily distinguished from the provision in this case, which stated that Aceva would indemnify Tyson “from . . . all . . . losses . . . 13 Cite as 2013 Ark.

1995In this respect, the situation is similar to that in Southside Water Ass’n, Inc. v. Hargan, 270 Ark. 117, 118 , 603 S.W.2d 466 , 467 (Ark.

1995In this respect, the situation is similar to that in Southside Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Hargan, 270 Ark. 117, 118 , 603 S.W.2d 466 , 467 (Ark.App.1980), where the Arkansas Court of Appeals ruled that the language of an indemnity contract was clear and unequivocal in obligating the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for claims relating to "injury, death or damage" that might "in any way arise out of the prosecution of the work hereunder by the Contractor or subcontractors, and without regard to negligence on the part of anyone whomsoever." If anything, the indemnity clause at issue i

1995Co., 249 Ark. 389 , 459 S.W.2d 549 (1970), we held that the subcontractor had clearly and unequivocally agreed to indemnify the general contractor where the indemnity clause provided that: [the subcontractor] shall specifically and distinctly assume, and does assume, all risks of damage or injury from whatever cause to property or persons used or employed on or in connection with his work, and of all damage or injury from any cause to property wherever located, resulting from any action or operation under this sub-contract or in connection with his work. . . . 249 Ark. at 391 , 459 S.W.2d at 5

1995Co., 249 Ark. 389 , 459 S.W.2d 549 (1970), we held that the subcontractor had clearly and unequivocally agreed to indemnify the general contractor where the indemnity clause provided that: [the subcontractor] shall specifically and distinctly assume, and does assume, all risks of damage or injury from whatever cause to property or persons used or employed on or in connection with his work, and of all damage or injury from any cause to property wherever located, resulting from any action or operation under this sub-contract or in connection with his work. . . . 249 Ark. at 391 , 459 S.W.2d at 5

1995While we focused on the ambiguity of “occasioned by,” it is worth noting that the indemnity clause in that case did not specifically allude to accidents “occasioned by” the general contractor; rather, the section spoke of all liability, claims, demands or judgments for damages arising from accidents to persons or property occasioned by Subcontractor, his agents or employees, and ... all claims or demands for damages arising from accidents to Subcontractor, his agents or employees, whether occasioned by Subcontractor or his agents or his employees. . . . 246 Ark. at 565 , 439 S.W.2d at 284 .

1995While we focused on the ambiguity of “occasioned by,” it is worth noting that the indemnity clause in that case did not specifically allude to accidents “occasioned by” the general contractor; rather, the section spoke of all liability, claims, demands or judgments for damages arising from accidents to persons or property occasioned by Subcontractor, his agents or employees, and ... all claims or demands for damages arising from accidents to Subcontractor, his agents or employees, whether occasioned by Subcontractor or his agents or his employees. . . . 246 Ark. at 565 , 439 S.W.2d at 284 .

1991In holding that the indemnity clause survived, the trial court stated that, although it had not found a case precisely on point, it was “most persuaded” by Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Collectramatic, Inc., 547 A.2d 245 (N.H. 1988).

1991Id. at 249 .