indemnity claim in Alabama

2017In Ex parte Athens-Limestone Hospital, 858 So.2d 960 (Ala. 2003), the defendant, a hospital, sought to assert an indemnity claim against its employee, Dr. Teng, who had allegedly injured the plaintiff, Wilson.

2017In Ex parte Athens-Limestone Hospital , 858 So.2d 960 (Ala. 2003), the plaintiff, Wilson, sued a hospital, alleging that it was liable for the medical malpractice of its employee, Dr. Teng.

2006We continued, however, that "`timely notice' is a relative term, that is, it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." 908 So.2d at 911 (citing Cochrane Roofing Metal Co. v. Callahan , 472 So.2d 1005 , 1008 (Ala. 1985)). "`"The notice must be timely in that it must not come so late that the indemnitor is prejudiced in preparing the defense."'" Burkes Meek , 908 So.2d at 911 (quoting Stone Building Co. v. Star Elec.

1994In entering the summary judgment for Commonwealth, the trial court relied on Cochrane Roofing & Metal Co. v. Callahan, 472 So.2d 1005 (Ala.1985), which involved an indemnity clause in a construction project subcontract, wherein the subcontractor agreed to indemnify “and exonerate” the contractor against losses on the project arising out of work done by the subcontractor.

2000It follows, therefore, that federal maritime law also governs the indemnity claims of the shipowners against [third-party defendants.] Vaughn v. Farrell Lines, Inc ., 937 F.2d 953 , 956 (4th Cir. 1991) (where the `underlying tort claims from which the indemnity claim is derived . . . are maritime tort claims,' the `"indemnity claim arising therefrom is similarly a maritime claim"'); White v. Johns-Manville Corp ., 662 F.2d 243 , 247 (4th Cir. 1981); Swogger v. Waterman S.S.

1992Vaughn v. Farrell Lines, Inc. , 937 F.2d 953 , 956 (4th Cir. 1991) (where the "underlying tort claims from which the indemnity claim is derived . . . are maritime tort claims," the " 'indemnity claim arising therefrom is similarly a maritime claim' "); White v. Johns-Manville Corp. , 662 F.2d 243 , 247 (4th Cir. 1981); Swogger v. Waterman S.S.

2000Corp ., 151 A.D.2d 100 , 546 N.Y.S.2d 80 *Page 729 (1989); T.

2000Corp ., 151 A.D.2d 100 , 546 N.Y.S.2d 80 *Page 729 (1989); T.

2000It follows, therefore, that federal maritime law also governs the indemnity claims of the shipowners against [third-party defendants.] Vaughn v. Farrell Lines, Inc ., 937 F.2d 953 , 956 (4th Cir. 1991) (where the `underlying tort claims from which the indemnity claim is derived . . . are maritime tort claims,' the `"indemnity claim arising therefrom is similarly a maritime claim"'); White v. Johns-Manville Corp ., 662 F.2d 243 , 247 (4th Cir. 1981); Swogger v. Waterman S.S.

1992Vaughn v. Farrell Lines, Inc. , 937 F.2d 953 , 956 (4th Cir. 1991) (where the "underlying tort claims from which the indemnity claim is derived . . . are maritime tort claims," the " 'indemnity claim arising therefrom is similarly a maritime claim' "); White v. Johns-Manville Corp. , 662 F.2d 243 , 247 (4th Cir. 1981); Swogger v. Waterman S.S.

2016Pursuant to McCollough, supra, the question then becomes whether the ordinary, plain, and natural meaning of the words “in,” “on,” or “about,” as used in the indemnity clause, is ambiguous.

2009In my view, the dispositive principle in this case is the long-established and sound principle I noted at the outset: an indemnity contract should not be “extended to losses or damages neither expressly within its terms, nor of such character that it may reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to covenant against them.” Pyle v. Pizitz, 215 Ala. at 401 , 110 So. at 824 .

2009In my view, the dispositive principle in this case is the long-established and sound principle I noted at the outset: an indemnity contract should not be “extended to losses or damages neither expressly within its terms, nor of such character that it may reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to covenant against them.” Pyle v. Pizitz, 215 Ala. at 401 , 110 So. at 824 .

2006"To be sure, in order to preserve an indemnity claim, the indemnitee must timely notify the indemnitor of the action against the indemnitee." Burkes Meek , 908 So.2d at 911 .

2006We continued, however, that "`timely notice' is a relative term, that is, it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." 908 So.2d at 911 (citing Cochrane Roofing Metal Co. v. Callahan , 472 So.2d 1005 , 1008 (Ala. 1985)). "`"The notice must be timely in that it must not come so late that the indemnitor is prejudiced in preparing the defense."'" Burkes Meek , 908 So.2d at 911 (quoting Stone Building Co. v. Star Elec.

2005The supreme court explained the triggering mechanism for an indemnity claim: "This Court addressed the issue of when a cause of action for indemnification occurs so as to trigger the running of the statutory limitations period in American Commercial Barge Line Co, v. Roush , 793 So.2d 726 , 729-30 (Ala. 2000) (noting that in an action seeking indemnification the limitations period does not begin to run until liability has become fixed); see also Alabama Kraft Co. v. Southeast Alabama Gas Dist , 569 So.2d 697 , 700 (Ala. 1990) ('a right to indemnity does not arise . . . until one acting as sure

2005In Stonebrook Development , the architects argued that the Court of Civil Appeals "should have applied the `occurrence rule' adopted . . . in Ex parte Panell , 756 So.2d 862 (Ala. 1999), and that by not doing so, it ha[d] incorrectly decided th[e] issue." Id.

2005In Stonebrook Development , the architects argued that the Court of Civil Appeals "should have applied the `occurrence rule' adopted . . . in Ex parte Panell , 756 So.2d 862 (Ala. 1999), and that by not doing so, it ha[d] incorrectly decided th[e] issue." Id.

2002Paul N. Howard Company v. Affholder, Inc., 701 So.2d 402 [ (Fl.Dist.Ct.App.1997) ]; Houdaille Industries, Inc., v. Edwards, 374 So.2d 490, 492-493 (Fla.1979).” The trial court found that Matweld could not be held liable for purposes of indemnifying CSX because the evidence at trial did not show that CSX was without fault or that Matweld did or failed to do something that resulted in Dawson’s and Arnold’s injuries.

1993The Court did not address the nature of the indemnity claim and, without mentioning Eley , relied on Sherman Concrete Pipe Machinery, Inc. v. Gadsden Concrete & Metal Pipe Co., 335 So.2d 125 (Ala.1976), which involved an implied, rather than an express, contractual agreement to reach its conclusion.

1993The Court did not address the nature of the indemnity claim and, without mentioning Eley , relied on Sherman Concrete Pipe Machinery, Inc. v. Gadsden Concrete Metal Pipe Co. , 335 So.2d 125 (Ala. 1976), which involved an implied, rather than an express, contractual agreement to reach its conclusion.

1992"If the parties knowingly, evenhandedly, and for valid consideration, intelligently enter into an agreement whereby one party agrees to indemnify the other, including indemnity against the indemnitee's own wrongs, if expressed in clear and unequivocal language, then such agreements will be upheld." Industrial Tile, Inc. v. Stewart , 388 So.2d at 176 .

1992The Court held in that case that "the trial court should have held, as a matter of law, that the indemnity agreement was enforceable by McDevitt [the indemnitee] against Mosher [the indemnitor]." 574 So.2d at 797 .

1991Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Cooper Stevedoring Co. , 504 So.2d 215 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied , 483 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 3268 , 97 L.Ed.2d 767 (1987). 3 The lease between the State Docks and Atlantic Gulf contained a specific indemnity clause and also incorporated by reference the terms of the Alabama State Docks Department Tariff No. 1-C, which provided that use of the State Docks' facility amounted to consent to the Tariff's terms.

1991Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Cooper Stevedoring Co. , 504 So.2d 215 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied , 483 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 3268 , 97 L.Ed.2d 767 (1987). 3 The lease between the State Docks and Atlantic Gulf contained a specific indemnity clause and also incorporated by reference the terms of the Alabama State Docks Department Tariff No. 1-C, which provided that use of the State Docks' facility amounted to consent to the Tariff's terms.

1991Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Cooper Stevedoring Co. , 504 So.2d 215 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied , 483 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 3268 , 97 L.Ed.2d 767 (1987). 3 The lease between the State Docks and Atlantic Gulf contained a specific indemnity clause and also incorporated by reference the terms of the Alabama State Docks Department Tariff No. 1-C, which provided that use of the State Docks' facility amounted to consent to the Tariff's terms.

1991Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Cooper Stevedoring Co. , 504 So.2d 215 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied , 483 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 3268 , 97 L.Ed.2d 767 (1987). 3 The lease between the State Docks and Atlantic Gulf contained a specific indemnity clause and also incorporated by reference the terms of the Alabama State Docks Department Tariff No. 1-C, which provided that use of the State Docks' facility amounted to consent to the Tariff's terms.

1988The Subcontractor's above described liability insurance policies shall each contain contractual insurance coverage so as to protect the Contractor and the Owner under this indemnity agreement.' " (Emphasis added in Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc.) 431 So.2d at 945 .

1988The Subcontractor's above described liability insurance policies shall each contain contractual insurance coverage so as to protect the Contractor and the Owner under this indemnity agreement.'" (Emphasis added in Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc.) 431 So.2d at 945 .