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25 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
GAF CORPORATION v. Tolar Construction Co.green2 sentences2014Co., 246 Ga. 411, 412 ( 271 SE2d 811 ) (1980). 2014Co., 246 Ga. 411, 412 ( 271 SE2d 811 ) (1980). | 2 | 2 |
Coleman v. B-H Transfer Co.green2 sentences2012See, e.g., Coleman v. B-H Transfer Co., 284 Ga. 624, 627 (3) ( 669 SE2d 141 ) (2008) (Georgia courts will enforce an indemnification clause in a contract unless such enforcement contravenes public policy). 2012See, e.g., Coleman v. B-H Transfer Co., 284 Ga. 624, 627 (3) ( 669 SE2d 141 ) (2008) (Georgia courts will enforce an indemnification clause in a contract unless such enforcement contravenes public policy). | 2 | 2 |
Binswanger Glass Co. v. Beers Construction Co.green2 sentences2004The panel did not compare the indemnity clause before it with the one at issue in Binswanger, supra, which would have revealed a crucial distinction. 1982See Binswanger Glass Co., 141 Ga. App. at 719 , supra. Our review of those enumerations of error which even arguably might be construed as addressing evidentiary rulings relating to the issue of negligence on the part of PHI, rather than on the part of ACC or Mr. Carter, demonstrates no error requiring reversal of the judgment for PHI on the indemnity claim. | 2 | 2 |
McMichael v. Robinsongreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., DeKalb County v. Lenowitz, 218 Ga. App. 884, 889 (4) ( 463 SE2d 539 ) (1995); McMichael v. Robinson, 162 Ga. App. 67, 69 (2) ( 290 SE2d 168 ) (1982). 1999See, e.g., DeKalb County v. Lenowitz, 218 Ga. App. 884, 889 (4) ( 463 SE2d 539 ) (1995); McMichael v. Robinson, 162 Ga. App. 67, 69 (2) ( 290 SE2d 168 ) (1982). | 2 | 2 |
Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Fieldsgreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Fields, 293 Ga. at 504 (2); Dodd, 275 Ga. at 837 . 13 Pursuant to California law, “[i]f an indemnity clause does not address itself to the issue of an indemnitee’s negligence, it is referred to as a ‘general’ indemnity clause.” Rossmoor Sanitation v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 628 (I) ( 532 P2d 97 ) (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc.green2 sentences2025See, e.g., Fields, 293 Ga. at 504 (2); Dodd, 275 Ga. at 837 . 13 Pursuant to California law, “[i]f an indemnity clause does not address itself to the issue of an indemnitee’s negligence, it is referred to as a ‘general’ indemnity clause.” Rossmoor Sanitation v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 628 (I) ( 532 P2d 97 ) (1975). 2025See, e.g., Fields, 293 Ga. at 504 (2); Dodd, 275 Ga. at 837 . 13 Pursuant to California law, “[i]f an indemnity clause does not address itself to the issue of an indemnitee’s negligence, it is referred to as a ‘general’ indemnity clause.” Rossmoor Sanitation v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 628 (I) ( 532 P2d 97 ) (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Sutherlin v. Sutherlingreen2 sentences2021Sutherlin v. Sutherlin, 301 Ga. 581, 584 (II) ( 802 SE2d 204 ) (2017). 2021Sutherlin v. Sutherlin, 301 Ga. 581, 584 (II) ( 802 SE2d 204 ) (2017). | 1 | 1 |
Dominic Firmani v. Dar-Court Builders, LLCgreen2 sentences2018Because the indemnity clause is a contractual provision, its interpretation is a question of law, and we therefore review the trial court’s ruling on this issue de novo. 4 Firmani v. Dar-Court Builders, LLC, 339 Ga. App. 413, 425 (4) ( 793 SE2d 596 ) (2016). 2018Because the indemnity clause is a contractual provision, its interpretation is a question of law, and we therefore review the trial court’s ruling on this issue de novo. 4 Firmani v. Dar-Court Builders, LLC, 339 Ga. App. 413, 425 (4) ( 793 SE2d 596 ) (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Natural Resources v. Duke Energy Sandersville, LLCgreen2 sentences2016It contends, therefore, that the issues “are not fully resolved.” But we cannot render “a 1 Board of Natural Resources v. Duke Energy Sandersville, 257 Ga. App. 815, 816 ( 572 SE2d 356 ) (2002) (“Mootness is a mandatory ground for dismissal of a case.”) (footnote omitted). 2 Id. at 815-816 . 3 Id. at 816 . hypothetical or advisory opinion.”4 And despite First Indemnity’s claim to the contrary, this business dispute is not the type of case that “is capable of repetition yet evades review.”5 Accordingly, because the question presented by this appeal has become moot, we hereby DISMISS the appeal. 2016It contends, therefore, that the issues “are not fully resolved.” But we cannot render “a 1 Board of Natural Resources v. Duke Energy Sandersville, 257 Ga. App. 815, 816 ( 572 SE2d 356 ) (2002) (“Mootness is a mandatory ground for dismissal of a case.”) (footnote omitted). 2 Id. at 815-816 . 3 Id. at 816 . hypothetical or advisory opinion.”4 And despite First Indemnity’s claim to the contrary, this business dispute is not the type of case that “is capable of repetition yet evades review.”5 Accordingly, because the question presented by this appeal has become moot, we hereby DISMISS the appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Willesen v. Ernest Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2016Willesen v. Ernest Communications, 323 Ga. App. 457, 459 (1) ( 746 SE2d 755 ) (2013). 2016Willesen v. Ernest Communications, 323 Ga. App. 457, 459 (1) ( 746 SE2d 755 ) (2013). | 1 | 1 |
National Service Industries, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co.green2 sentences2011Service Indus. v. Ga. Power Co., 294 Ga.App. 810, 812 (1), n. 4, 670 S.E.2d 444 (2008). [33] SRG Consulting v. Eagle Hosp. 2011Service Indus. v. Ga. Power Co., 294 Ga.App. 810, 812 (1), n. 4, 670 S.E.2d 444 (2008). [33] SRG Consulting v. Eagle Hosp. | 1 | 1 |
Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.green2 sentences2009Ryder Integrated Logistics v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 281 Ga. 736, 737 ( 642 SE2d 695 ) (2007). 2009Ryder Integrated Logistics v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 281 Ga. 736, 737 ( 642 SE2d 695 ) (2007). | 1 | 1 |
Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templingreen2 sentences2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). 2 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). 3 See Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 244 Ga. App. 427, 429 (2) ( 535 SE2d 780 ) (2000). 4 OCGA § 51-12-32 (a); Crawford v. Johnson, 227 Ga. App. 548, 549 (1) ( 489 SE2d 552 ) (1997). 5 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin, 201 Ga. App. 30, 35 (2) ( 410 SE2d 154 ) (1991). 6 Auto-Owners Ins. 2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). 2 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). 3 See Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 244 Ga. App. 427, 429 (2) ( 535 SE2d 780 ) (2000). 4 OCGA § 51-12-32 (a); Crawford v. Johnson, 227 Ga. App. 548, 549 (1) ( 489 SE2d 552 ) (1997). 5 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin, 201 Ga. App. 30, 35 (2) ( 410 SE2d 154 ) (1991). 6 Auto-Owners Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). 2 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). 3 See Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 244 Ga. App. 427, 429 (2) ( 535 SE2d 780 ) (2000). 4 OCGA § 51-12-32 (a); Crawford v. Johnson, 227 Ga. App. 548, 549 (1) ( 489 SE2d 552 ) (1997). 5 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin, 201 Ga. App. 30, 35 (2) ( 410 SE2d 154 ) (1991). 6 Auto-Owners Ins. 2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). 2 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). 3 See Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 244 Ga. App. 427, 429 (2) ( 535 SE2d 780 ) (2000). 4 OCGA § 51-12-32 (a); Crawford v. Johnson, 227 Ga. App. 548, 549 (1) ( 489 SE2d 552 ) (1997). 5 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin, 201 Ga. App. 30, 35 (2) ( 410 SE2d 154 ) (1991). 6 Auto-Owners Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughtongreen2 sentences2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). 2 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). 3 See Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 244 Ga. App. 427, 429 (2) ( 535 SE2d 780 ) (2000). 4 OCGA § 51-12-32 (a); Crawford v. Johnson, 227 Ga. App. 548, 549 (1) ( 489 SE2d 552 ) (1997). 5 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin, 201 Ga. App. 30, 35 (2) ( 410 SE2d 154 ) (1991). 6 Auto-Owners Ins. 2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). 2 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). 3 See Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 244 Ga. App. 427, 429 (2) ( 535 SE2d 780 ) (2000). 4 OCGA § 51-12-32 (a); Crawford v. Johnson, 227 Ga. App. 548, 549 (1) ( 489 SE2d 552 ) (1997). 5 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin, 201 Ga. App. 30, 35 (2) ( 410 SE2d 154 ) (1991). 6 Auto-Owners Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Tuxedo Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Lie-Nielsengreen2 sentences2003See generally Tuxedo Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Lie-Nielsen, 245 Ga. 27 , 262 SE2d 794 (1980) (seminal Supreme Court of Georgia case establishing exception discussed in this paragraph). 2003See generally Tuxedo Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Lie-Nielsen, 245 Ga. 27 , 262 SE2d 794 (1980) (seminal Supreme Court of Georgia case establishing exception discussed in this paragraph). | 1 | 1 |
McAbee Construction Co. v. Georgia Kraft Co.green2 sentences2003Federated argues that an “insurance exception” to OCGA § 13-8-2 (b)’s public policy prohibition renders the instant Indemnity Clause enforceable under precedent established by this Court and the Supreme Court of Georgia; Federated claims that, The combination of a clause requiring insurance with an indemnity clause “clearly and unambiguously show[s] that the parties intended coverage by insurance, not ultimately indemnification of the ‘indemnitee’. . . against its own negligence.” McAbee Construction Co. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 178 Ga. App. 496, 498 , 343 SE2d 513, 515 (1986). 2003Federated argues that an “insurance exception” to OCGA § 13-8-2 (b)’s public policy prohibition renders the instant Indemnity Clause enforceable under precedent established by this Court and the Supreme Court of Georgia; Federated claims that, The combination of a clause requiring insurance with an indemnity clause “clearly and unambiguously show[s] that the parties intended coverage by insurance, not ultimately indemnification of the ‘indemnitee’. . . against its own negligence.” McAbee Construction Co. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 178 Ga. App. 496, 498 , 343 SE2d 513, 515 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
DeKalb County v. Lenowitzgreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., DeKalb County v. Lenowitz, 218 Ga. App. 884, 889 (4) ( 463 SE2d 539 ) (1995); McMichael v. Robinson, 162 Ga. App. 67, 69 (2) ( 290 SE2d 168 ) (1982). 1999See, e.g., DeKalb County v. Lenowitz, 218 Ga. App. 884, 889 (4) ( 463 SE2d 539 ) (1995); McMichael v. Robinson, 162 Ga. App. 67, 69 (2) ( 290 SE2d 168 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Electric Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Markley v. Beaglegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Batson-Cook Co. v. Georgia Marble Setting Co.
green
2 sentences1983Defendants Cofer and Beauchamp rely most heavily upon our decisions in Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Pinkerton & Laws Co., 120 Ga. App. 29 ( 169 SE2d 360 ), while defendant Kenimer's argument draws heavily from Batson-Cook Co. v. Ga. Marble Setting Co., 112 Ga. App. 226 ( 144 SE2d 547 ), which was distinguished in the Robert & Co. Assoc. case partially on the basis of "the language of the applicable agreements, which fail to refer to acts or omission of the indemnitee as a basis for liability." Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Pinkerton & Laws Co., 120 Ga. App. 29, 32 , supra. The case sub judice apparently sh 1983Defendants Cofer and Beauchamp rely most heavily upon our decisions in Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Pinkerton & Laws Co., 120 Ga. App. 29 ( 169 SE2d 360 ), while defendant Kenimer's argument draws heavily from Batson-Cook Co. v. Ga. Marble Setting Co., 112 Ga. App. 226 ( 144 SE2d 547 ), which was distinguished in the Robert & Co. Assoc. case partially on the basis of "the language of the applicable agreements, which fail to refer to acts or omission of the indemnitee as a basis for liability." Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Pinkerton & Laws Co., 120 Ga. App. 29, 32 , supra. The case sub judice apparently sh | 2 | 1983–1983 |
City of Gainesville v. Dodd
green
1 sentence2025See, e.g., Fields, 293 Ga. at 504 (2); Dodd, 275 Ga. at 837 . 13 Pursuant to California law, “[i]f an indemnity clause does not address itself to the issue of an indemnitee’s negligence, it is referred to as a ‘general’ indemnity clause.” Rossmoor Sanitation v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 628 (I) ( 532 P2d 97 ) (1975). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Emergency Professionals of Atlanta, P.C. v. Watson
green
1 sentence2016Here, the indemnity clause did not “expressly, plainly, clearly, and unequivocally state that [Dar-Court] would indemnify [Appellants] from [their] own negligence.” Id. (footnote omitted). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Anthony v. Gator Cochran Construction, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Indeed, Gill Plumbing specifically maintains that “[tjhis is not a situation where a new trial is necessary on the damage aspect of the indemnity claim.” 3 Asserting that this court must resolve the substantive issue of whether the verdict in this case was internally inconsistent, Gill Plumbing relies upon Anthony v. Gator Cochran *870 Constr., 288 Ga. 79 ( 702 SE2d 139 ) (2010), which held that a party does not waive a claim that a jury verdict is void and that the judgment entered on it must be set aside by failing to object to the special verdict form that was submitted to the jury. 2011Indeed, Gill Plumbing specifically maintains that “[tjhis is not a situation where a new trial is necessary on the damage aspect of the indemnity claim.” 3 Asserting that this court must resolve the substantive issue of whether the verdict in this case was internally inconsistent, Gill Plumbing relies upon Anthony v. Gator Cochran *870 Constr., 288 Ga. 79 ( 702 SE2d 139 ) (2010), which held that a party does not waive a claim that a jury verdict is void and that the judgment entered on it must be set aside by failing to object to the special verdict form that was submitted to the jury. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
BBL-MCCARTHY, LLC v. Baldwin Paving Co.
green
1 sentence2011Co., supra (citation and punctuation omitted). [30] Id. [31] See BBL-McCarthy, supra at 500-501(2), 646 S.E.2d 682 (the phrase "arising out of" in an indemnity clause means "had its origins in" or "grew out of" and encompasses almost any causal connection or relationship). [32] See Nat. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Proctor & Gamble Paper Products Co. v. Yeargin Construction Co.
green
1 sentence2004(Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) 196 Ga. App. at 216 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Texas, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992The Texas Supreme Court did not say why it found that contract "does not satisfy the `express negligence' rule," ( Singleton, 729 SW2d at 691 ), and we cannot bind ourselves to Texas cases such as Gulf Oil Corp. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, supra, which do not recognize the ambiguous and limited nature of the whole indemnity clause in the Singleton contract. 1992The Texas Supreme Court did not say why it found that contract “does not satisfy the ‘express negligence’ rule,” (Singleton, 729 SW2d at 691 ), and we cannot bind ourselves to Texas cases such as Gulf Oil Corp. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, supra, which do not recognize the ambiguous and limited nature of the whole indemnity clause in the Singleton contract. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, P.C.
green
2 sentences1992The Texas Supreme Court did not say why it found that contract "does not satisfy the `express negligence' rule," ( Singleton, 729 SW2d at 691 ), and we cannot bind ourselves to Texas cases such as Gulf Oil Corp. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, supra, which do not recognize the ambiguous and limited nature of the whole indemnity clause in the Singleton contract. 1992The Texas Supreme Court did not say why it found that contract “does not satisfy the ‘express negligence’ rule,” (Singleton, 729 SW2d at 691 ), and we cannot bind ourselves to Texas cases such as Gulf Oil Corp. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, supra, which do not recognize the ambiguous and limited nature of the whole indemnity clause in the Singleton contract. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Gulf Coast Masonry, Inc. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Of the same ilk as the Singleton contract is the one *299 in Gulf Coast Masonry v. Owens-Illinois, supra, where the contractor agreed to indemnify the owner from loss arising out of "any act or omission of contractor." That provision on its face indemnifies the owner only for claims arising out of the contractor's acts or omissions. 1992Of the same ilk as the Singleton contract is the one in Gulf Coast Masonry v. Owens-Illinois, supra, where the contractor agreed to indemnify the owner from loss arising out of “any act or omission of contractor.” That provision on its face indemnifies the owner only for claims arising out of the contractor’s acts or omissions. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Arthur Pew Construction Company, Inc. v. Bryan Construction Company, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991Co., 156 Ga. App. 780 ( 275 SE2d 384 ) (1980), if the jury found SEACO liable at all, under the indemnity clause, SEACO would be 100 percent liable for the settlement. 1991Co., 156 Ga. App. 780 ( 275 SE2d 384 ) (1980), if the jury found SEACO liable at all, under the indemnity clause, SEACO would be 100 percent liable for the settlement. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Peck v. Rollins Protective Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991Cf. Peck v. Rollins Protective Svcs., 189 Ga. App. 381 (2) ( 375 SE2d 494 ) (1988). 4. 1991Cf. Peck v. Rollins Protective Svcs., 189 Ga. App. 381 (2) ( 375 SE2d 494 ) (1988). 4. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Georgia State Telephone Company v. Scarboro
green
2 sentences1990Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that by settling the claim, plaintiff admitted that its insured bore all liability for the injuries alleged in the claim so that, pursuant to the holding in Georgia State Telephone Co. v. Scarboro, 148 Ga. App. 390 ( 251 SE2d 309 ) (1978), plaintiff was precluded from seeking indemnity from Sayler Marine. 1990Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that by settling the claim, plaintiff admitted that its insured bore all liability for the injuries alleged in the claim so that, pursuant to the holding in Georgia State Telephone Co. v. Scarboro, 148 Ga. App. 390 ( 251 SE2d 309 ) (1978), plaintiff was precluded from seeking indemnity from Sayler Marine. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Robert & Co. Associates v. Pinkerton & Laws Co. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Charter Builders, Inc. v. Sims Crane Service, Inc. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Scarboro Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirsh green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Georgia Ports Authority v. Central of Georgia Railway Co. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Benson Paint Co. v. Williams Construction Co. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.