indemnity claim in Connecticut

2016The right to indemnity is clear when the obligation springs from a separate contractual relation, such as an employer-tenant's express agreement to hold the third-party landlord harmless, or a bailee's obligation to indemnify a bailor, or a contractor's obligation to perform his work with due care; but when the indemnity claim rests upon the theory that a primary wrongdoer impliedly promises to indemnify a secondary wrongdoer, the great majority of jurisdictions disallow this claim. 2A A. Larson, [Workmen's Compensation Law] § 76." (Emphasis added; footnote in original; internal quotation mark

2003In Ferryman , we stated that a third party’s right to seek indemnity from an employer is “clear when the obligation springs from a separate contractual relation, such as an employer-tenant’s express agreement to hold the third-party landlord harmless, or a bailee’s obligation to indemnify a bailor, or a contractor’s obligation to perform his work with due care; but when the indemnity claim rests upon the theory that a primary wrongdoer impliedly promises to indemnify a secondary wrongdoer, the great majority of jurisdictions disallow this claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 145 .

1993Which statute of limitations applies depends upon the nature of the underlying action that gives rise to the indemnity claim (i.e. tort three years; contract six years)." Casalini v. The Four D's, Inc., 8 CTLR 129 , 130 (December 30, 1992), citing Morrison v. Zenobia, 1 Conn. App. 7 , 8 , 467 A.2d 682 (1990).

1993Which statute of limitations applies depends upon the nature of the underlying action that gives rise to the indemnity claim (i.e. tort three years; contract six years)." Casalini v. The Four D's, Inc., 8 CTLR 129 , 130 (December 30, 1992), citing Morrison v. Zenobia, 1 Conn. App. 7 , 8 , 467 A.2d 682 (1990).

1998Mason's counterclaim alleges all the elements of an indemnity claim established by Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Co. , 152 Conn. 405 , 416 (1965).

1994An indemnitee must prove "`that the negligence with which it had been found chargeable was passive or secondary, while the indemnitor had been negligent and in a manner which was active and primary.'" Id., quoting Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corporation, 152 Conn. 405 , 415 , 207 A.2d 732 (1965).

2003Various Superior Courts have considered whether third-party complaints against employers are permissible under Ferryman : Peterson v. Sabini, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield, No. CV95 0327596S, 1996 Ct. Sup. 5284-R (Aug. 23, 1996, Hauser, J.) (third-party complaint stricken because no sufficient independent duty alleged); Bremseth v. Conn. Light Power Co., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain, at Hartford, No. CV93 0526545 S, 1995 Ct. Sup. 9107 CT Page 2905-ce (Aug. 11, 1995, Corradino, J.) (third-party complaint stricken because no sufficient independent du

2003Various Superior Courts have considered whether third-party complaints against employers are permissible under Ferryman : Peterson v. Sabini, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield, No. CV95 0327596S, 1996 Ct. Sup. 5284-R (Aug. 23, 1996, Hauser, J.) (third-party complaint stricken because no sufficient independent duty alleged); Bremseth v. Conn. Light Power Co., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain, at Hartford, No. CV93 0526545 S, 1995 Ct. Sup. 9107 (Aug. 11, 1995, Corradino, J.) (third-party complaint stricken because no sufficient independent duty alleged); Car

1996Enacted as General Statutes § 52-598a , this provision states that "[n]otwithstanding any provision of this chapter, an action for indemnification may be brought within three years from the CT Page 4722 date of the determination of the action against the party which is seeking indemnification by either judgment or settlement." Prior to Public Act 93-370, the statute of limitations applied to an indemnification action "depend[ed] upon the nature of the underlying action that gives rise to the indemnity claim. (i.e. tort three years; contract six years." Kapetan Inc. v. STO Industries, Inc., Sup

1996Kapetan Inc. v. STO Industries, Inc. , Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 0101815 (December 2, 1992, Sylvester, J., 8 CSCR 54 , 54 ).

1993Under Protter v. Brown Thompson Co., 25 Conn. App. 360 593 A.2d 524 (1991) an indemnity claim based on tort begins to run upon the occurrence of the alleged negligent act.

1993Under Protter v. Brown Thompson Co., 25 Conn. App. 360 593 A.2d 524 (1991) an indemnity claim based on tort begins to run upon the occurrence of the alleged negligent act.

2002Similarly, in the case of Burkle v. Car Truck Leasing Co. , 1 Conn. App. 54 , 467 A.2d 1255 (1983), the court held that the defendant lessor was entitled to be indemnified by the lessee under the lease's indemnity clause for the lessor's own negligence in furnishing a defective motor vehicle.

2002Similarly, in the case of Burkle v. Car Truck Leasing Co. , 1 Conn. App. 54 , 467 A.2d 1255 (1983), the court held that the defendant lessor was entitled to be indemnified by the lessee under the lease's indemnity clause for the lessor's own negligence in furnishing a defective motor vehicle.

2002The plaintiff cites Cirrito v. Turner Construction Company, 189 Conn. 701 , 705 , 458 A.2d 678 (1983) for the proposition that the phrase "arising out of . . . the execution of work) as used in the context of an indemnity clause is similar to phrases used "in the Workers' Compensation Act, where the sine qua non is that the injury arise out of and in the course of employment." 2 Therefore, the plaintiff reasons "it is appropriate to look to workers' compensation cases to examine the employment relationship between Klein and Oxford as it relates to the present case." Plaintiff urges this court

2002The plaintiff cites Cirrito v. Turner Construction Company, 189 Conn. 701 , 705 , 458 A.2d 678 (1983) for the proposition that the phrase "arising out of . . . the execution of work) as used in the context of an indemnity clause is similar to phrases used "in the Workers' Compensation Act, where the sine qua non is that the injury arise out of and in the course of employment." 2 Therefore, the plaintiff reasons "it is appropriate to look to workers' compensation cases to examine the employment relationship between Klein and Oxford as it relates to the present case." Plaintiff urges this court

2001"There is a split of authority in the Superior Court concerning whether an allegation in a third party complaint that a third party defendant was in `exclusive control of the situation' is legally sufficient to support an indemnity claim arising out of an automobile accident when both parties are alleged to have committed active negligence." Keller v. Irizarry, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. 067999 (May 8, 2000, Arnold, J. ) ( 27 Conn. L.

2001"In view of the exclusivity of workers' compensation relief, indemnity claims against employers as joint tortfeasors warrant the special additional limitation of an independent legal relationship." Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694 , 699 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997).

2001"In view of the exclusivity of workers' compensation relief, indemnity claims against employers as joint tortfeasors warrant the special additional limitation of an independent legal relationship." Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694 , 699 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997).

2001The plaintiffs assert that finding an unconscionable contract requires the finding of facts as to whether the renter "(1) was a consumer leasing the automobile for consumer purposes; (2) had no opportunity to read the two page automobile lease as a whole; (3) had difficulty, because of the size of the type and the location of the indemnity clause in the lease, in reading the text of the clauses in the lease that had not specifically been called to his attention; (4) had failed to understand the indemnity clause because of its use of obscure legalese; (5) had been unable to read or understand t

1999For example, in Freislinger v. Emro Propane Co. , supra, 99 F.3d 1420 , the indemnity clause in that case included "any and all claims . . . connected with or arising out of the use of [the] storage tank or with the use of propane gas." Similarly, each of the indemnity clauses in the Illinois cases that Deere and Lomac rely upon include analogous broad and inclusive language. 4 None of them include the limiting language found in the indemnity agreement in the present case.

1997See Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Bradfield, 193 Colo. 151, 155 , 563 P.2d 939 (1977) (“the notion that indemnification must be based on some legal relationship or duty imposed by statutory or common law has long been implicit in the ‘primary tortfeasor’ requirement of our case law”); Frazer v. A. F. Munsteram, Inc., 123 Ill. 2d 245, 254 , 527 N.E.2d 148 (1988); Central Telephone Co. v. Fixtures Mfg.

1996"Thus, a finding that a given defendant was liable to the plaintiff does not necessarily determine whether that responsibility was based on a passive negligence which might, therefore, entitle that defendant to a full reimbursement from other defendants based upon indemnification principles." Id.

1996The Court explained that "[t]he reason that the indemnity claim is not finally determined by the first party judgment lies in the fact that indemnification implicates different factual and legal considerations which may be outside of the matters determined in the first party plaintiff's claim under the product liability act." Id., 198 .

1994Atkinson v. Berloni, 23 Conn. App. 325 , 327 (1990).

1993CT Page 1489 The holding in Ferryman, which the court appeared to limit in dicta 1 to negligence actions was most recently extended to product liability actions in Thibeault v. Mark Industries, 8 CSCR 27 (November 11, 1992, Dunn, J.).

1991"The unambiguous language of an indemnity clause should be given effect as expressing the parties' intentions." Laudano v. General Motors Corp., 34 Conn. Sup. 684 , 687 (App. Sess. 1977), cert. denied, 174 Conn. 772 (1977).

1983We have held that a charge relating to principles of law enunciated in workers’ compensation cases is equally applicable to cases brought under the common law. 2 It is therefore appropriate to consider this court’s opinions relative to the application of the Workers’ Compensation Act terminology in reference to eases involving an employee’s going to or departing from work. *706 In Hughes v. American Brass Co., 141 Conn. 231, 232-33 , 104 A.2d 896 (1954), an employee was injured on Ms way to work on a passway in a parking lot adjacent to the defendant’s plant maintained by it.

1983We have held that a charge relating to principles of law enunciated in workers’ compensation cases is equally applicable to cases brought under the common law. 2 It is therefore appropriate to consider this court’s opinions relative to the application of the Workers’ Compensation Act terminology in reference to eases involving an employee’s going to or departing from work. *706 In Hughes v. American Brass Co., 141 Conn. 231, 232-33 , 104 A.2d 896 (1954), an employee was injured on Ms way to work on a passway in a parking lot adjacent to the defendant’s plant maintained by it.

1979In fact, New York is the only jurisdiction to allow an indemnity claim against an employer for failure to follow precautions on the label, for use of untrained personnel and for failure to air the premises after use of a fumigant, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143 . . . (1972).” Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Sup. 1010, 1019 (D.

1925At the same time the Jensen case was decided, another case, Clyde Steamship Co. v. Walker, 244 U. S. 255 , 37 Sup. Ct. 545, was decided upon its authority, the court saying: “The legislature exceeded its authority in attempting to extend the statute to conditions like those which the record discloses.” In Chelentis v. Luckenbaeh S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 382 , 38 Sup. Ct. 501, the court renewed its adherence to the principal ground upon which the Jensen case was rested, in these words: “Under the doctrine approved in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen , no State has power to abolish the well-recog

1925Such a substitution would distinctly and definitely change or add to the settled maritime law; and it would be destructive of the ‘uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign States.’ ” This was reiterated by Mr. Justice Day as the ground of the decision in Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U. S. 308 , 39 Sup. Ct. 112.

1925At the same time the Jensen case was decided, another case, Clyde Steamship Co. v. Walker, 244 U. S. 255 , 37 Sup. Ct. 545, was decided upon its authority, the court saying: “The legislature exceeded its authority in attempting to extend the statute to conditions like those which the record discloses.” In Chelentis v. Luckenbaeh S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 382 , 38 Sup. Ct. 501, the court renewed its adherence to the principal ground upon which the Jensen case was rested, in these words: “Under the doctrine approved in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen , no State has power to abolish the well-recog