abandonment waiver (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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abandonment waiver in Arizona

18 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
College Book Centers, Inc. v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners' Ass'ngreen
arizctapp · 2010 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2016–2024
2 sentences

2024Although Defendants raised the abandonment defense and must prove it, see College Book Ctrs., 225 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 12 , Knight initiated the action that potentially impacted all the property owners’ interests in the CC&Rs.

2016Book Ctrs., 225 Ariz. at 539, ¶ 18 , 241 P.3d at 903 .10 ¶26 In evaluating the Cundiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of abandonment/waiver, the trial court applied the standard adopted by this court in College Book Centers to the intent behind the Declaration of ensuring “a rural, residential environment.” The court noted that the Coxes had “based their assertion of the abandonment and waiver of the [Declaration] on 1) an affidavit of Defendant Cox, and 2) a survey of the subdivision properties by a private investigator, Sheila Cahill, and research done by Ms. Cahill through the r

22
Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen
ariz · 2000 · cited in 3 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2014–2023
2 sentences

2023Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 21 . 4 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.J., et al.

2016Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250 , ¶ 22 (quoting In re Pima Cty.

13
Hoyle v. Superior Courtgreen
arizctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025See Hoyle v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 224, 227 (App. 1989) (“What a statute necessarily implies is as much a part of the statute as what the statute specifically expresses.”).

11
State v. Hendersongreen
ariz · 2005 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022But see State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“Failure to argue a claim usually 8 STATE v. TERAN Opinion of the Court constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.”); State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 18 (2005) (the State bears the burden to show an error was harmless). ¶31 In holding the State to its harmless-error burden, this court looks to the evidence at trial, arguments of counsel, and the instructions as a whole in considering whether an instruction, or the lack of an instruction, constituted harmless error.

11
State v. Solisgreen
arizctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022State v. Solis, 236 Ariz. 285, 288, ¶ 14 (App. 2014). ¶32 As the State points out, a detective testified about the duties of pedestrians with respect to crosswalks.

11
Calderon v. Lang (In Re Calderon)green
bap9 · 2014 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019However, this statute does not “create an absolute temporal bar, that on the second anniversary of [a debtor’s] removal from homestead, debtors automatically are deemed to have abandoned their homesteads for exemption purposes.” Calderon v. Lang (In re Calderon), 507 B.R. 724, 731 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014). “[T]he temporal aspect of the statute simply was meant to aid courts in determining the intended permanency of the removal from the residence.” Id. ¶7 In this case, it is apparent that Stange never intended his removal from the residence to be permanent.

2019However, this statute does not “create an absolute temporal bar, that on the second anniversary of [a debtor’s] removal from homestead, debtors automatically are deemed to have abandoned their homesteads for exemption purposes.” Calderon v. Lang (In re Calderon), 507 B.R. 724, 731 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014). “[T]he temporal aspect of the statute simply was meant to aid courts in determining the intended permanency of the removal from the residence.” Id. ¶7 In this case, it is apparent that Stange never intended his removal from the residence to be permanent.

11
Cullum v. Cullumgreen
arizctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424 , 452 n.9, ¶ 101, 94 P.3d 1119 , 1147 n.9 (2004); see also Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352 , 355 n.5, ¶ 14, 160 P.3d 231 , 234 n.5 (App. 2007) (holding that appellate courts “will not consider argument posited without authority”). 4 HARRIS v. GODADDY.COM Decision of the Court B.

2015State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424 , 452 n.9, ¶ 101, 94 P.3d 1119 , 1147 n.9 (2004); see also Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352 , 355 n.5, ¶ 14, 160 P.3d 231 , 234 n.5 (App. 2007) (holding that appellate courts “will not consider argument posited without authority”). 4 HARRIS v. GODADDY.COM Decision of the Court B.

11
Anonymous v. Anonymousgreen
arizctapp · 1975 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50, ¶ 18, 995 P.2d at 685–86; see also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 25 Ariz. App. 10, 12 , 540 P.2d 741, 743 (1975).

2014Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50, ¶ 18, 995 P.2d at 685–86; see also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 25 Ariz. App. 10, 12 , 540 P.2d 741, 743 (1975).

11
In Re MDSgreen
kanctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000See In the Interest of M.D.S., 16 Kan.

2000See In the Interest of M.D.S., 16 Kan.

11
State v. Youngbloodgreen
ariz · 1993 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993See State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 504-05 , 844 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1993); State v. Nirschel, 155 Ariz. 206, 208 , 745 P.2d 953, 955 (1987).

1993See State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 504-05 , 844 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1993); State v. Nirschel, 155 Ariz. 206, 208 , 745 P.2d 953, 955 (1987).

11
State v. Nirschelgreen
ariz · 1987 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993See State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 504-05 , 844 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1993); State v. Nirschel, 155 Ariz. 206, 208 , 745 P.2d 953, 955 (1987).

1993See State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 504-05 , 844 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1993); State v. Nirschel, 155 Ariz. 206, 208 , 745 P.2d 953, 955 (1987).

11
Minghelli v. INDUS. COMMISSION OF ARIZONAgreen
arizctapp · 1981 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
2 sentences

1984See Minghelli v. Industrial Commission, 129 Ariz. 222 , 630 P.2d 45 (App.1981) (claimant left Arizona without approval and after that failed to contact the Industrial Commission or the carrier for five years).

1984See Minghelli v. Industrial Commission, 129 Ariz. 222 , 630 P.2d 45 (App.1981) (claimant left Arizona without approval and after that failed to contact the Industrial Commission or the carrier for five years).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
State v. Carvergreen
ariz · 1989 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022But see State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“Failure to argue a claim usually 8 STATE v. TERAN Opinion of the Court constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.”); State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 18 (2005) (the State bears the burden to show an error was harmless). ¶31 In holding the State to its harmless-error burden, this court looks to the evidence at trial, arguments of counsel, and the instructions as a whole in considering whether an instruction, or the lack of an instruction, constituted harmless error.

11

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. green
cal · 1963
2 sentences

1972S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, supra. In Greenman, Chief Justice Traynor said: “Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law * * * make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. “ * * * ‘The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the int

1972S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, supra. In Greenman, Chief Justice Traynor said: “Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law * * * make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. “ * * * ‘The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the int

31965–1972
Karner v. Roy White Flowers, Inc. green
nc · 2000
1 sentence

2016Thus, the Coxes’ reliance on Karner v. Roy White Flowers, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 40 15 CUNDIFF et al. v. COX Decision of the Court (N.C. 2000), is misplaced.15 The elimination of the Coxes’ abandonment defense rendered any argument regarding joinder moot.16 IV.

12016–2016
State v. Moody green
ariz · 2004
2 sentences

2015State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424 , 452 n.9, ¶ 101, 94 P.3d 1119 , 1147 n.9 (2004); see also Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352 , 355 n.5, ¶ 14, 160 P.3d 231 , 234 n.5 (App. 2007) (holding that appellate courts “will not consider argument posited without authority”). 4 HARRIS v. GODADDY.COM Decision of the Court B.

2015State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424 , 452 n.9, ¶ 101, 94 P.3d 1119 , 1147 n.9 (2004); see also Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352 , 355 n.5, ¶ 14, 160 P.3d 231 , 234 n.5 (App. 2007) (holding that appellate courts “will not consider argument posited without authority”). 4 HARRIS v. GODADDY.COM Decision of the Court B.

12015–2015
Ortiz v. Clinton green
arizctapp · 1996
2 sentences

2004Citing Ortiz v. Clinton, 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 (App.1996), Komalestewa argues that the abandonment standard for noncompensability still applies despite the above amendments.

2004Citing Ortiz v. Clinton, 187 Ariz. 294 , 928 P.2d 718 (App.1996), Komalestewa argues that the abandonment standard for noncompensability still applies despite the above amendments.

12004–2004
Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission green
ariz · 1963
2 sentences

1981After acknowledging the abandonment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity (Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384 , 381 P.2d 107 (1963), the court noted that a prospective plaintiff still needed to prove the elements of actionable negligence. ■ These include (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff, (2) the breach of that duty and (3) resulting injury proximately caused by the breach.

1981After acknowledging the abandonment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity (Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384 , 381 P.2d 107 (1963), the court noted that a prospective plaintiff still needed to prove the elements of actionable negligence. ■ These include (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff, (2) the breach of that duty and (3) resulting injury proximately caused by the breach.

11981–1981
Baures v. Baures green
arizctapp · 1970
2 sentences

1981In Baures v. Baures, 13 Ariz.App. 515 , 478 P.2d 130 (1970), the court refused to apply the doctrine of laches to excuse the collection of child support arrearage.

1981In Baures v. Baures, 13 Ariz.App. 515 , 478 P.2d 130 (1970), the court refused to apply the doctrine of laches to excuse the collection of child support arrearage.

11981–1981
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. green
ny · 1963
2 sentences

1967In accord, see, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432 , 240 N.Y.

1967In accord, see, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432 , 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 , 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).

11967–1967

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-531 (4) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

MO 149 (1885–2025) TX 84 (1909–2026) IL 66 (1898–2025) CA 41 (1863–2026) NY 39 (1873–2025) LA 32 (1931–2023) CT 28 (1967–2024) FL 26 (1931–2025) OH 25 (1960–2026) PA 24 (1905–2025) UT 24 (1987–2020) MI 23 (1886–2026) WA 20 (1963–2019) AZ 18 (1965–2025) IN 15 (1881–2019) CO 14 (1914–2026) TN 12 (1899–2024) NJ 11 (1957–2024) MS 11 (1924–2020) AL 11 (1912–2011) ID 10 (1873–2024) SC 10 (1926–2024) MD 8 (1976–2016) MA 7 (1938–2025) IA 7 (1940–2021) OK 7 (1947–1993) AR 7 (1898–2017) AK 7 (1983–1998) WI 6 (1938–2026) GA 6 (1976–2017) NC 6 (1948–2014) MN 6 (1914–2004) NM 6 (2012–2016) NE 6 (1906–2009) VT 5 (1881–2015) KY 5 (1932–2025) VA 5 (1902–2024) NH 4 (1859–2007) KS 4 (1976–2025) DC 4 (1978–2023) MT 3 (1910–2010) OR 3 (1978–2014) WV 3 (1957–1997) HI 3 (1940–2006) RI 3 (1987–2005) ME 2 (1992–2012) DE 2 (2019–2022) SD 2 (1915–1990) NV 2 (1983–2014)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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